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Those of us in the tax law business know that we are bright,
engaging, and athletic; we combine animal magnetism with erudi
tion. However, tax lawyers are lumped with accountants in the
public mind, and are burdened with the images of thick specta
cles, green eyeshades, cluttered minds, and unlimited capacities
for boredom. One commentator has even stated that a "tax lawyer
is a person who is good with numbers but who does not have
enough personality to be an accountant. "1

I. INTRODUCTION
It is high time we tax lawyers did a better job of educating
the world that tax law is not about financial accounting. It is
important that we do so not because we dislike accountants;
some very nice ones have been students in my classes. It is im
portant because the often implicit assumption that financial ac
counting presumptively guides tax accounting can and has un
dermined tax values. This Article is one modest contribution in
the continuing efforts toward the emancipation· of tax law from
financial accounting.
Those steeped in a financial accounting background often
have trouble letting go of that culture when they cross over the
great divide into the tax realm. Perhaps more important, those
who are not steeped in financial accounting-such as judges
often assume without reflection that financial accounting princi
ples ought to govern tax accounting. This tendency is often the
strongest when it comes to the financial accounting norm com
monly referred to as "the matching principle."
The principle that expenditures ought to be deducted in the
same period as the income to which they relate is a sacrosanct
1. Erik M. Jensen, The Heroic Nature of Tax Lawyers, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 367, 367
68 (1991) (book review essay of John Grisham, The Firm) (footnotes omitted).
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one in the financial accounting world. 2 The income tax, however,
is not uniformly wedded to this matching principle. In some
cases, the Code seems to require what smacks of "matching," not
in the financial accounting sense described above, but in the
sense that income or expenses can be deferred to the future or
accelerated in order to be accounted for in the same period as
offsetting deductions or inclusions. One example is the rule in
section 121!3 that deductible capital losses are allowable in any
year only to the extent of includable capital gain; unused losses
must be deferred. Sections 163(d), 465, 469, and 1092 similarly
require delay of otherwise deductible amounts to future years in
which income is realized. The capitalization of expenditures that
do not create or purchase a distinct asset but will produce a sig
nificant economic benefit in future years is a similar, though
distinct, manifestation of the phenomenon, as is depreciation.
And the matching of inclusion and deduction between two differ
ent taxpayers, required by sections 83(h), 267(a)(2), 483,
404(a)(5), and the original issue discount rules of sections 1271
1275, is yet another distinct facet of the idea.
But the income tax (and cases construing it) also selectively
departs from the matching principle. Prepaid services income re
ceived by an accrual basis taxpayer must usually, though not al
ways, be included in the year of receipt under current law, even
though the related expenses will not be incurred (and deducted)
until future years. 4 Similarly, the "economic performance" re
quirement of section 461(h) may result in what accountants
would argue is a "mismatch" of income and deduction. 5
These income tax rules that require deviation from the
matching principle are usually perceived by accountants as ei
ther indefensible or as introducing unnecessary complexity to
the tax accounting world. 6 They are also often perceived as un
fair, in that they sometimes combine to create a "one-way
street" in favor of the fisc. 7 Accountants typically argue that tax
2. For a fuller description of the matching principle, see infra notes 25-29 and ac
companying text.
3. All references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, unless
otherwise noted.
4. See infra notes 319-414 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 255-288 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
7. See William L. Raby & Burgess J.W. Raby, '.Abuse of Discretion' and 'Clearly Re
flect Income', 71 TAX NCYl'Es 227, 229 (Apr. 8, 1996) (chastising "indiscriminate IRS at
tempts to switch all and sundry to methods of accounting that will maximize the Trea
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accounting should simply follow financial accounting. 8 Even
some tax lawyers, policymakers, and judges (and justices), insuf
ficiently conscious of the tax values that should inform tax ac
counting and with no formal background in financial accounting,
are often lulled into agreement with the rhetoric of the financial
accountants. As recently as 1992, for example, the Supreme
Court has (unfortunately) stated: "The Code endeavors to match
expenses with the revenues of the taxable period to which they
are properly attributable, thereby resulting in a more accurate
calculation of net income for tax purposes."9 Accounting norms
can exude an enticing siren song to those insufficiently schooled
in tax values. Accounting norms seem to some to be formal,
tested, and have the aura of an entire profession behind them, 10
which can lend them solidity in the unquestioning judge's eye.
And, after all, both tax accounting and financial accounting
measure "income," don't they?
Nowhere does this tension between the income tax world
and the world of financial accounting manifest itself so explicitly
as in section 446(b), which provides that "if the [taxpayer's ac
counting method] does not clearly reflect income, the computa
tion of taxable income shall be made under such method as, in
the opinion of the Secretary, does clearly reflect income." Under
this authority, the Commissioner can challenge not only the tax
payer's use of a particular regime of tax accounting in general,
such as the cash method, the accrual method, or inventory ac
counting, but also the taxpayer's treatment of a particular item
or transaction under those methods.
Most courts are quite deferential to the Commissioner's ex
ercise of authority under this provision. 11 Yet, the authority is
not without limits under the statute, for it is constrained by the
sury's revenue" and characterizing the IRS approach as one that "comes close to
asserting that the King can do no wrong").
8. See Harold Dubroff et al., Tux Accounting: The Relationship of Clear Refl.ection
of Income to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, 47 ALB. L. REv. 354, 359 n.20 and
389 n.143 (1983) (both collecting authorities); Raby & Raby, supra note 7.
9. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422, 440 (1926) (viewing the abil
ity of taxpayers to use the accrual method of accounting if they kept their financial
books using that method as sanctioning the use of "scientific accounting principles•); in
fra notes 57-76 and 180-225 and accompanying text (challenging this characterization).
11. See Dubroff et al., supra note 8, at 363-66; Erik M. Jensen, The Deduction of
Future Liabilities By Accrual-Basis Thxpayers: Premature Accruals, the All Events '.lest,
and Economic Performance, 37 U. FLA. L. REv. 443, 470 (1985) [hereinafter Jensen, Pre
mature Accruals].
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command that the Commissioner's proposed method must, itself,
"clearly reflect income." 12 Section 446(b) itself does not provide
any guidance for the court (or the Commissioner, when exercis
ing his power under that section) regarding what those words
mean. 13 It thus presents a wonderful-and difficult-exercise in
statutory interpretation. What should guide a court's analysis of
whether the Commissioner's (or the taxpayer's) method of ac
counting "clearly reflect[s] income"? Because the matching prin
ciple is thought by the accounting profession to be premised on
a "clear reflection" notion, it is quite often cited by the parties or
courts in their discussion of whether the taxpayer's method (or
the government's proposed method) clearly reflects income, 14
even though "neither the Code nor the Regulations generally re
quire a taxpayer to match the gross income and deductions from
a trade or business."15 This approach is buttressed by the Trea
sury Regulations, which provide that "[a] method of accounting
which reflects the consistent application of generally accepted
accounting principles in a particular trade or business will ordi
narily be regarded as clearly reflecting income, provided all
items of gross income and expense are treated consistently from
year to year . . . ."16 Sometimes the matching principle is ac
cepted as persuasive, but sometimes it is rejected, as discussed
below. The analytical approach often seems to be ad hoc, how
ever, and sometimes is based on what should be irrelevant con
siderations if tax values were well understood by courts.
12. "Simply to call the section 446(b) determination a matter of Commissioner dis
cretion is meaningless without some notion of the standard of judicial review that will
be applied to exercises of that discretion." Karl S. Coplan, Protecting the Public Fisc:
Fighting Accrual Abuse with Section 446 Discretion, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 378, 394 (1983).
The Note proceeds to analyze the scope of the "abuse-of-discretion" standard of review
commonly employed. One goal of this Article is to articulate explicitly the tax values
that should guide the inquiry. The matching principle is not among them.
13. "As a self-defining standard, 'clear reflection of income' is woefully inadequate."
Dubroff et al., supra note 8, at 365.
14. "Most commentators have assumed, often without explanation, that clear re
flection of income has the same meaning for tax cases as it has for financial accounting:
matching of costs and revenues." Alan Gunn, Matching of Costs and Revenues as a Goal
of '1'w: Accounting, 4 VA. TAX REv. 1, 11 (1984). "In many instances, tax law has uncriti
cally adopted the matching principle as its own." Jensen, Premature Accruals, supra note
11, at 473.
15. Leo F. Nolan II, Can the Cash Method of Accounting Clearly Reflect Income?, 74
TAX NOI'Es 1175, 1178 (Mar. 3, 1997).
16. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-l(aX2).
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I have argued elsewhere that courts should accept guidance
from the larger structure created by the entire text of the Inter
nal Revenue Code when construing particular provisions within
it. 17 I believe in the primacy of statutory text. Imaginatively re
constructing the "immediate purpose"18 various members of Con
gress might have had in mind when passing a particular provi
sion within the larger statute and construing the provision to
implement that purpose is fraught with institutional difficulties,
including separation-of-powers concerns. But the search for
meaning of statutory text need not be-indeed, should not be, in
my view-limited to the words of the particular provision in iso
lation, uprooted from the linguistic landscape that creates the
context for examining it, the landscape which gives it meaning.
The collection of Code sections that create the income tax sys
tem is itself statutory text that can provide much insight into
the construction of individual provisions within the Code; no re
sort to "intent" or "purpose" in the sense much maligned by
some commentators is necessary, even if such an approach were
possible. This inquiry is particularly rich when attempting to
construe undefined tax terms with no intuitive or common
meaning, such as "clearly reflect income," as well as "capital ex
penditure" and "economic performance."
This Article builds on the work of others19 by arguing that
the matching principle is not, properly understood, a tax value.
While the matching principle is a highly valued one in the fi
nancial accounting profession, for quite understandable reasons,
it is not one that should be considered a value at all in a system
that seeks to collect revenue, and to do so based on "income."
Those provisions in the Code where matching seems to be me
morialized should be understood as based on independent tax
17. See, e.g., Deborah A. Geier, Albertson's, Statutory Interpretation, and Correcting
Misconceptions, 71 TAX NOTES 826 (May 6, 1996); Deborah A. Geier, Interpreting 7bx
Legislation: The Role of Purpose, 2 FLA. TAX REv. 492 (1995) [hereinafter Geier, Purpose];
Deborah A. Geier, Textualism and Tux Cases, 66 TEMP. L. REv. 445 (1993); Deborah A.
Geier, Tufts and the Evolution of Debt-Discharge Theory, 1 FLA. TAX REv. 115 (1992)
[hereinafter Geier, Debt-Discharge Theory].
18. The terminology belongs to Professors Robert S. Summers and Geoffrey Mar
shall. See Robert S. Summers & Geoffrey Marshall, The Argument from Ordinary Mean
ing in Statutory Interpretation, 43 N. IRELAND LEGAL Q. 213 (1992) (discussed in Geier,
Purpose, supra note 17, at 514-17).
19. See, e.g., Gunn, supra note 14, at 2 ("[T]ax accounting should not, and charac
teristically does not, accept matching as a central principle."); Jensen, Premature Accru
als, supra note 11, at 475 ("[T]he matching principle lacks a coherent theoretical basis
for tax purposes.").
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values that can be articulated independently. That a few of
them require matching is descriptively accurate, but matching
for the sake of matching is not the value underlying these provi
sions. Continued use of the matching rhetoric often skews analy
sis and decisionmaking, leading to poor-or at least haphaz
ard-results. I hope, with this Article, not only to deflate the
notion that matching is a tax value but also to affirmatively ar
ticulate the tax values that are at stake and that should be
driving the analysis.
The easiest and most straightforward illustration of this
idea is section 1211, which delays the deduction of realized capi
tal losses until future years when it can be matched with capital
gain inclusions. One might be tempted to say that such match
ing of gains and losses in the same period is perhaps loosely
based on the matching idea from financial accounting, even
though the gains and losses may be unrelated to one another.
But every student in the basic tax course knows that section
1211 illustrates tax values far removed from financial account
ing. As implied by the text of section 1001, changes in the value
of property owned by a taxpayer are not taken into account for
tax purposes until realized by some realization event, most often
a sale or exchange of the property. The realization rule means
that a taxpayer with a portfolio of unrealized gains and losses
could selectively realize his losses, leaving his gains unrealized,
and create a tax loss where the taxpayer has no net economic
losses. 20 Section 1211 prevents such "cherry picking."21 While it
is true that the deferral mechanism used in section 1211 results
in what loosely looks like matching in fact, that result is de
scriptive only.
History is an important part of the story here. The early in
come tax statutes did not define the all important term "in
come." Early judges, seeking guidance to help them in crafting a
meaning for the term, understandably imported notions devel
oped in other disciplines. One source of guidance on the mean
ing of this ambiguous term "income" was, not surprisingly, fi
nancial accounting. And thus the rhetoric of the matching
20. See JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE & POL
ICY 592-93 (1995). The operation of section 1211 is crnde in that it defers losses even
when the taxpayer has no unrealized gains.
21. Section 1092, which defers straddle losses to the extent they exceed related un
recognized straddle gains, is a much more sophisticated and complex example of the
same tax value that underlies section 1211.
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principle was accepted almost by rote. And the matching princi
ple adopted from financial accounting endures in many minds as
a value in tax as well, particularly since some provisions do
seem to require such matching, at least as a descriptive matter.
But beginning in the 1930s and 1940s, the Internal Revenue
Service (the Service) began to argue that matching income and
deductions in the same period actually distorted "income" for tax
purposes in some contexts even as it might have accurately de
scribed it for purposes of financial accounting. The reasoning
was imprecise; something just did not "feel" right. With hind
sight, we can now articulate why the Service's instincts were
right as a matter of theory, as I shall describe below. But at the
time, the deviations from the matching principle were premised
on reasoning that was mostly entirely beside the point. The tax
values at stake were simply not widely appreciated.
Beginning in the 1980s, however, sophisticated understand
ing of these tax values became more widespread, at least in
academia, which contributed to enactment of several major pro
visions that either deviated from the matching principle, such as
the economic performance rule of section 461(h), or strengthened
it, such as the passive activity loss rules of section 469. These
provisions were really evidence of the increasing legislative ap
preciation that "matching" is not a tax value. Judicial recogni
tion of the tax values that underlie these amendments have
been slower in coming, however. Indeed, one recent Supreme
Court opinion that honors the tax value underlying the notion of
"capital expenditure" still uses matching rhetoric as justifying
its opinion. 22 This rhetoric lies in wait, under the rubric of stare
decisis, to infect future opinions. 23 It is time for this rhetoric
that the matching principle is a value in the income tax-to be
put to rest. It is also time for courts and administrative gui
dance to explicitly recognize and discuss the real tax values un
derlying those provisions and doctrines that happen to coincide
22. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
23. As Professor Glenn Coven put it:
In the past decade the sophistication of the analysis of the relationship between
income taxation and the passage of time by both scholars and Congress has in
creased enormously. Little of that sophistication, however, has rubbed off on the
courts. In this increasingly critical area, the Supreme Court remains 20-50 years
out of date ....
Glenn E. Coven, And the Rebuttal, 11 VA. TAX REv. 493, 493 (1991) (citations omitted).
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descriptively with the matching principle. Coherent development
of the law is otherwise sacrificed.
My intended audience for this Article is judges, practition
ers, and administrators who have not immersed themselves in
the literature developing the time value of money principles and
the difference between an income tax and a consumption tax,
and who therefore have not before thought critically about these
issues. These are the people who often unknowingly perpetuate
the myth of the matching principle as a tax value and thereby
often unknowingly damage tax values. My aim is thus to consol
idate, in an accessible primer, the intellectual history of the
matching principle in the income tax for those who are con
fronted daily with issues implicating this big picture. The in
sights described in this Article are not original with me, but
they seem to be well understood only within tax academia, not
within the day-to-day practices of the lawyer, judge, and admin
istrator. I perceive my role in this Article as a bridge between
those on the front lines and those in the ivory tower. A clearer
understanding of how the painting evolved over time does not,
of course, make all decisionmaking easy-judging will always
entail judgment, and statutory amendment may be necessary if
the latest thinking is to be implemented-but it does provide a
coherent framework through which the analysis can be
refocused. It provides a structure, grounded in solid tax values,
for the inquiry. I hope it also provides judges, practitioners, and
administrators with the strength to refocus the rhetoric of old
tests and inquiries that grew up, and became solidified through
stare decisis, in eras in which the theory discussed here was not
widely appreciated.
The tax values I have in mind are the "anti-tax-arbitrage
value" and the "income-tax value," though these values are not
neat, little boxes but rather blend at the margins. The anti-tax
arbitrage value discourages the creation of profit from the Trea
sury itself, while the income-tax value allows the taxpayer to re
ceive tax-free income of a kind clearly intended to be taxed
under an "income" tax, though it would not be under a con
sumption tax. These are purely "tax" concerns, not concerns that
are relevant to financial accounting, and both have timing prin
ciples at their foundations. The time value of money is critically
important in a system that measures tax liabilities periodically.
The matching principle, as developed by financial accounting, is
often antithetical to time-value-of-money principles. As greater
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appreciation of the time value of money has infiltrated our un
derstanding of tax phenomena, Congress has amended the Code
again and again to reflect concern for these tax values. 24 These
amendments are part of the statutory text and should inform
our evolving notions of such ambiguous terms as "clearly reflect
income," "capital expenditure," and "economic performance."
Most recently, Congress enacted the Roth IRA in 1997. This
enactment shows acceptance of the principle of the yield
exemption phenomenon that exemplifies the difference between
a consumption tax and an income tax. As will be explored, the
yield-exemption phenomenon provides that allowing a deduction
under a traditional IRA for an outlay that will produce income
in future years (providing consumption-tax treatment) is the ec
onomic equivalent of not allowing an initial deduction but ex
empting from tax all returns from the outlay under the Roth
IRA (also providing consumption-tax treatment). But since the
·"income" portion of the return is. supposed to be taxed under an
income tax, allowing immediate deduction of outlays producing
significant future returns replicates consumption-tax treatment,
effectively exempting the future returns from tax (even though
they are nominally included in gross income). The income-tax
value stands for the proposition that consumption-tax treatment
should not be allowed absent a clear indication by Congress that
such treatment was intended or unless the income-tax value is
outweighed by values of administrative convenience if the dis
tortion is minimal. In other words, my position is that consump
tion-tax treatment of an item not mandated by the language of
the Code should not result by accident or through inadvertence
in administering the remaining provisions of the Internal Reve
nue Code.
I begin by briefly discussing the role of the matching princi
ple in the financial accounting world. I then shift to the world of
tax accounting and the uneasy relationship over time between
the financial accounting norm of "matching" and tax norms. In
so doing, I discuss an interrelated series of issues, including the
capitalization concept and depreciation, the accrual of future
costs, the accrual of prepaid receipts and receipts not yet re
ceived, and symmetrical treatment of the two sides of a transac
tion. I take as a given the continuation of our current tax sys
24. For an exhaustive article, see Lawrence Lokken, The Time Value of Money
Rules, 42 TAX L. REv. 1 (1986).

1998]

THE MYTH OF MATCHING

27

tern and discuss suggested judicial and administrative changes
in rhetoric and focus with this backdrop in mind.

II. THE

MATCHING PRINCIPLE IN FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING AND THE
ROLE OF GAAP IN TAX ACCOUNTING

The centrality of the matching principle in financial ac
counting can be illustrated by its status as a "pervasive princi
ple." In 1970, the Accounting Principles Board (predecessor to
the Financial Accounting Standards Board)25 identified three
levels of accounting principles: "(1) pervasive principles, which
relate to financial accounting as a whole and provide a basis for
the other principles; (2) broad operating principles, which guide
the recording, measuring, and communicating processes of fi
nancial accounting, and (3) detailed principles, which indicate
the practical application of the pervasive and broad operating
principles." 26 In illustrating the difference among the three
levels of principles, McCullers and Schroeder wrote:
As an illustration of these different levels, we might consider

matching to be a pervasive principle because much of financial
accounting is based upon the perceived need to match revenues
and expenses. If matching is considered to be a pervasive princi
ple the next step is to move to the broad operating principle(s)
that will implement the basic principle. Perhaps one of those
principles would be cost allocation for assets that provide service
over time. A procedure, or detailed principle, for cost allocation,
might be depreciation on a straight-line basis.
This three-level structure provides a frame of reference so
that any given accounting activity can be related to the structure
in a consistent· and logical manner. For example, if a question is
raised about depreciation, the accountant can respond that depre
ciation is a means of cost allocation, which is necessary if we are
to achieve a proper matching of revenues and expenses. Match
ing, in turn, is considered to be a fundamental goal of financial
accounting. Ideally, we should be able to relate all accounting
25. See infra notes 57-76 and 180-225 and accompanying text (briefly describing
the evolution of •generally accepted accounting principles" and the organizations respon
sible for articulating them).
26. Accounting Principles Board, Statement No. 4, Basic Concepts and Accounting
Principles Underlying Financial Statements of Business Enterprises 'II 27 (American In
stitute of Certified Public Accountants, 1970) (hereinafter APB No. 4], quoted in LEVIS D.
MCCULLERS & RICHARD G. SCHROEDER, ACCOUNTING THEORY, TEXT AND READINGS 13 (2d
ed. 1982).
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principles to the other two levels. Unfortunately, that is not al
ways possible because many accounting practices have simply
evolved without being based upon any higher level principles. 27

Dubroff, Cahill, and Norris provide a succinct articulation of
the "matching principle" in financial accounting:
The matching principle requires that for any period in which in
come is to be reported, revenue to be recognized should be deter
mined according to the revenue principle; then the expenses in
curred in generating that revenue should be determined and
reported for that period. It follows, therefore, that if revenue is
carried over from past periods or deferred until a future period in
accordance with the revenue principle, any expense related to
that revenue should also be carried over or deferred until the ap
propriate period. Careful matching is an essential element of fi
nancial accounting; it ensures that there is a proper determina
tion of periodic net income. 28

Stanger, Vander Kam, and Polifka give a thicker description by
listing the five tenets of the matching principle:
(1) Revenues are recognized as entering into the determina
tion of income when sales are made or services are rendered.
(2) The mere receipt of money or the promise of another per
son to pay money for goods or services does not represent revenue
which should be recognized in the period of receipt if it is bur
dened with an obligation to deliver goods or render services in
the future. Items of this nature are treated as resulting in liabili
ties or deferred credits until they are earned through the fulfill
ment of the required performances.
(3) Costs and expenses directly identifiable with revenues are
chargeable against the income of the period in which revenues
are recognized. Expenses, such as insurance, rent, property taxes
and interest, which are for particular periods of time are chargea
ble over such periods. Other expenses incurred in the general con
duct of the business are chargeable against the income of the pe
riod in which they are incurred unless it is clearly evident that
they are for the benefit of future periods and there is a reasona
ble basis, both as to amount and time, for allocating them to fu
ture periods, in which event they should be deferred and charged
to such periods.
27.
28.

MCCULLERS & SCHROEDER, supra note 26, at 13-14.
Dubroff et al., supra note 8, at 359 n.19 (citations omitted).
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(4) If the precise amount of any costs or expenses is not de
terminable at the time they are chargeable against income, they
should be recognized on the basis of reasonable estimates.
(5) Accounting recognition of costs and expenses which can
not be determined with a reasonable degree of accuracy at the
time they would otherwise be charged against income of a partic
ular period should be deferred until such determination is
possible. 29

Therefore, under the matching principle, cash in hand may
not be included in revenue because not yet earned if future per
formance is required. Costs not yet paid may nevertheless re
duce revenue already included. And capital expenditures should
not be deducted in the year of payment but amortized over the
income stream produced by that expenditure. This matching of
revenues with costs is intended to produce a more accurate peri
odic account over time of the financial health of the business en
terprise for those who will make judgments based on this profit
picture. "A primary function of accounting is to accumulate and
communicate information essential to our understanding of the
activities of an enterprise. The information so communicated is
used by management, by owners, and by other interested par
ties in making judgments relating to the operation of the en
tity."30 An accurate reflection of periodic profit over time is nec
essary if the banker making a loan or the shareholder
contemplating a stock purchase or the manager making a busi
ness judgment is to make an informed decision. For example,
rollercoaster profits from year to year, suggesting volatility,
should reflect real rollercoaster profits, not the happenstance of
bunched receipts and bunched outlays in connection with a busi
ness that is actually steadily growing more profitable.
Accountants often chastise the Service or courts for failing
to deify the matching principle in the income tax. Messrs. Wil
liam L. Raby and Burgess J.W. Raby, who write a regular col
umn entitled Tax Practice and Accounting News for the widely
read Tax Notes magazine, are regular critics of the failure of tax
accounting to adhere to the matching principle. "All this," they
29. Abraham M. Stanger et al., Prepaid Income and Estimating Expenses: Finan
cial Accounting Versus 7bx Accounting DicJwtomy, 33 TAX LAw. 403, 405 (1980) (citing
Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
No. 5 (1975)).
30. 1964 Concepts and Standards Research Study Committee, The Matching Con
cept, 40 ACCOUNTING REV. 368, 368 (1965).
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have written, "offends the matching principle that is so impor
tant to accountants but has been at odds with the more legalis
tic 'all events' test since the taxation of business income be
gan."31 Their lack of appreciation of the significance of the time
value-of-money principles often underlying the tax values dis
cussed in this Article is revealed in the following passage of the
same article:
Maybe we need to go back to the 1954 Internal Revenue
Code, as originally enacted, reinstate section 462, and restore
proper matching of expense with income as a primary goal of in
come tax accounting. Most of the statutory fine-tuning of business
tax accounting has actually done little more than create timing
differences by moving items from one year to another. That is
where the great complexity lies. That is where much of the time
is spent when the IRS agent makes an audit. We think that the
tax process would be improved if consistency were restored to its
throne and conceptual precision given the boot.32

In discussing a Technical Advice Memorandum in which the
Service required capitalization of the cost of major engine in
spections of turpoprop aircraft engines undertaken by a sched
uled air carrier about every four years, 33 Messrs. Raby and Raby
stated:
As we have commented before, financial accounting puts a
high value on the proper matching of costs against revenues to
which they relate. Proper financial accounting would, in fact, set
up a reserve out of income over the four years preceding each ma
jor engine inspection. While the IRS is unlikely to go quite that
far, absent a reenactment of section 452, it does sometimes seems
to recognize the significance of this matching principle, although
only sporadically. . . .
31. William L. Raby & Burgess J.W. Raby, Consistency, Matching, and Economic
Performance, 71 TAX NOTES 923, 924 (May 13, 1996) [hereinafter Raby & Raby, Consis
tency]. See also William L. Raby, Meaning of "Accrued•-Accounting Concepts Versus Tax
Concepts, 57 TAX NOTES 777 (Nov. 9, 1992) (arguing that tax accounting should follow fi
nancial accounting).
32. Raby & Raby, Consistency, supra note 31, at 926 (emphasis added). Section 462
allowed the deduction by accrual basis taxpayers of additions to reserves for future ex
penses. It was the companion to section 452, which allowed such taxpayers to defer in
clusion of prepaid income until earned. Both were retroactively repealed within one year
of enactment. See infra notes 341-345 and accompanying text (discussing these sections
in more detail).
33. See T.AM. 9618004 (Jan. 23, 1996).
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Even when the IRS ignores matching expense with income,
the courts sometimes come to the taxpayer's rescue....34

Accounting Professor Dennis J. Gaffney has similarly bemoaned
the fact that "[t]oo many courts simply do not understand basic
financial accounting concepts,"35 including the matching princi
ple. 36 And this attitude among accountants is not a new one.
Writing in 1939, Stephen Gilman collected similar quotations
from his time.
Thus Canning speaks of "ill-considered and changing statistica1
determinations of taxable income," while Bryerly writes: "the in
come-tax point of view has, I think, affected the ideas as to sound ·
accounting which have insinuated themselves into many of us."
Stempf, Chairman of the American Institute Committee on Fed
era1 Taxation, refers to the "ever-widening breach between 'tax
accounting' and 'business accounting.' " He thinks a1so that "too
many managements, and likewise accountants, permit tax atti
tudes to color their reasoning and distort the application of sound
principles of accounting." Even the fair and conservative Journal
of Accountancy commented editorially upon one income tax ruling
in these words: "Genera] counsel's memorandum 20021, promul
gated in May, 1938, again exemplifies the needlessly irritating
and futile variance between commercia1 practice and the highly
legalistic concept of income held by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue. 37

But why should the matching principle be honored in tax
accounting simply because it is sacrosanct in financial account
34. William L. Raby & Burgess J.W. Raby, Capitalizing the Costs of Aircraft Engine
Overhauls, 71 TAX NOTES 1221, 1222 (May 27, 1996). See infra not.es 81-125 and accom
panying t.ext (discussing the tax values that should drive the capitalization/expense
inquiry).
35. Dennis J. Gaffney, Rotable Spare Parts: How Did a 'Terrible' Accounting
Metlwd Become So Bad?, 70 TAX NOTES 1009, 1012 (Feb. 19, 1996). In the cases dis
cussed by Professor Gaffney, the courts invoked the matching principle but applied it in
correctly under financial accounting standards. By criticizing the courts' poor application
of the matching principle under financial accounting standards, Professor Gaffney im
plies, of course, that the matching principle properly controlled. He just did not like the
way the courts went about applying its t.enets. I, in contrast, would have liked the courts
to have recognized that the matching concept has no independent tax value and to have
resolved the case using ta:c values. For a fuller description of the problem at issue in
Professor Gaffney's article, see infra not.es 139-147 and accompanying t.ext.
36. See also Calvin H. Johnson, The Illegitimate •Earned" Requirement in Tux and
Nontax Accounting, 50 TAX L. REv. 373, 377-78 (1995) (collecting additional quotations
by accountants) [hereinafter Johnson, •Earned" Requirement].
37. STEPHEN GILMAN, ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS OF PROFIT 18 (1939) (citations omitted).
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ing? In the celebrated 1979 case of Thor Power Tool Co. v. Com
missioner, 38 the Supreme Court explicitly recognized that tax
values and accounting values often diverge. While not directly
involving the matching principle, 39 the case is nevertheless
worth discussing here.
Thor Power Tools was in the business of selling merchan
dise and thus was required to use "inventory" accounting. 40 To
compute gross income derived from business under section
61(a)(2) for a business selling merchandise, the taxpayer must
subtract the "cost of goods sold" from "gross receipts."41 Comput
ing the cost of goods sold is not done by tracking the cost basis
of each item of inventory actually sold. Rather, inventory ac
counting computes the cost of goods sold on a mass basis by
starting with the cost of the opening inventory pool at the be
ginning of the year, adding inventory purchased or produced
during the year, and subtracting closing inventory (the goods re
maining on hand at the end of the year). 42 The number obtained
represents the inventory disposed of during the year. Closing in
ventory becomes opening inventory for. the next year. Notice
that if the number used for closing inventory can be lowered,
the cost of goods sold increases, which decreases gross income
from the sale of inventory for tax purposes. 43 Because closing in
ventory becomes opening inventory for the next year, this defer
ral of income is perpetual so long as the business continues.
38. 439 U.S. 522 (1979).
39. Because the case dealt with inventory accounting, it did deal indirectly with
the matching principle. An allocation of the costs of goods sold to the revenues included
in the period from the sale of inventory "matches" such costs to the revenues and is thus
required under the matching principle for financial accounting purposes. As will be de
veloped later, inventory accounting is consistent with tax values as well. See infra notes
139-147 and accompanying text.
40. See Treas. Reg. § 1.471-1 (requiring the use of inventories if "the production,
purchase, or sale of merchandise is an income-producing factor").
41. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-3(a).
42. Closing inventory is done by first doing a physical count of the items of inven
tory on hand. These numbers are matched to purchase invoices-if the items were pur
chased-by using one of two conventions: the last-in-first-out method (LIFO) or the first
in-first-out method (FIFO). Under LIFO, for example, if 100 items are on hand in inven
tory at the end of the year, the invoices for the earliest received 100 items are used for
purposes of calculating closing inventory. See DoDGE ET AL., supra note 20, at 634-35.
43. Assume, for example, that opening inventory is $300, inventory purchased is
$200, and closing inventory is $400. The cost of goods sold would be $100 ($300 + $200 
$400). If gross sales proceeds are $300, then gross income derived from sales is $200
($300 - $100). If the taxpayer can increase the cost of goods sold to $200 by decreasing
closing inventory by $100, gross income is decreased to $100 ($300 - $200).
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Under Treasury Regulations, Thor Power Tool was entitled
to use the lower of cost or the fair market value of the items in
closing inventory in calculating the cost of goods sold. 44 For the
year at issue, Thor Power Tool wrote down the cost of closing in
ventory by nearly $1 million, an amount management thought
reflected a reduction to scrap value of excess inventory that it
would not be able to sell, though it continued to produce and
sell these items at the same price charged for "nonexcess" inven
tory. It was less costly for Thor Power Tool to maintain excess·
production than risk subsequent production runs should they
run short, entailing costly retooling and delays in filling orders.
Thor Power Tool's write-down of closing inventory was consis
tent with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).
The Court denied the write-down for "excess inventory" as
not "clearly reflecting income" under section 446(b). Some might
argue that the Court's denial was based on the tax value of real
ization, since using a value for closing inventory that is lower
than its original cost is tantamount to allowing a deduction for
that as-yet-unrealized loss in value. That reasoning is not fully
persuasive in this context, however. 45 Like the tax values dis
cussed later in this Article, the realization requirement is a gen
eral tax value that must give way if the Code or regulations spe
cifically sanction violation of the value in the particular
instance. 46 And-for better or worse'7-the regulations specifi
44. See Treas. Reg. § l.471-2(c).
45. For a discussion of the tax values implicated by inventory accounting see infra
notes 139-147 and accompanying text (discussing inventory accounting for rotable spare
parts).

46. See, e.g., l.R.C §§ 475 & 1256 (requiring mark-to-market accounting in violation
of the realization requirement).
·
47. Many would say "for worse" based on the realization-requirement value. An in
teresting aside: The use of lower of cost or value apparently did not originate in finan
cial accounting but in tax accounting-specifically as a means to lower taxable income.
Writing in 1939, Stephen Gilman said,
The illogical rule of cost or market [in inventory accounting], while not originating
in this country, became popular here upon the advent of the Federal income tax
program. Paton says that: "The early American enthusiasm for the device . . . was
not a tribute to the merits of the scheme as a worthwhile accounting mecha
nism-but as an immediate method of reducing taxable income."
GILMAN, supra note 37, at 17 (quoting W.A Paton, Comments on ~Statement of Ac
counting Principles," J. AccoUNTANCY 202 (1938)); Gilman, id. at 440-45 (recounting the
origin of the rule in England in 1904 and its adoption by the U.S. Treasury Department
in 1917). Thus the rule seems to further neither sound tax theory nor financial account
ing goals. Its retention is a testament to both inertia and the lobbying power of corpo
rate America. See Deborah A. Geier, A Brilliant Instance of Flabby Thinking, 76 TAX
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cally condone using the lower of cost or value.
The real problem was an evidentiary one. The regulations
define "market" price as "the current bid price prevailing at the
date of the inventory for the particular merchandise in the vol
ume in which usually purchased by the taxpayer,"48 which had
been uniformly interpreted to mean replacement cost. Where no
open bid market exists, the regulations instruct to use the best
evidence available, "such as specific purchases or sales by the ·
taxpayer or others in reasonable volume and made in good faith,
or compensation paid for cancellation of contracts for purchase
commitments."49 Lower prices could be used only under two cir
cumstances: if the taxpayer actually offers and sells merchan
dise at lower than these market prices50 or if the merchandise is
defective,51 neither of which pertained to Thor Power Tool.
Although the taxpayer conceded that an active market ex
isted in the inventory at issue, it made no effort to obtain the
objective replacement cost of its excess inventory in the market.
Rather, the "market" prices used were based on the "best guess"
of management in light of the president's twenty years of experi
ence. The Court concluded:
The Regulations demand hard evidence of actual sales and
further demand that records of actual dispositions be kept. The
Tax Court found, however, that Thor made no sales and kept no
records. Thor's management simply wrote down its closing inven
tory on the basis of a well-educated guess that some of it would
never be sold. The formulae governing this write-down were de
rived from management's collective "business experience"; the
percentages contained in those formulae seemingly were chosen
for no reason other than that they were multiples of five and em
bodied some kind of anagogical symmetry. The Regulations do not
permit this kind of evidence. If a taxpayer could write down its
inventories on the basis of management's subjective estimates of
the goods' ultimate salability, the taxpayer would be able, as the
Tax Court observed, "to determine how much tax it wanted to pay
for a given year."52
NOTES 124 (July 7, 1997).
48. Treas. Reg. § 1.471-4(a).
49. Treas. Reg. § 1.471-4(b).
50. Id.
51. Treas. Reg. § l.471-2(c).
52. Thor Power 7bol, 439 U.S. at 536 (citations omitted).
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Thus, the Court's decision ultimately rested on a tax value dif
ferent from the realization requirement: the prevention of tax
payer manipulation, which is an administrative value.
Of particular importance here is the Court's response to the
taxpayer's argument that since the write-down conformed to
GAAP, it must be accepted for tax purposes as well under Trea
sury Regulation § 1.446-l(a)(2), which provides that "[a] method
of accounting which reflects the consistent application of gener
ally accepted accounting principles . . . will ordinarily be re
garded as clearly reflecting income." Thor Power Tool argued
that this regulation creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of
the taxpayer if its method of accounting conforms to GAAP and
that the burden shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate af
firmatively that the method "demonstrably distorts income" or
that its use was "motivated by tax avoidance."53 The Court re
jected the argument.
The Regulations embody no presumption; they say merely
that, in most cases, generally accepted accounting practices will
pass muster for tax purposes. And in most cases they will. But if
the Commissioner, in the exercise of his discretion, determines
that they do not, he may prescribe a different practice without
having to rebut any presumption nmning against the Treasury. 54

Among the reasons the Court dismissed the taxpayer's argu
ment are the very disparate goals and purposes of tax and fi
nancial accounting.
The primary goal of financial accounting is to provide useful in
formation to management, shareholders, creditors, and others
properly interested; the major responsibility of the accountant is
53. Id. at 539-40 (citations omitted).
54. Id. at 540. Justice Blackmun's commonsensical point that in most instances fi
nancial accounting will "pass muster" is worth stressing. This is an important point be
cause it is easy to lose sight of the "general rule" in an Article devoted to exceptions. It
is perfectly reasonable to allow taxpayers to use GAAP in tax accounting as a matter of
administrative simplicity in those cases in which no substantial damage to other tax val
ues would result. Some would argue that simplification demands that departures from
GAAP should not be required even in those cases where substantial tax values are at
risk-except perhaps in the most abusive of cases. The case for using GAAP on simplifi
cation grounds is certainly overstated, however. Taxpayers must keep two sets of books
in any event. It is unavoidable, unless taxpayers are willing to give up such things as
favorable depreciation schedules unheard of in GAAP. Even if taxpayers were so willing,
the malleability of GAAP is too big a problem to countenance full scale adoption of
GAAP as a replacement for the Internal Revenue Code. See infra notes 57-76 and ac
companying text.
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to protect these parties from being misled. The primary goal of
the income tax system, in contrast, is the equitable collection of
revenue; the major responsibility of the Internal Revenue Service
is to protect the public fisc. Consistently with its goals and re
sponsibilities, financial accounting has as its foundation the prin
ciple of conservatism, with its corollary that "possible errors in
measurement [should] be in the direction of understatement
rather than overstatement of net income and net assets." In view
of the Treasury's markedly different goals and responsibilities,
understatement of income is not destined to be its guiding light.
Given this diversity, even contrariety, of objectives, any presump
tive equivalency between tax and financial accounting would be
unacceptable.55

Equally important, however, the Court also noted that the
sheer malleability of GAAP violates tax values.
Accountants have long recognized that "generally accepted ac
counting principles" are far from being a canonical set of rules
that will ensure identical accounting treatment of identical trans
actions. "Generally accepted accounting principles," rather, toler
ate a range of "reasonable" treatments, leaving the choice among
alternatives to management. Such, indeed, is precisely the case
here. Variances of this sort may be tolerable in financial report
ing, but they are questionable in a tax system designed to ensure
as far as possible that similarly situated taxpayers pay the same
tax. If management's election among "acceptable" options were
dispositive for tax purposes, a firm, indeed, could decide unilater
ally-within limits dictated only by its accountants-the tax it
wished to pay. Such unilateral decisions would not just make the
Code inequitable; they would make it unenforeeable.56

Because GAAP (including the matching principle) does have for
many an enticing aura of "theoretical soundness" that makes de
ferring to it in the tax arena an appealing method of argument,
Justice Black.mun's point is worth developing further.
Use of the word "principles" in "generally accepted account
ing principles"57 may be misleading if it suggests that the ac
55. 439 U.S. at 542-43 (citations omitted).
56. Id. at 544 (footnotes omitted). " 'Accounting bas never been and will never be
an exact science and a precise measurement exercise,' said Timothy S. Lucas, director of
research at the [Financial Accounting Standards Board]. 'There is an element of judg
ment that will always be necessary.' " Jon E. Hilsenrath, On the Books, More Fact and
Less Fiction, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1997, § 3, at 1, 5 (national edition).
57. See infra notes 180-225 and accompanying text (providing a short synopsis of
the origin of the term "generally accepted accounting principles").
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counting method is based in theory apart from practice; practice
can be theory when it comes to GAAP. As George 0. May, one
early and influential commentator in the field of accounting, put
it, "[T]he rules of accounting, even more than those of the law,
are the product of experience rather than of logic."58 McCullers
and Schroeder put it this way:
The expression generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP) has thus come to play a significant role in the accounting
profession. The precise meaning of the term, however, has
evolved rather slowly. In addition to official pronouncements [of
the Federal Accounting Standards Board], another method of de
veloping principles is to determine whether other accountants are
actually following the particular practice in question. There is no
need for complete uniformity; rather, when faced with a particu
lar transaction, the accountant is to review the literature and
current practice to determine if a treatment similar to the one
proposed is being used. For example, if many accountants are us
ing sum-of-years-digits (S-Y-D) depreciation for assets, this
method becomes a GAAP. In the theoretical sense, depreciation
may not even be a principle; however, according to accounting
theory formation, if many accountants are using S-Y-D it becomes
a GAAP. 59

According to the Accounting Principles Board (APB), gener
ally accepted accounting principles "does not mean that GAAP is
based on what is most appropriate or reasonable in a given situ
ation but simply that the practice represents a consensus."60
Moreover, "[t]he description of present generally accepted ac
counting principles is based primarily on observation of account
ing practice. Present generally accepted accounting principles
have not been formally derived from the environment, objec
tives, and basic features of financial accounting."61 Keller and
Zeff captured the distinction pithily when they wrote, " 'Gener
ally accepted' must be distinguished from 'generally accept
able.' "62 And Gilman wrote, "[T]he word 'principles' is commonly
58. GEORGE 0. MAY, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING viii (1943), quoted in Maurice Moonitz,
Why Do We Need •Postulates• and •Principles•?, 116 J. ACCOUNTANCY 42, 42 (1963).
59. MCCULLERS & ScHROEDER, supra note 26, at 2-3.
60. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting APB No. 4, supra note 26). See infra notes
180-225 and accompanying text (describing the birth and death of the APB).
61. MCCULLERS & ScHROEDER, supra note 26, at 12-13 (quoting APB No. 4, supra
note 26).
62. 2 FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING THEORY vi (Thomas F. Keller & Stephen A Zeff eds.,
1969). Another has said, "The so-called accounting principles followed in preparing ac·
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used to characterize the common law of accounting."63 In a foot
note appending the word "principles," he wrote, "[T]he use of
this word does not indicate its approval . . . ."64 While rule 203
of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) Code of Professional Ethics does require compliance
with accounting principles established by the Financial Account
ing Standards Board (FASB),65 accountants may consult indus
try practices in determining GAAP in the absence of such gui
dance. 66 This practice leaves a lot of room for "acceptable"
variation,67 leading one commentator to call for the creation of
an "Accounting Court."68
counting reports to the public constitutes a hodge-podge of entrenched traditional prac
tices. They have few if any objective standards, and they have grown up and gained au
thority largely by precedent and tradition. . . ." Leonard Spacek, Business Success
Requires an Understanding of Unsolved Problems of Accounting and Financial Report
ing, in FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING THEORY, id. at 135, 136.
63. GILMAN, supra note 37, at 169.
64. Id.
65. McCULLERS & ScHROEDER, supra note 26, at 4. See infra notes 180-225 and ac
companying text (describing FASB).
66. MCCULLERS & ScHROEDER. supra note 26, at 4.
67. Spacek provides a detailed example showing how the use of alternative gener
ally accepted accounting principles can dramatically affect the earnings report of two fic
tional companies. See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING THEORY, supra note 62, at 139-41. "It is
wholly possible," he concludes, "to have the stock of these two comparable companies
selling at prices as much as 100% apart, merely because of the differences in accounting
practices." Id. at 139.
68. Leonard Spacek, The Need for An Accounting Court, ACCOUNTING REv. 368 (July
1958). In referring to the certification that accountants must sign to the effect that the
report conforms with •generally accepted accounting principles; see infra notes 196-199
and accompanying text, he wrote:
[N]owhere does it say that for the same transaction there are acceptable al
ternative principles which produce widely different results and which destroy com
parability with other companies, or sometimes make impossible a realistic ap
praisal of the company itself. On this point we should ask ourselves this question
which is an important moral one: Do the readers know that in giving the standard
certificate we have a choice of principles, practices or conventions applicable to the
same transactions, and that each choice can be certified without qualification even
though the profits reported would vary widely, depending on which principle of ac
counting was chosen?
In fact, [the accountant] will often certify statements which reflect identical trans
actions in different companies, recorded in widely different ways and with mate
rial differences in the results obtained. The only defense for this latitude of choice
is that alternative principles which produce such widely varying results are all
classified as "generally accepted."
Would a doctor be justified in passing on to his patient the choice of anesthetic
just because there are several types that are acceptable without the doctor being
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Within an article recounting a study by the respected in
vestment firm Goldman, Sachs regarding recent improvements
in the veracity of earnings reports, for example, Jon Hilsenrath
gives a flavor of the tractability of GAAP.
Executives don't have to risk committing fraud to play with
the earnings. The Goldman study notes somewhat archly that ac
counting rules still give financial officers plenty of "opportuni
ties"-all quite legal-to massage income statements. Using dif
ferent approaches, financial officers can shift earnings from the
present to the future, paving the way for steady earnings growth.
They can also take tomorrow's earnings and place them on to
day's income statements, pleasing impatient investors. And if the
auditors do not object, these executives can get away with report
ing revenues well before their time. 69

He provides several examples, one of which was the manner
in which l.B.M. accounted for its acquisitions of the Lotus De
velopment Corporation, Tivoli Systems, Inc., and Object Technol
ogy International, Inc., in 1995 and 1996. "Because of the ac
counting method that it chose, l.B.M. was able to show a
significant jump in earnings from 1995 to 1996. It was also able
to set up its financial statements to show earnings growth in
the future." 70 It did this by declining to amortize over a term of
years the $2.275 billion attributable to the "goodwill" it pur
chased in these acquisitions, choosing instead to deduct this
amount immediately as an expense attributable to "purchased
in-process research and development" instead of goodwill. 71 In
other words, it chose to take a "quick hit" to earnings in 1995
and 1996 in order to prevent a drag on earnings in the years to
come. Using this technique, l.B.M. reported income for 1996 of
$5.4 billion, an increase of $1.2 billion over 1995. "If the com
pany had written off this goodwill over a more traditional pe
riod, such as five years, rather than taking a one-time expense,
responsible for deciding and telling the patient which one would be best under the
circumstances? Is not the doctor responsible for recommending which of those ac
ceptable should be taken?
Id. at 373-74. Cf. REED K SroREY, THE SEARCH FOR ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES 6 (1964) (re
ferring to Mr. Spacek's speech, which was given at the 1957 annual convention of the
American Accounting Association and later published, as "revolutionary in the view of
most accountants" and as contributing to renewed efforts to formulate uniform principles
for the profession).
69. Hilsenrath, supra note 56, at 5.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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profits for 1996 would have been $5.5 billion, down from $5.8
billion in 1995."72
While I.B.M. chose to hurry earnings reductions to make
the future earnings trend rosier, some companies, particularly
young ones under pressure to show a profit rather quickly, take
the opposite tack, delaying earnings reductions to future peri
ods. America Online did this by choosing to characterize market
ing expenses, which immediately reduce earnings, as outlays re
quiring amortization over several years. The outlays at issue
were the costs associated with shipping millions of trial disket
tes to prospective customers. While it listed those costs as "de
ferred subscription acquisition costs" that had to be amortized
for financial accounting purposes, "[m]ost companies would have
immediately listed those costs as an expense ...."73 By the end
of its fiscal year on June 30, 1996, it listed $237 million of such
deferred costs, nearly eight times its reported net income for
that year of $30 million. By September 30, 1996, the costs had
grown to $385 million. Finally, faced with widespread com
plaints by analysts (not accountants, note), it charged off the
$385 million all at once. 74
In referring to a "pathbreaking, as-yet unpublished study"75
that empirically quantified the extent of earnings manipulations
to meet certain thresholds, Roger Lowenstein of the Wall Street
Journal said dryly:
Companies will strive to meet three supposed thresholds
[when reporting earnings]: (1) positive earnings, (2) prior-year re
sults and (3) analyst-expectations.
Most of them will do so, though often by only a whisker. A
few, on the other hand, will miss by a mile.
72. Id. Professor Baruch Lev, an accounting professor at the Stern School of Busi
ness at New York University, relates that this technique is called the "big bath" in ac
counting jargon, and he estimates that more than 300 companies have used similar tech
niques in the last two years in accounting for acquisitions of high technology companies.
See supra notes 57-76 and accompanying text (describing how practice becomes GAAP).
For the tax treatment of acquired goodwill, see infra notes 148-50 and accompanying
text.
73. Hilsenrath, supra note 56, at 5 (quoting Howard Schilit, an adjunct accounting
professor at American University).
74. Id.
75. Roger Lowenstein, How to Be a Winner in the Profits Game, WALL ST. J., Apr.
3, 1997, at Cl (referring to Francois Degeorge, Jayendu Patel, and Richard Zeckhauser,
Earnings Manipulation to Exceed Thresholds (unpublished)).
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This is not due to chance, nor smiling fates. Companies ma
nipulate their earnings to make it come out that way. Those that
are going to fall short or that are comfortably ahead "save up"
earnings for next time. Those who expect to come close will "bor
row" earnings from the future. 7&

In sum, Thor Power Tool tells us that the divergent goals of
tax accounting and financial accounting, as well as the mallea
bility of GAAP itself, renders GAAP inappropriate as the lode
star for tax accounting. 77 But I have not yet discussed with any
kind of precision-other than to collect revenue in a fair and ad
ministrable manner-the goals of tax accounting. The bottom
line question thus becomes: What tax values are relevant to con
texts in which courts and accountants are apt to invoke the
matching principle permeating GAAP? The stories of l.B.M. and
America Online illustrate how the issues here are obviously
matters of timing. As we shall see, however, while the timing of
income and deductions is important to financial accounting be
cause of the earnings picture such timing portrays over time, it
is important to tax accounting for very different reasons.
III.

THE

MATCHING PRINCIPLE IN

TAX ACCOUNTING

A. CAPITALIZATION, DEPRECIATION, AND THE INCOME-TAX

VALUE

Capitalization and depreciation to the financial accountant
are notions premised wholly on the matching principle. Recall
that McCullers and Schroeder referred to matching as a "perva
sive principle" and described cost allocation for assets that pro
vide service over time, i.e., depreciation, as a broad operating
principle intended to implement the pervasive principle of
76. Id.
77. This point needs to be stressed again and again, however. Courts sometimes
continue to be swayed by arguments that certification that the treatment under review
complies with GAAP means, by definition, that it also clearly reflects income for tax pur
poses. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 1625 (1997); Dennis
J. Gaffney et al., Inventory Accounting: Recent Decision Could Save '.lbxes for Retailers,
75 TAX NOTES 1255 (June 2, 1997) (criticizing the decision). In Wal-Mart, the Tax Court
allowed Wal-Mart to use inventory accounting methods certified by a CPA to be in accor
dance with GAAP even though inventory shrinkage estimates were used when actual
shrinkage was both known and significantly less, significant inventory was never
counted (which allowed a backdoor write-off of a kind that was disallowed in Thor l'ower
Thol), and inventory that was counted was improperly priced.
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matching. 78 Thus, for example, acquired goodwill can be amor
tized under financial accounting norms. 79
Capitalization and depreciation have wholly different func
tions in an income tax. Capitalization is what differentiates an
income tax from a tax based solely on consumption, and depreci
ation in a realization-based income tax system allows passage
of-time "final" losses to be deducted. 80 Neither of these tax con
cepts is premised on the matching principle.
1. Capitalization
A pure Shanz-Haig-Simons income tax base is comprised of
consumption plus net wealth increases (or less net wealth de
creases).81 An outlay in the form of a capital expenditure-the
purchase of an investment asset, for example-does not decrease
the taxpayer's wealth; it merely changes the form in which that
wealth is held. Therefore, an income tax disallows deductions
for capital expenditures, i.e., deductions for savings. A cash flow
consumption tax, in contrast, would exempt savings from tax by
allowing a deduction for the purchase of nonconsumption assets,
such as an investment asset. 82 Thus, the capitalization principle
is the defining feature of an income tax. 83
The economic effect of inappropriately allowing a deduction
in an income tax for a capital expenditure is dramatic. E. Cary
Brown, writing in 1948, demonstrated that, under certain condi
tions, 84 allowing immediate deduction of the cost of an invest
ment yielding future income is economically equivalent to not
allowing a year-1 deduction but exempting all the future returns
on the investment from tax. 85 In other words, inappropriately al
See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text and note 127.
But see Douglas A Kahn. Accelerated Depreciation-Tax Expenditure or Proper
Allowance for Measuring Net Income?, 78 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1979) (taking the position that
depreciation is simply a cost allocation mechanism, as it is in financial accounting).
81. See DODGE ET AL., supra note 20, at 26-27. The realization requirement of our
current income tax means that only realized wealth changes are taken into account.
82. See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMIC
78.
79.
80.

GROWTH 191-93 (1984); U.S. TREAS. DEF'T, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 113-44
(1977); and Professor Andrews' seminal piece, William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type
or Cash Flow Personal Income Thx, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1113 (1974).
83. See DODGE ET AL., supra note 20, at 411.
84. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAX: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES 306-07 (3d ed. 1995) (listing conditions).
85. See E. Cary Brown, Business-Income Thxation and Investment Incentives, in IN
COME, EMPLOYMENT AND PlIBLIC POLICY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ALVIN H. HANSEN (1948).

1998)

THE MYTH OF MATCHING

43

lowing a deduction of a capital expenditure means that the fu
ture income generated by that investment, though nominally in
cluded in income under the Internal Revenue Code, is
economically exempt from tax, as though the investment were
being taxed under a consumption-tax regime. That the invest
ment return is nominally included in the tax base can cause
casual observers to fail to understand that it is effectively free
from tax.
The reason that this phenomenon holds true under stated
conditions is that the cost of an investment is (in theory, at
least) simply the present value of the anticipated future returns
that will be generated by the investment. Thus, deducting the
original purchase price-the present value of the future re
turns-turns out to be equivalent to not taxing those future re
turns. The equivalence of not allowing a deduction for business
and investment capital expenditures but exempting all the fu
ture returns on the capital expenditure, on the one hand, and
deducting a capital expenditure but taxing the future returns,
on the other, can be illustrated with the following example. The
example also compares these results with the result that should
occur under an income tax, where capital expenditures are not
deducted and the portion of the future return consisting of "in
come" (the portion of the gross return exceeding the tax-free ba
sis recovery) is taxed.
Assume that Investor has a $100,000 wage bonus at the end
of year 0 to invest, the interest (and discount) rate is 10 percent
compounded semi-annually, the tax rate is a flat 30 percent,
and the $100,000 investment is held for one year, at which time
the total net return (income and principal after tax) is
consumed. 86

86. The example is taken from DODGE

ET AL., supra

note 20, at 416-20.
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Gross Investment
Tax (30%)
Net Investment
Gross Return
Tax on $7 ,000 "Income"
Tax on Gross Return
Net Return
Present Value

No deduction
of C/E and
"income" return
taxed
$100,000
30,000
70,000
77,000
2,100
0
74,900
67,364

Deduction
of C/E and
all returns
taxed
$100,000
0
100,000
110,000
0
33,000
77,000
70,000
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No deduction
of C/E and
all returns
exempt
$100,000
30,000
70,000
77,000
0
0
77,000
70,000

Column one above illustrates the treatment of this investment
capital expenditure under our current income tax: no deduction
of the outlay coupled with taxation of the "income" portion of
the return (with basis recovery going untaxed). Column two il
lustrates treatment under a cash flow consumption tax: deduc
tion of the savings outlay (the purchase of the investment asset)
coupled with taxation of all returns on the investment as con
sumption. Column three illustrates that the economic result of
column two can be accomplished if the investment capital ex
penditure is not deducted, as under an income tax, but all re
turns on the investment are exempted from tax, the E. Cary
Brown yield-exemption phenomenon. 87
The equivalence of columns three and two-consumption
tax regimes-demonstrates that allowing a deduction for a capi
tal expenditure is the economic equivalent of not allowing an in
itial deduction but exempting from tax all the returns from the
capital expenditure. But, as column one illustrates, the "income"
portion of the return is supposed to be taxed under an income
tax. At bottom, allowing immediate deduction of capital expendi
tures replicates consumption-tax treatment and thus violates.
what I call the "income-tax value" in an income-tax regime by
failing to tax the "income" portion of the investment's return
and replicating consumption-tax treatment. Acceleration of a de
87. Column three also provides an example of the wage tax, colloquially called the
"flat tax," that has been suggested as a consumption-tax replacement for our current tax
system. See RoBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABusHKA, THE Fl.AT TAX (2d ed. 1995); Deborah A.
Geier, Cognitive Theory and the Selling of the Flat Tux, 71 TAX NOTES 241 (Apr. 8, 1996).
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duction produces the same yield-exemption effect. 88
Enactment of the Roth IRA shows acceptance of the yield
exemption phenomenon by Congress. Since I believe that statu
tory interpretation should take account of the words in the In
ternal Revenue Code, even in other Code sections, I think this
event was significant. Both the Roth IRA and traditional IRA
are explicit consumption-tax components of our hybrid tax sys
tem, and the Roth IRA is explicitly premised on this idea that
not allowing an up-front deduction of an investment but al
lowing the returns to be received tax-free under the Roth IRA is
the equivalent of allowing an up-front deduction but taxing the
yield under a traditional IRA. Both yield consumption-tax treat
ment, not income-tax treatment.
While the importance of the yield-exemption phenomenon
seems to be widely understood now in academia,89 judges and
the Commissioner have thus far not demonstrated complete or
consistent awareness of the economic significance in an income
tax of allowing a deduction for investments that will produce
significant future income. Their rhetoric never recognizes it.
This discussion reveals that the sine qua non of a capital
expenditure in the tax sense is any outlay that will produce sig
nificant future income. Immediate deduction of such an outlay is
inappropriate in an income tax, not because of the matching
principle, but because it is the equivalent of exempting from tax
the future returns from the outlay. Such a result replicates a
consumption-tax outcome and is inconsistent with an income
tax, 90 violating the income-tax value. 91 Note that while capitali
88. See Alvin C. Warren, Accelerated Capital Recovery, Debt, and 7bx Arbitrage, 38
TAX LAw. 549 (1985); Calvin H. Johnson, Soft Money Investing Under the Income Tux,
1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 1019 (both describing how accelerated deduction of basis under cur
rent tax depreciation methods results in failure to tax fully the income from the
investment).
89. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 88; Johnson, supra note 88; George K Y-m, Of In
dianapolis Power and Light and the Definition of Debt: Another View, 11 VA. TAX REv.
467 (1991); Mary Louise Fellows, A Comprehensive Attack on Tux Deferral, 88 MICH. L.
REv. 722, 732-33 (1990); Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Thxing the Time Value
of Money,• 95 YALE L.J. 506, 519 (1986) [hereinafter Halperin, Disguised Interest]; Daniel
I. Halperin, The Time Value of Money-1984, 23 TAX NOTES 751, 752 (June 4, 1984)
[hereinafter Halperin, 1984].
90. Treatment of some investments under a consumption-tax regime when others
are treated under an income-tax regime means that the former are taxed at effective
rates lower than the statutory rate. According to Professor Johnson, "The lower effective
rate means that high-bracket investors will drive out lower bracket competitors and that
poorer investments, judged by their economic merit, will win out over better ones." Cal
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zation does defer the deduction of the outlay producing future
income until the future, matching does not drive capitalization
under an income tax, even though it may describe it. That is an
important distinction to appreciate, since if one thinks the
matching principle is the tax value that drives capitalization,.
the matching principle will be raised inappropriately in other
contexts to support a treatment that would violate the income
tax value, such as in the area of accrual of prepaid gross re
ceipts. The problem is the familiar one of mistaking a descrip
tive trait for a substantive one.
Appreciation of this nuance can be gained by considering
what would happen if Congress were to replace the current In
ternal Revenue Code with a pure, cash flow consumption tax.
Capitalization would be a thing of the past for tax purposes. Yet,
financial accountants would continue to capitalize costs to
match future income. Capitalization simply serves very different
purposes in the two worlds. In the tax world, capitalization pro
tects the tax on income from investments and avoids inadver
tent consumption-tax treatment, 92 while in the financial ac
vin H. Johnson, Capitalization After the Government's Big Win in INDOPCO, 63 TAX
NOI'ES 1323, 1324 (June 6, 1994) [hereinafter After INDOPCO].
91. AB Professor Johnson phrases it, "Costs with significant future value are in
vestments and in an income tax, investments need to be made and continued with non
deductible moneys. Except where the costs are too small or the future benefits are too
speculative to count, costs with future value need to be capitalized.n Id.
92. One rationale behind the passive activity loss rule might be that it protects
capitalization and the income-tax value. Tax shelters provide up-front deductions, such
as interest and depreciation deductions of basis created by debt, coupled with delayed
income inclusions. For an example, see DODGE ET AL., supra note 20, at 528-29 (recount
ing the story of Sara Surgeon who purchases a $100,000 apartment building with
$95,000 of nonrecourse debt and whose rental income from the building is offset by cur
rent expenses, leaving the depreciation deduction to produce a series of tax losses until
the building is sold).
The way § 469 operates is to net passive activity losses against passive activ
ity gains; only the net overall loss is deferred. The idea of aggregating invest
ments and deferring any net overall loss is plausible if one adopts a "portfolion
view of an individual taxpayer's investment activity; that is, a net overall invest
ment loss for a year is a price one sometimes pays in managing the risks of a di
versified portfolio over time. Thus, losses are a "costn of overall profitability, which
suggests "capitalizationn of net overall losses, which is exactly the result achieved
by deferral . . ..
DODGE ET AL., supra note 20, Teacher's Manual, at 289. I thank Joseph Dodge for this in
sight. In other words, capitalization of the early losses incurred by Sara Surgeon's in
vestment ensures that the future income from that investment is not, in effect, partially
exempted from tax. This approach differs from the traditional one in thinking about tax
shelters, which focuses on their elimination of the current tax on other income, such as
income from Sara's surgical practice.
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counting world, it serves to match costs with related income
solely for informational purposes. Congress may decide someday
to replace the current tax system with a pure consumption tax, 93
but until it does, judges and the Commissioner should endeavor
to realign their rhetoric around the central tax idea of capitali
zation in an income tax world: the likelihood of significant fu
ture returns from the outlay. Consumption-tax treatment for an
item not mandated by the language of the Code should not re
sult by "accident" in administering the remaining provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code.
This realignment in rhetoric seemed eminently possible af
ter the Supreme Court's decision in INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commis
sioner.94 INDOPCO provides the opportunity to jettison outdated
rhetoric that pre-dated INDOPCO and which dances around the
underlying tax values, described above, that are at stake.
Whether it will have this salutary long-term effect remains to be
seen.
INDOPCO was the successor corporation to National Starch
and Chemical Corporation. National Starch incurred significant
investment banking fees and lawyers fees, amounting to more
than $2.5 million, as the target in a friendly merger with
Unilever United States, Inc., 95 and the issue in the case was
whether these fees were immediately deductible as "expenses"
Other deferral rules may be similarly explained. For example, the deferral of invest
ment interest deductions under section 163(d) until investment income is included pro
tects the taxation of that investment income.
I should note that Charlotte Crane is also absolutely right in pointing out to me
that, on the .flip side of the coin, section 469 has destroyed any hope of •matching" for
the real economic losses of passive investors who cannot sell and have no offsetting
positions.
93. There are several important consumption-tax features in our current system.
For example, the exclusion or deduction of qualified pension contributions under sections
401-420, deductions under sections 174 or 179 or Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-6 and -12(a) (al
lowing deduction of certain capital expenditures), and the deferral of tax on unrealized
asset appreciation under the realization requirement are cash flow consumption-tax fea
tures of our current tax system, while the exemption of interest under section 103 is a
wage or &flat9 tax feature of our current system. Just as with other tax values, the Con
gress and the Code sometimes deviate from the income-tax value in delineated
circumstances.
94. 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
95. Because of corporate reorganization problems, this transaction would not have
gone forward had it not been for the creativeness of the tax lawyers involved. I am al
ways amazed that the lawyer's fees for tax counsel as well as general representation
amounted to only $490,000 along with $15,069 for out-of-pocket expenses compared with
the investment banking fees for the fairness opinion of $2,200,000 along with $7,586 for
out-of-pocket expenses and $18,000 for legal fees! See ~03 U.S. at 82.
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under section 162 or whether they constituted nondeductible
capital expenditures under section 263. 96 On its final income tax
return, National Starch maintained that the outlays constituted
"expenses" by default, arguing that in order for an outlay to be a
capital expenditure it must create or enhance a separate and
distinct additional asset and that no such asset was created
here. 97
The Supreme Court disagreed that no outlay could be cate
gorized as a capital expenditure absent a link with a separate
and distinct asset. The language had originated in an earlier
Supreme Court opinion in which the Court labeled as a capital
expenditure an outlay that had created a separate and distinct
asset, 98 but the INDOPCO Court clarified that creation of a sep
arate asset was not a necessary but merely a sufficient condition
for capitalization. 99
The Court's language in INDOPCO had both good and bad
points. The following passage was one of the unfortunate ones,
as it assumes that matching is a tax value. 100
The primary effect of characterizing a payment as either a busi
ness expense or a capital expenditure concerns the timing of the
taxpayer's cost recovery: While business expenses are currently
deductible, a capital expenditure usually is amortized and depre
ciated over the life of the relevant asset, or, where no specific as
set or useful life can be ascertained, is deducted upon dissolution
of the enterprise. Through provisions such as these, the Code en
deavors to match expenses with revenues of the taxable period to
which they are properly attributable, thereby resulting in a more
accurate calculation of net income for tax purposes. 10 1
96. The particular outlays at issue might have been best characterized as construc
tive dividends to the shareholders of the target corporation. See Calvin H. Johnson, The
Expenditures Incurred by the target Corporation in an Acquisitive Reorganization are
Dividends to the Shareholders, 53 TAX NO'I'Es 463 (Oct. 28, 1991).
97. See 503 U.S. at 86.
98. See Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345 (1971).
99. See 503 U.S. at 86-88.
100. After reading repeated assertions of this kind in various judicial decisions,
some practitioners and judges find it very difficult to understand why, for example, it is
appropriate to require accrual basis taxpayers to include prepaid receipts immediately
upon receipt while at the same time disallowing deduction of related future expenses,
thus violating this "matching principle." For this reason alone, it is important to jettison
the matching rhetoric in favor of the true tax values that inform each of these contexts.
101. 503 U.S. at 83-84 (citations omitted).
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The Court clearly failed to realize the role that capitalization
plays in the income tax, i.e., protection of the income-tax value
by ensuring taxation of the net future returns on investments
and thus avoiding a consumption-tax result. Moreover, its unfor
tunate language once again implied that the matching principle
not only is a tax value but explains capitalization when coupled
with depreciation.
IDtimately, however, the Court's decision did focus empha
sis in the right direction. It confirmed that "deductions are ex
ceptions to the norm of capitalization,"102 an important perspec
tive in viewing the appropriateness of a current deduction for an
outlay. Such a norm is critical if the income-tax value is to be
respected. 103 Moreover, it confirmed that the proper inquiry to
undertake in determining whether an outlay must be capitalized
was that taken by the lower courts in the case: Outlays that cre
ate substantial future benefits (presumably economic) must be
capitalized.
This perspective, focusing on the likelihood of substantial
future income-as opposed to past or current-year income
makes perfect sense once one understands the income-tax value.
Since taxation of that future income would be effectively avoided
if the initial outlay were currently deducted, which is an inap
propriate result under an income tax, the focus logically should
rest on whether there is a likelihood of substantial future in
come. Outlays that do not generate substantial future income
can be deducted in the current year as an "expense" without
damaging the income-tax value. Trying to determine which out
lays contribute significantly to substantial future income is not
an easy task, of course, but it is clearly the appropriate task to
undertake if the outlay is to be taxed in accordance with in
come-tax principles rather than consumption-tax principles.
INDOPCO has created a lot of unrest in the practitioner
community, which worried that it might render nondeductible
many outlays that had been previously expensed without ques
102. See id. at 84.
103. Because the Court seemed to fail to understand the income-tax value, how
ever, it did not rely upon it in confirming that deductions were the exceptions to the
norm in an income tax. It relied instead on two things. One was the fact that since de
ductions are specifically enumerated in the Code while nondeductible capital expendi
tures are not, capitalization must be the norm as a matter of statutory interpretation.
See id. The other was Professor Johnson's article espousing a "strong law of capitaliza
tion• in the income tax. See id. at 84 n.4 (quoting Johnson, supra note 96, at 478).
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tion. 104 Resistant to change, practitioners also were very wary of
the language regarding substantial future benefits, even if the
deductibility outcomes under it were the same as under pre-IN
DOPCO law. 105 The Service has responded by issuing several
Revenue Rulings 106 and private rulings 107 regarding the deduct
ibility of items in the post-INDOPCO world. It has also solicited
comments from the bar regarding further guidance under
INDOPC0. 108
Both the courts and the Commissioner (as well as the Trea
sury Department, through new regulations) should use IN
DOPCO to refocus the analysis often undertaken in the past in
capitalization cases. For example, a great deal of energy has
been expended in trying to determine whether a particular out
lay constitutes a deductible "repair" or a nondeductible "perma
nent improvement or betterment." Regulations issued in 1958109
provide that the cost of "incidental repairs which neither materi
104. See Burgess J.W. Raby & William L. Raby, Tux 20 Forum: Practitioner Reac·
tion ro INDOPCO, 73 TAX NOTES 1581, 1581 (Dec. 30, 1996) (expressing "concern that
INDOPCO would not be limited to its rather unique facts but would lead to increased
IRS aggressiveness in capitalizing all manner of expenses").
105. See Timothy V. McCormally, Rev. Rul. 96-62: A Lump of Coal or a Nicely
Wrapped Present?, 74 TAX NOTES 797 (Feb. 10, 1997) (aptly describing the paranoia in
the tax bar over INDOPCO, which chastised even rulings that confirmed current
deductibility).
106. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 96-62, 1996-2 C.B. 9 (ruling that routine employer training
costs were deductible expenses notwithstanding future benefits unless connected to a
new trade or business); Rev. Rul. 94-12, 1994-1 C.B. 36 (confirming that INDOPCO does
not affect treatment of incidental repair costs as expenses); Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B.
35 (ruling that hazardous waste clean-up costs were deductible except the cost of con
structing a groundwater treatment facility, which was a capital expenditure); Rev. Rul.
94-77, 1994-2 C.B. 19 (confirming that severance pay was currently deductible); Rev. Rul.
92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57 (confirming that "plain vanilla" advertising expenses remain de
ductible after INDOPCO).
107. See, e.g., TAM. 9627002 (June 17, 1996) (ruling that environmental investiga
tion clean-up costs were currently deductible); TAM. 9618004 (Jan. 23, 1996) (ruling
that costs incurred for major inspections of turboprop aircraft engines resulting in re
placement of a significant number of engine parts must be capitalized); T.A.M. 9544001
(July 21, 1995) (ruling that the costs of converting to just-in-time manufacturing must
be capitalized); TAM. 9547002 (July 18, 1995) (ruling that the costs of replacing vines,
etc., because of vineyard pest infestation must be capitalized); TAM. 9240004 (June 29,
1992) (ruling that the costs of asbestos removal in a manufacturing plant must be
capitalized).
108. See Notice 96-7, 1996-6 l.R.B. 22 (Feb. 5, 1996); AMERICAN BAR Ass'N SECTION
OF TAX'N COMM. ON TAX ACCOUNTING, REPORT ON CAPITALIZATION ISSUES RAISED UNDER
SECTIONS 162 AND 263 BY INDOPCO, INC. v. COMMISSIONER, 50 TAX LAW. 181 (1996) (re
port issued in response to Notice 96-7).
109. See T.D. 6291, 23 Fed. Reg. 2,244 (Apr. 5, 1958).
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ally add to the value of the property nor appreciably prolong its
life, but keep it in an ordinarily efficient operating condition"
may be categorized as an expense. 110 Regulations of that same
vintage 111 provide that amounts expended for "permanent im
provements or betterments made to increase the value of any
property" or made in "restoring property" or to "substantially
prolong [its] useful life" or "to adapt property to a new or differ
ent use" must be capitalized. 112 The language in vintage "repair"
cases, such as American Bemberg Corp. v. Commissioner, 113 re
ally miss the mark, though stare decisis (and the regulations, of
course) has the effect of perpetuating it.
American Bemberg built a factory near a river in 1925
1928. In 1940 and 1941, portions of the factory floor caved in,
and American Bemberg expended almost $1 million to fill in
large cavities in the subsoil above the bedrock and under the
floor with grout (essentially a low grade cement) and sought to
deduct the costs as current expenses. The Tax Court said:
In deciding whether the expenditures . . . may be classed as
expenses of the business . . . or whether they [were capital ex
penditures], we think it is appropriate to consider the purpose,
the physical nature, and the effect of the work for which the ex
penditures were made.
In connection with the purpose of the work, [the outlays were]
intended to avert a plant-wide disaster and avoid forced abandon
ment of the plant. The purpose was not to improve, better, ex
tend, or increase the original plant, nor to prolong its original
useful life. Its continued operation was endangered; the purpose
of the expenditures was to enable petitioner to continue in opera
tion not on any better scale, but on the same scale and . . . as ef
ficiently as it had operated before. . . .
In connection with the effect of the work, the accomplishment of
what was done forestalled imminent disaster and gave petitioner
some assurances that major cave-ins would not occur in the fu
ture ....n•
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4.
See T.D. 6313, 23 Fed. Reg. 7,172 (Sept. 17, 1958).
Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-l(a), (b).
10 T.C. 361 (1948), affd, 177 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1949) (per curiam).
10 T.C. at 376-77.
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Thus, the court allowed current deduction of the nearly $1 mil
lion outlay. 115
The outlay certainly did not contribute to past income, nor
can it be limited to the earning of 1941-42 income. The outlay,
beyond question, contributed substantially to the creation of
substantial future income. The court's language does not focus,
however, on the outlay's connection to substantial future income
but rather to the "purpose, physical nature, and the effect of the
work," taking a dictionary approach to the word "repair." Such
an approach was understandable-excusable, as an historical
matter-since it was developed during eras when we did not
have a full or widespread understanding of the relationship be
tween a consumption tax and income tax and how the immedi
ate deduction of an outlay creating future income creates the ec
onomic equivalent of a consumption tax, effectively exempting
the return on the investment from tax. Today, however, the
American Bemberg court's kind of analysis misses the mark. To
day, "repair" and "permanent improvement" should best be per
ceived as mere shorthand in trying to determine which outlays
will likely create substantial future income and which will not.
The focus in American Bemberg on the literal language-as
though the terms had independent significance-derails the un
derlying inquiry, which is the likelihood of future benefits. Per
haps it would even be better simply to drop the "repair" versus
"permanent-improvement" shorthand and get right to the real
issue, though I realize that that suggestion is too radical for re
alistic adoption. 116 At the least, however, courts and administra
tive guidance should use INDOPCO and the income-tax value
underlying it to inform the inquiry regarding where the line
should be drawn between an "expense" and a "permanent
improvement."
115. See also Illinois Merchants Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 4 B.T.A 103 (1926)
(similarly allowing current deduction of the substantial cost of replacing pilings under a
building after the pilings, which had been submerged in water, developed dry rot. The
court reasoned that the replacement did not extend the life of the building beyond what
it would have been had the dry rot not occurred).
116. As Professor Johnson put it:
Repairs and other remedial costs are not different from any other costs. They
should prove to be capitalized under INDOPCO if they provide significant future
benefits. Deductible repairs are those repairs that have expired by year-end or
that can be treated as if they had expired without material distortion.
Johnson, After INDOPCO, supra note 90, at 1334-35.
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Has INDOPCO changed the rhetoric in such cases to better
reflect the underlying theory at stake? The report card is mixed.
No court or ruling explains in plain English the income-tax
value at stake underlying tax capitalization; articles by practi
tioners are also similarly limited. 117 All nonacademic commenta
tors either fail to discuss the theory underlying tax capitaliza
tion at all or implicitly assume that it is a matching rationale.
They therefore are not guided by the deep structural theory of
capitalization advanced here. Moreover, the rhetoric doggedly
carries forward the pre-INDOPCO analysis, tacking on the IN
DOPCO inquiry only as an add-on at the end. Nevertheless,
some cases and rulings have begun to require capitalization in
appropriate cases even when the outlay clearly seeks merely to
allow continuation of the operation on the same scale as previ
ously, as in American Bemberg itself.
As an example from the Commissioner, consider a Technical
Advice Memorandum dealing with the deductibility of asbestos
removal. 118 Because both the Federal Occupational Safety and
Health Administration and the state in which the taxpayer op
erated imposed new regulations regarding permissible levels of
airborne asbestos fibers in the workplace, the taxpayer decided
to remove the asbestos lining in its business equipment and re
place it with alternative insulation. Alternatively, the taxpayer
could have continuously monitored the levels of asbestos during
ordinary repairs. The taxpayer rejected the latter option because
of its more significant long-term costs, the risk of being found in
violation of federal or state law, and the risk of equipment
downtime. The replacement insulation was 10 percent less effi
cient than the asbestos. The cost, while significant, was minor
in relation to overall maintenance costs for the facility and in
relation to the equipment's assessed value for property tax
purposes.
The Commissioner used INDOPCO primarily for its state
ment that deductions are exceptions to the general rule of capi
talization. It then went immediately to pre-INDOPCO analysis,
weighing the facts to determine whether the asbestos removal
117. See, e.g., Peter L. Faber, INDOPCO: The Still Unsolved Riddle, 47 TAX LAw.
607, 634 (1994) (arguing against the presumption in favor of capitalization and implic
itly failing to understand that immediate deduction of a capital expenditure, by defini
tion, fails to reflect income clearly in the income tax sense since it allows consumption
tax treatment); id. at 635 (explicitly adopting the matching rationale).
118. T.A.M. 9240004 (June 19, 1992).
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constituted an incidental repair or a permanent improvement or
betterment. The ruling concluded that the equipment was per
manently improved because it became more marketable after
the asbestos removal. It rejected the taxpayer's American
Bemberg-type argument that the asbestos removal did not in
crease the value of the property but merely restored it to its
original value before the asbestos problem was discovered. The
distinction was disingenuous: It noted that the work done in
American Bemberg did not cure the underlying geological defect
but dealt only with its consequences, while the taxpayer's asbes
tos removal cured the underlying problem-a distinction which
has nothing to do with the connection of the outlay to substan
tial future income and the underlying tax values at stake. It
nevertheless served notice that American Bemberg-type argu
ments are going to be given short shrift today.
The ruling returned to INDOPCO at the end, after a "fi
nally," unfortunately indicating that it provides only an add-on
analysis rather than the embodiment of the capitalization in
quiry. The ruling concludes that the asbestos removal created
long-term benefits, including safer working conditions, reduced
liability risks for owners and investors, and increased marketa
bility. The ruling gave no indication that the future-benefits in
quiry is what underlies the repair-permanent improvement di
chotomy. That is, it displayed no understanding that the pre
INDOPCO tests essentially try to get at the INDOPCO question
via indirect methods. The drafting implied that the INDOPCO
analysis was an independent, additional reason for concluding
that the outlay had to be capitalized here. All that really needed
to be said in this ruling after a clear explanation of the income
tax value and how capitalization protects it is that, under IN
DOPCO, it is clear that the significant outlays did not pertain to
past or current-year income but rather contributed substantially
to future income. Thus, capitalization is necessary to prevent
the effective sheltering of that future income from tax.
From the courts, consider the post-JNDOPCO case of The
Swig Investment Co. v. United States. 119 The Commissioner chal
lenged the current deduction of $3,023,347 incurred to replace
"an entablature, which had been constructed in 1907 and con
sisted of five foot high unreinforced terra cotta and concrete par
apets with overhanging cornices around the entire roof perime
119. 96-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) Cf[ 50,540 (1996).
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ter" of the Fairmont Hotel in San Francisco. The parapets and
cornices were not deteriorated or in otherwise poor condition.
They were replaced solely because they failed to comply with a
city earthquake ordinance that increased the safety standards
applicable to such appurtenances. The engineering team hired to
rectify the problem replaced the cornices and parapets with rep
licas made of glass-fiber-reinforced concrete rather than terra
cotta. Moreover, they were attached to the hotel using welded
connections instead of wire supports.
The court agreed with the Commissioner that the outlay
constituted a capital expenditure, even though it merely brought
the building into conformity with the city ordinance and allowed
it to continue operations on the same basis as before. It cited
INDOPCO and concluded that the outlay produced significant
benefits that extended beyond the tax year. But its rhetoric was
not otherwise helpful. This court, too, failed to appreciate and
explain the role of capitalization in an income tax. The court
cited the unfortunate language from INDOPCO quoted earlier
that bought into the rhetoric of the matching principle. 120 It did
not point out that the capitalization of outlays that contribute
significantly to the earning of future income ensures that such
future income is effectively taxed. In short, it failed to under
stand, as did the Supreme Court, that matching has nothing to
do with it. And it, too, used the INDOPCO inquiry as though it
constituted a separate consideration from the repair-permanent
improvement analysis. Under the latter analysis, the court con
cluded that the replacements significantly improved the struc
tural soundness of the hotel and thus increased its value.
Rather than being an incidental repair, the court concluded that
the work "was a major replacement project." It could simply
have said that the income earned with respect to the significant
outlay cannot be limited to the current year's receipts or past
receipts but rather will contribute to significant earnings far
into the future.
And some courts still come to the wrong results. Consider
the Seventh Circuit's reversal of the Tax Court in A.E. Staley
Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner. 121 Staley sought to deduct
investment banking and advisory fees in connection with its ul
timate acquisition by Tate & Lyle PLC. The only difference be
120. See supra not.e 101 and accompanying t.ext.
121. 105 T.C. 166 (1995), rev'd, 119 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 1997).
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tween the facts of this case and those in INDOPCO was that the
Tate & Lyle offer was at first invited, then rejected, and then af
ter much maneuvering finally accepted when there was no alter
native and the Board of Directors was obligated under law to
recommend acceptance to the shareholders of what was consid
ered by the investment bankers to be a fair offer. 122 Tax Court
Judge Halpern, writing for the majority, required capitalization
of the fees under INDOPCO, notwithstanding that the acquisi
tion was at one point resisted-was "hostile," in trade parlance.
He wrote, "Neither the investment bankers' fees nor the print
ing fees related to current income production or needs of the im
mediate present. Those fees were incurred in connection with a
change in ownership with indefinite and extended future
consequences."123
The Seventh Circuit reversed, focusing on the fact that this
was a "hostile" attack and not the friendly merger undertaken
in INDOPCO. Judge Ripple, writing for the court, noted that
Tate & Lyle promised to sell the business (which it ultimately
did). Judge Ripple saw the hostile offer as an attack on Staley's
business; he thus reasoned that the costs of defending that busi
ness should be currently deductible as would the costs of de
fending a lawsuit. 124 Lee A. Sheppard's pithy commentary sum
marized how seductive but ultimately shortsighted such
reasoning is.
It is tempting to believe that the advisory expenses incurred
by a target corporation in fending off a hostile takeover are some
how different from the expenses incurred by the target of a
friendly acquisition, so that while the latter must be capitalized,
the former should be immediately deductible as somehow com
pelled....
The reality of being a publicly traded corporation is that
there is really no such thing as a hostile takeover. There are only
offers that managers and boards believe are insufficient. A pub
licly traded company is for sale every day the securities markets
are open. "Hostile" is a construct; what is really going on is no
more hostile than professional wrestling.
INDOPCO does not require a court to get into a debate about
whether the merger or other capital transaction was a good idea.
122. The facts are drawn from 105 T.C. at 168-80.
123. Id. at 197.
124. See 119 F.3d at 490.
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It asks whether the corporation's capital structure and future
were affected, indulging in the polite fiction that the board did
what it thought would benefit the corporation.
The Seventh Circuit in Staley sincerely believed the manage
ment argument that the business itself and management's philos
ophy-for which read the foolish decision to diversify-were
under attack. But it does not follow that responding to such a
threat should be immediately deductible. If that was the case,
then why wouldn't the court understand that the hostile takeover
defense costs were, as management claimed, intended to ensure
the long-term future of Staley as a conglomerate? If the life of the
business and not just the manager's personal comfort is at stake
in a hostile takeover defense, why aren't those properly capital
ized? The Seventh Circuit believed that the fate of Staley was at
stake. Win or lose, the cost of ensuring that ought to be capital.
[Judge Ripple] ignored the fact that, once the professional wres
tling was over, the board and management had a duty under Del
aware law to get out of the way and get the highest price for the
shareholders.125

The critical fact was that the change in ownership structure did
occur, and costs allocable to changes in ownership structure
should always be capitalized, period.
In short, both the Service and the courts should strive to
further widespread understanding of the role of capitalization in
an income tax by focusing on the income-tax value in their rul
ings and cases. Discussion of the role of capitalization in an in
come tax would lead to better development by practitioners and
courts of the appropriate analysis of the cases: whether the out
lay contributes significantly to future income, on the one hand,
or past or present income, on the other. The line-drawing will
not be any easier under this inquiry than it was under pre-IN
DOPCO rhetoric, but it is the correct inquiry to make. Discus
sions of whether an outlay constitutes a "repair" or "permanent
improvement" in the literal, dictionary sense for example, are
merely indirect methods of trying to get at the same inquiry. It
would be healthier to the future development of the law if that
inquiry were done aboveboard, directly, explicitly.
125. Lee A. Sheppard, Will There Euer Be Another Friendly Takeouer?, 76 TAX
Non:s 461, 461-65 (July 28, 1997). See also Calvin H. Johnson, Snarling for the Cam
eras: Hostility and Takeouer Expense Deductions, 76 TAX Non:s 689 (Aug. 4, 1997).
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2. Depreciation
Just as capitalization serves a purpose in the income tax
that is wholly different from the matching purpose that it serves
in financial accounting, the role of depreciation in an income tax
also has nothing to do with matching revenues and costs. Its tax
role is to allow the deduction of final, passage-of-time losses of
income-producing property. And just as with capitalization, fail
ure to understand this tax rQle can lead to premature deduction
of capitalized costs and thus violation of the income-tax value.
With few exceptions, 126 our current income tax system
adopts the principle of "realization,'' under which gains and
losses in the value of property owned by taxpayers are not taken
into account until the value change is made final by a "realiza
tion event," typically disposition of the property other than by
gift. But certain gains and losses are not transient, i.e., subject
to market forces, but rather are final and thus "realized" in the
tax sense even before the property is disposed of. I am referring
to gains and losses that arise solely because of the ineluctable
passage of time.
On the gain side, for example, consider an original issue
discount obligation held by Lender. Lender transfers $10,000 to
Borrower in exchange for a debt instrument entitling Lender to
collect $12,597 at the end of three years. The instrument re
quires the payment of no "interest," but Lender knows that the
repayment terms are equivalent to repayment of the $10,000 at
the end of three years coupled with payment of 8 percent com
pound interest each year. At the end of each year of ownership,
we know with certainty that the value of Lender's debt instru
ment has increased in value by an amount that is not subject to
market forces but rather is due solely to the passage of time. 127
The amount of the permanent, realized increase in value of the
instrument at the end of the first year can be obtained by multi
plying $10,000 by 8 percent, or $800. The amount of the perma
nent, realized increase in value at the end of year 2 is $864
($10,800 multiplied by 8 percent), and the amoilnt for year 3 is
126. See, e.g., l.R.C. §§ 475, 1256 (requiring mark-to-market accounting for certain
financial investment products owned by certain taxpayers).
127. It may also decrease in value because of market forces, such as the increas
ingly precarious solvency of Borrower. But those kinds of value changes may be tran
sient and thus are not taken into account for tax purposes until actually realized, such
as when the debt instrument becomes worthless. See l.R.C. §§ 165(g), 166.

1998]

THE MYTH OF MATCHING

59

$933 ($11,664 multiplied by 8 percent). 128 The original issue dis
count rules 129 require Lender to include these "final" gains each
year as they are realized through the sheer passage of time,
even though the property (the debt instrument) has not yet been
disposed of or retired.
Depreciation is the flip side of the coin. While fluctuations
in the value of business or investment property due to market
forces are not generally realized, and thus taken into account
for tax purposes, until the property is disposed of, "the concept
of a 'sustained' loss encompasses events short of disposition.
Thus, destruction or abandonment of business or investment
property produces a 'sustained' loss, as does worthlessness. A
'sustained' loss thus means, in a realization-based income tax
system, a final or irretrievable loss." 130 Passage of time losses
due to the encroaching end of a finite useful life are final losses
and thus appropriately deducted in a realization-based income
tax system. 131
Since financial theory tells us that an asset's value is the sum of
the present values of all net future receipts expected to be real
ized from the asset, there are four possible causes for a loss in an
asset's value.
First, the expected aggregate amount (as opposed to the num
ber) of future net receipts may decline from the initial projection.
Second, the discount rate may increase so that the present value
of the future receipts may turn out to be less than expected.
Third, the time at which future receipts are anticipated to occur
may turn out to be later than previously estimated. Fourth, the
number of future receipts may decrease, because the asset has a
finite income-generating capacity.
The first three of these factors are subject to countervailing
and transient changes from time to time, and thus losses attribu
128. See DODGE ET AL., supra note 20, at 663-64 (describing this hypothetical).
129. See I.R.C. §§ 1271-1275.
130. Joseph M. Dodge & Deborah A. Geier, Simon Says: A Liddle Night Music
With Those Depreciation Deductions, Please, 69 TAX NCYrEs 617, 623 (Oct. 30, 1995) (foot
notes omitted).
131. That depreciation was not intended to be considered an "exception" to the re
alization requirement is buttressed by history. The first income tax statute allowed de
preciation deductions, i.e., allowed deductions of the basis of an asset prior to its disposi
tion. See Act of Oct. 3, 1913, 38 Stat. 167. At that time, however, the realization
requirement was thought to be constitutionally mandated. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252
U.S. 189 (1920). Deductions attributable to depreciation, in other words, have always
been considered-at least implicitly-to be realized losses, and only losses that are "fi
nal" are realized.
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table to them cannot, at any particular point in time, be consid
ered "sustained." With respect to an asset with a finite useful life,
however, the number of future receipts (the fourth factor above)
must decrease with the passage of time: As the remaining in
come-producing life gets shorter, the number of remaining re
ceipts must inevitably decline. Since value loss produced by this
phenomenon is permanent, the loss is appropriately considered to
be "sustained." . . .
In sum, depreciation, under a tax system with a realization
principle, is the method by which "sustained" losses due solely to
the passage of time (factor four above) are reckoned. Thus, depre
ciation is necessarily a function of useful life, and the other fac
tors that affect value are not decisive, including fair market value
itself. 132

Consider, for example, 133 Investor's purchase of a machine
for $300,000 that will produce income for three years and then
be valueless. Because Investor has merely changed the form of
her wealth, i.e., she has made a capital expenditure, she is not
allowed to deduct the $300,000 outlay at the time of purchase,
in order to protect the income-tax value. That is, immediate de
duction of the $300,000 would effectively exempt the returns
nominally included in the tax base in the future from tax, as
under a consumption tax. 134 Assume that the machine will gen
erate three level payments that will yield a recovery of Inves
tor's $300,000 outlay plus a return equal to the current discount
rate of 10 percent. Under these assumptions, Investor will earn
a gross yield of $120,634 in each of the three years.
Gross Annual Return on $300,000
3-Year Investment at 10% Discount Rate
Year
1
2

3

Gross Receipts
$120,634
120,634
120,634

Present Value
$109,668
99,698
90,634

$300,000
132. Dodge & Geier, supra note 130, at 623.
133. The example is taken from id. at 624.
134. See supra notes 81-125 and accompanying text.
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Investor should be allowed to reduce the gross receipts by
the $300,000 capital expenditure incurred to produce them, but
how should the cost recovery be scheduled? If we consider cost
recovery under the accountant's "matching principle," where the
matching of revenues and costs is the paramount value, perhaps
the cost should be deducted in accordance with the expected
scheduling of receipts. Since Investor expects to earn three level
payments of $120,634, perhaps the cost should be matched
against those receipts in equal amounts of $100,000 each year
in order to measure income "accurately," according to financial
accounting tenets of accurate income measurement. 135
Such a scheduling for tax purposes, however, would violate
the realization principle, as it overstates the sustained losses in
years 1 and 2 and understates the sustained loss in year 3.
"Correct" realization depreciation in year 1 would be $90,634,
which is the excess of the $300,000 (the value at the beginning)
less the sum of $109,668 and $99,698 (or $209,366). That sum
comprises the present values at the end of year 1, using the
original discount rate, of the two remaining receipts. The
$90,634 difference between these two numbers represents the ir
retrievable loss in value of the machine due solely to the. fact
that the machine is one year nearer to the end of its income
producing life. The "correct" depreciation deductions for years 2
and 3 would be $99,698 and $109,668, respectively, when the
same principles are applied to those years. 136 Thus, $100,000 de
ductions in each of the three years overstates the sustained loss
realized in years 1 and 2. And recall the significance of allowing
premature deduction of a portion of a capital expenditure: It is
tantamount to exempting the return from that portion from tax,
as though the return were being treated under a consumption
135. This is a simple example of a unit-of-production or income forecast method,
which also happens to replicate the results in this simple hypothetical of straight line
depreciation, or even proration over the recovery period. "(U]nder the unit of production
method or income forecast methods, the remaining basis of the asset is multiplied by a
fraction, the numerator of which is units of use {or dollars of income received, as the
case may be) and the denominator of which is total remaining expected units of use {or
dollars of income)." Dodge & Geier, supra note 130, at 624 n.41. Actually, "[f]inancial ac
counting traditionally [has] allowed the business to elect among several methods of com
puting depreciation, so long as the methods were rational and were followed consist
ently." Id. at 624 n.42.
136. This method of determining depreciation is commonly called "sinking-fund"
depreciation or "Samuelson" depreciation. See generally Paul A Samuelson, 'Ib.1: Deduct
ibility of Economic Depreciation to Insure Invariant Valuations, 72 J. POL. ECON. 604
(1964).
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tax regime instead of an income-tax regime. 137 Thus, while the
$100,000 deductions in each of the three years might measure
income "accurately" in the financial accounting world, where the
matching principle reigns supreme, such a scheduling of deduc
tions would violate the income-tax value and thus would fail to
reflect income "clearly" in the tax sense. 138 This illustrates once
again that the matching principle has no role as a tax value and
sometimes is actually antithetical to tax values.
Appreciation of this nuanced difference between the role
that depreciation plays in the different worlds of financial ac
counting and the income tax can once again be gained by con
sidering what would happen if Congress replaced the current In
ternal Revenue Code with a pure, cash flow consumption tax.
Because capitalization would be a thing of the past for tax pur
137. See supra notes 81-125 and accompanying text; authorities cited in supra note
89.
138. Some commentators continue to be insufficiently sensitive to the role of tax
depreciation and adopt the matching principle as a tax value. For example, the hypo
thetical in the text demonstrates how the income forecast method can violate tax values
by matching depreciation deductions with the fluctuating income earned by the asset.
Such depreciation methods •are flawed under the realization principle, because they im
plicitly take into account temporary fluctuations of income." Dodge & Geier, supra note
130, at 624 n.41. Yet, Professor Mary LaFrance wrote:
In principle, the income forecast method offers a reasonable means of deter
mining the rate at which a taxpayer's investment in a motion picture or similar
asset is exhausted because it bases annual depreciation on the productivity of the
asset during the year in question. This method, therefore, matches income and ex
pense in a way that produces a "clear reflection of income" as required by the
Code.
Mary LaFrance, Trouble in Transamerica· Deferred Compensation, Contingent Debt, and
Overstated Basis, 15 VA TAX REv. 685, 691 (1996). See also id. at 715 (explicitly adopting
a matching rationale for tax depreciation with no citations to authorities recognizing
that only Samuelson depreciation is consistent with the income-tax value by preventing
premature deduction of capital expenditures, regardless of fluctuating income). Under
the tax values discussed here, however, Professor LaFrance was nevertheless correct in
the larger point of her article. She argued that deferred compensation and other future
liabilities should not be included in the basis of films depreciated under the income fore
cast method. Inclusion of such future expenses in the basis of depreciable films would
result in premature deduction of these costs.
As with other deviations from tax values discussed in this Article, Congress has cho
sen to deviate from the income-tax value in the context of depreciation by allowing accel
erated depreciation, including the income forecast method in some cases, over artificially
short useful lives, which allows the capital expenditure to be depreciated much faster
than Samuelson depreciation would dictate. See l.R.C. § 168(b), (c), and (e) (prescribing
depreciation schedules and recovery periods, none of which require sinking-fund depreci
ation over actual useful lives). The stated reasoning in the legislative history for these
decisions was to provide an investment stimulus for economic expansion. See infra notes
151-162 and accompanying text.
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poses, there would be no need for tax depreciation; all such costs
would be immediately expensed. Yet, financial accountants
would continue to capitalize costs and then allow depreciation to
match future income. Capitalization and depreciation simply
serve very different purposes in the two worlds. In the tax
world, we saw that capitalization protects the tax on income
from investments and depreciation allows deduction of final,
sustained losses. Premature depreciation of capitalized costs vio
lates the income-tax value and thus must be avoided in the ab
sence of specific Congressional authorization. In the financial ac
counting world, on the other hand, both capitalization and
depreciation serve simply to match costs with related income for
informational purposes.
There is a wonderful example in this context that shows
how accountants and tax theorists approach this issue very dif
ferently. Because the financial accounting approach and tax the
ory approach both point to the same result in the example, it
also implicitly illustrates how easy it can be for some judges and
practitioners to blithely assume that financial accounting values
and tax values-in particular the matching principle-are
coterminous.
In Hewlett Packard Co. v. United States, 139 the taxpayer's
predecessor sought to depreciate a pool of rotable spare parts
that it kept on hand from year to year and used as necessary to
repair computers it had previously sold to customers. The pool
was created with original computer parts from its manufactur
ing business. When a replacement part was needed in the
course of a repair, the taxpayer would substitute the malfunc
tioning part with one from the pool, repair the old part, and re
turn it to the pool. Thus, the pool was maintained from year to
year at a constant level. The Service argued that the parts in
the pool were part of the taxpayer's inventory and thus could
not be depreciated. While the lower court agreed with the Ser
vice, the Federal Circuit reversed and allowed the taxpayer to
depreciate the spare parts.
Whether or not the taxpayer was required to inventory the
spare parts depended "on whether the exchange of rotable spare
parts for the original parts in [the] customers' computers consti
tuted the 'sale of merchandise' as an 'income-producing fac
139. 71 F.3d 398 (Fed. Cir. 1995), rev'g Apollo Computer, Inc. v. United States, 32
Cl. Ct. 334 (1994). The facts are drawn from 71 F.3d at 398-99.
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tor.' "140 The Federal Circuit concluded:
The undisputed facts show that [the taxpayer's] maintenance bus
iness was a service business in which it maintained the pool of
ratable spare parts in order to provide better service to its cus
tomers. In any realistic sense [the taxpayer's] substitution of a
rotable spare part for a malfunctioning original part in a cus
tomer's computer was not a sale of that part to the customer. Ac
cordingly, in the language of the regulation, the "sale of merchan
dise" was not an "income-producing factor" in the conduct of [the
taxpayer's] repair business. 141

The court, in other words, approached the language of the con
trolling regulation in a literal manner, seeking illumination in
the scope of the regulation from neither the "matching principle"
from financial accounting nor the role and purpose of inventory
accounting in the protection of tax values.
Both Professor Dennis J. Gaffney, an accounting professor
who served as an expert witness for the federal government in
the case, and Professor Calvin H. Johnson, a law professor, who
was considered but not used as a government expert in the case,
have written scathing commentaries on the court's result and
reasoning. 142 But though both agree that the rotable spare parts
should have been considered inventory and thus should not have
been depreciable, they argue for their positions on very different
grounds, reflecting their very different perspectives as account
ing theorist and tax theorist.
Professor Gaffney wrote that "much of the error results
from a failure of some courts to understand basic financial ac
counting concepts such as 'expired' costs, 'unexpired' costs, and
'matching.' "143 He went on to explain in some detail how the
matching principle required treatment of the rotable spare parts
as inventory that is not depreciable under financial accounting
principles:
140. 71 F.3d at 400 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.471-1).
141. Id.
142. Calvin H. Johnson, Federal Circuit Plays Dirty Pool With Inventory Account
ing, 70 TAX NOTES 111 (Jan. 1, 1996) [hereinafter Johnson, Dirty Pool]; Gaffney, supra
note 35. The fact that the government chose to use the accounting professor as an expert
witness instead of the tax professor provides implicit confirmation that many courts fail
to understand fully that financial accounting values and tax accounting values can
diverge.
143. Gaffney, supra note 35, at 1009.
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The matching concept associates the consumption of an as
set's service potential (i.e., the diminution of an asset's ability to
generate future economic benefits) with a period. Depending on
the circumstances, the "match" of cost consumption to a period is
made through: 1. a revenue, 2. an event, or 3. an allocation.
If there is a direct cause-and-effect relationship between a
revenue and the consumption of the service potential represented
by a cost, expense is recognized in the same period that the reve
nue is recognized. An obvious example of this direct "match" is
the normal sale of merchandise transaction; the cost of a good
sold is recognized in the same period as the revenue from the sale
of that good. . . . .
There are two mutually exclusive approaches to recognizing
as expense the consumption of costs not directly associated with
particular revenues. I refer to the first as a "matching-based-on
events" and to the second as a "matching-based-on-allocation." ...
Note that depreciation (fixed asset) accounting reflects the
last approach, a matching-based-on-allocation approach, to ex
pense recognition.
Unless the difference in results is trivial in all periods af
fected, it is inappropriate to match costs to periods on the basis of
allocation when those costs could be matched to periods on the
basis of events. Allocations, by their very nature, involve an ele
ment of arbitrariness. Allocations are made when there is no bet
ter way to do what needs to be done. Accounting strives to deter
mine periodic income as accurately as available methodologies
permit and, therefore, accounting employs allocations only when
no better methodology is available.
What accounting methodology produces the best "match" of
costs to periods in these rotable spare parts cases, an inventory
approach or a fixed asset (depreciation) approach? ... The best
"match" results from the inventory methodology, since the loss in
utility of the rotable spare parts pool results from an identifiable
event, the installation of a functioning part in the customer's
computer, and the increases and decreases in the utility of the
pool can be both identified ("tracked") and measured. There is no
need for cost allocation. 144
144. Id. at 1011-12 (emphasis in original). Professor Gaffney goes on to describe
how the court's allowance of depreciation of the rotable spare parts pool provides a
roadmap to manufacturers providing warranty, maintenance, or repair work on their
products for circumventing Thor Power Tool:
The approach would be simple. Create a pool of rotable spare parts, segregate
the pool from the inventory used in the manufacturing activity, treat the pool as a
depreciable fixed asset, transfer inventory including that which might otherwise
be regarded as •excess" inventory into the pool, and then use the parts in the de
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Thus, Professor Gaffney's appraisal was made through the
prism of financial accounting and the matching principle that is
at its heart. Inventory accounting in general, in which the cost
of the good sold is deducted against the revenue earned on the
sale in the same period, is justified in the financial accounting
world because it provides a match of the related costs and reve
nues in the same period. The costs of the spare parts, though
not associated with any particular revenue stream, should not
be allocated (depreciated) across periods under financial ac
counting principles because the expiration of the costs can be
linked to an identifiable event, which requires accounting for
the cost in the period of the event.
This analysis is quite different from the tax analysis prof
fered by Professor Johnson. Inventory accounting in tax is not
premised on the matching of costs and revenues for the sake of
matching. It is true that inventory accounting delays deduction
of the costs of the goods sold until revenue is earned on the sale
and thus "matches" the costs and revenues in the same period.
But this is descriptive only and does not explain the tax value
at stake in inventory accounting. The tax value protected by the
delay of the deduction of costs of goods on hand for sale in fu
ture years is the income-tax value. Such costs for goods on hand
are capital expenditures. The taxpayer's wealth has changed
form upon the purchase or manufacture of inventory but there
has been no decrease in wealth. Hence, premature deduction of
the capital expenditures representing the cost of goods on hand
for sale would effectively exempt the future sales revenues from
tax, violating the income-tax value. The same analysis explains
why the rotable spare parts maintained from year to year
should not be depreciable.
Deducting or depreciating inventory costs that are still on
hand and still valuable is a violation of the fundamental norms of
an income tax. Under an income tax, costs that remain part of
wealth cannot be deducted, even when the costs are profit
related. Investments, in an income tax, are made and continued
with cash that has not been deducted. Costs that remain part of
preciable fixed asset pool to provide warranty, maintenance, and time-and
materials repairs. The excess inventory could effectively be written down (and, ul
timately, written oft) through depreciation deductions; this avoids the need to of
fer the excess inventory to potential customers at a reduced price.
Gaffney, supra note 35, at 1012.
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the taxpayer's wealth and investment must not be deducted, but
Just remain part of basis.
The ability to deduct unexpired costs that remain part of
wealth and investment is an extraordinary privilege within an in
come tax. Deducting unexpired costs is like exempting subsequent
income generated by the costs from tax: The ability to make an
investment with deducted or untaxed "soft money" can ordinarily
be expected to be as valuable as not having to pay tax on the sub
sequent income. The effective tax rate on the income generated
by the investment is zero. 145

In other words, capitalization and the protection of the in
come-tax value informs the role of inventory accounting in tax,
and that is what is sought to be captured by the test fashioned
in the controlling regulation, regarding whether "the sale of
merchandise" is an "income-producing factor." 146 The Hewlett
Packard court demonstrated no understanding at all of this tax
value and how its decision undermined it. The court did not
turn to the structural underpinnings of an income tax, including
the role of capitalization and the income-tax value it protects, in
order to help give it guidance regarding what the words of Trea
sury Regulation§ 1.471-1 meant.141
While both Professor Gaffney's "matching-principle" ap
proach from financial accounting and Professor Johnson's "in
come-tax value" approach from tax accounting would have
reached the same result if applied correctly by the Hewlett
Packard court, it is dangerous for courts to assume that they
would reach similar results in all cases and that, therefore, the
matching principle is itself a tax value as well. There are many
costs that are permissibly depreciated or amortized under the
matching principle for financial accounting purposes that cannot
145. Johnson, Dirty Pool, supra note 142, at 112.
146. Treas. Reg. § 1.471-1.
147. The Hewlett-Packard court is not alone in this habit. See infra notes 427-451
and accompanying text. As discussed there, the Service has attempted to force cash ba
sis taxpayers to use the accrual method of accounting (required of all taxpayers who are
also required to use inventory accounting) by arguing that they sold "merchandise" in
the course of providing services to taxpayers and that the sale of such merchandise was
an "income-producing factor," even though the taxpayers kept no inventory from year to
year. There, too, the courts parsed this language in a literal fashion with no guidance
from the underlying structure of an income tax and the role of inventory accounting
within it and required taxpayers who had no inventory from year to year but rather who
purchased merchandise on an as-needed basis for each job to switch to the accrual
method of accounting under the "inventory" shoehorn.
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be similarly depreciated or amortized for tax purposes without
violating the income-tax value.
For example, consider the cost of goodwill when one busi
ness purchases another. 148 In the absence of "pooling-of-interest"
accounting, where the creation of goodwill is avoided, "purchase"
accounting in the financial accounting world provides that such
goodwill can (indeed must) be amortized over a number of years
after the business combination. 149 For tax purposes, however,
goodwill is not considered to have an ascertainable useful life
and thus is not generally depreciable. 150 The critical importance
of the "useful-life" requirement is appreciated only when one un
derstands the tax role of depreciation. Without an ascertainable
useful life, no sustained losses arise with the passage of time.
Depreciation deductions for a capital expenditure that has no
ascertainable useful life would effectively exempt the future in
come of that investment from tax, violating the income-tax
value. These concerns are inapposite in financial accounting,
where the matching of revenues and costs requires amortization
of acquired goodwill, even though the goodwill may have a long
and indeterminate useful life.
The cases of Simon v. Commissioner 151 and Liddle v. Com
missioner152 are examples of recent decisions where the match
ing rhetoric and the absence of an understanding of the role of
tax depreciation contributed to the wrong results and created
dangerous reasoning for future cases. The Tax Court and Second
148. By •goodwill" I generally mean the excess of the purchase price over the value
of the identifiable tangible and intangible assets constituting the purchased business.
The excess value represents such things as going-concern value and the expectation of
continued patronage by old customers of the acquired business.
149. See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
150. "An intangible asset, the useful life of which is not limited, is not subject to
the allowance for depreciation. ... No deduction for depreciation is allowable with re
spect to good will." Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3. Inability to deduct the costs of acquired
goodwill until sale or termination of the acquired business enterprise prompted much lit
igation by taxpayers attempting to show that a component of purcbased goodwill could
be segregated and proven to have an ascertainable useful life-and thus the costs for its
purchase could be amortized. See, e.g., Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507
U.S. 546 (1993). Congress became concerned with the administrative costs of the case-by
case litigation associated with these fact-bound cases and the unfairness inherent in a
process that was effectively open only to taxpayers with the financial resources to liti
gate. It thus enacted section 197 in 1993, which generally allows 15-year amortization
for the costs of purchased goodwill acquired as part of a going concern. Section 197 is
properly understood as primarily reflecting the tax value of administrability.
151. 103 T.C. 247 (1994), af{'d, 68 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995), nonacq., 1996-2 C.B. 2.
152. 103 T.C. 285 (1994), af{'d, 65 F.3d 329 (3d Cir. 1995).
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Circuit held in Simon 153 that professional musicians could depre
ciate their 19th century violin bows made by the premier bow
maker, Francois Xavier Tourte. The Tax Court and the Third
Circuit held in Liddle 154 that a professional musician could de
preciate his 17th century bass viola built by Francesco Ruggeri.
In both cases, these instruments had substantial value in the
collector market when their playing lives were finished and thus
had no ascertainable useful life. Yet, because the instruments
demonstrated some physical wear and tear with use (which did
not diminish their worth in the collector market), the courts
held that the instruments were eligible for depreciation under
section 167, which allows a depreciation deduction "for the ex
haustion, wear and tear (including a reasonable allowance for
obsolescence)" of business and investment property. While that
language had always been interpreted to mean that only wast
ing assets could be depreciated, and while that language had
not been amended since it was enacted in 1954, the Tax Court,
Second Circuit, and Third Circuit each concluded that the un
amended language took on a new meaning-one that negated
the requirement that an asset have an ascertainable useful life
in order to be depreciable-when in 1981 Congress created arti
ficial recovery periods that no longer corresponded to actual use
ful lives.
In other words, the courts took a new and literal approach
to the "wear and tear" language, demonstrating no understand
ing of the role that depreciation plays in an income tax and
showing no appreciation of the underlying income-tax value that
is violated when capital expenditures are allowed to be deducted
prematurely without clear Congressional permission, effectively
exempting the future returns from tax. 155 In so doing, they mini
mized the all important useful-life requirement for tax deprecia
tion. While Congress has allowed depreciation deductions to be
taken over artificially short useful lives using methods that
frontload the deductions in the early years (in order, according
to the legislative history, to encourage investment in depreciable
153. The facts are drawn from 103 T.C. at 248-52.
154. The facts are drawn from id. at 286-88.
155. As always, Congress can deviate from fundamental structural principles, but
courts should be loathe to deviate from them in the absence of clear language requiring
it. The language at issue in the case did not. For an exhaustive examination of the
weaknesses of the courts' decision, see Dodge & Geier, supra note 130.
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property), 156 it did not amend the threshold requirement that
only wasting assets can be depreciated. Indeed, the very legisla
tive history that these courts relied upon in reaching their deci
sions that Congress intended to eliminate the requirement that
only assets with ascertainable useful lives are eligible for depre
ciation, i.e., intended implicitly to change the meaning of the un
amended "wear and tear" language, also explicitly confirmed
prior law that only wasting assets were depreciable. 157
When the majority and concurring opinions did advert to
the theory underlying the allowance of a depreciation deduction,
they used language evidencing a belief that depreciation serves
the same function in the tax world as it does in the financial ac
counting world, where assets with indeterminate useful lives
can permissibly be depreciated under the matching principle. 158
In Simon, for example, Tax Court Judge Laro wrote for the ma
jority that "[t]he primary purpose of allocating depreciation to
more than one year is to provide a more meaningful matching of
the cost of an income-producing asset with the income resulting
_ therefrom; this meaningful match, in turn, bolsters the account
ing integrity for tax purposes of the taxpayer's periodic income
statements." 159 He also wrote:
Allowing petitioners to depreciate the Tourte bows comports with
the text of [the statute], and enables them to match their costs
for the Tourte bows with the income generated therefrom. Refus
ing to allow petitioners to deduct depreciation on the Tourte
bows, on the other hand, would contradict [the statute] and viti
ate the accounting principle that allows taxpayers to write off in
come-producing assets against the income produced by those
assets. 160

Writing for the Second Circuit majority in Simon, Judge Winter
wrote that "[t]he original rationale for the depreciation deduc
tion was to allow taxpayers to match accurately, for tax account
ing purposes, the cost of an asset to the income stream that the
asset produced."161 In Liddle, Tax Court Judge Laro included the
156. See Simon, 103 T.C. at 254-58.
157. See id. at 270-71 (Hamblen, C.J., dissenting).
158. See supra notes 148-150 and accompanying text (discussing the differing
treatment of goodwill under financial and tax accounting).
159. 103 T.C. at 253 (Laro, J.).
160. Id. at 261.
161. 68 F.3d at 44.
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same sentences, verbatim, quoted above. 162 In each case, these
judges cited prior decisions that themselves misinterpreted the
role of depreciation in an income tax. In this way, ill-informed
theory is carried forward to infect the law indefinitely.

B. ACCRUAL ACCOUNTING-DEDUCTIONS

1. The Anderson Case
The first income tax statute, enacted in 1913, provided that
"net income" should be computed by including gross income re
ceived and deducting expenses paid, losses sustained, and inter
est and taxes paid. 163 In other words, the statute required use of
the cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting cur
rently mentioned in section 446(c)(l)'. While this general rule
was retained in section 12(a) of the 1916 statute, Congress ad
ded an important exception in section 13(d):
A corporation . . . keeping accounts upon any basis other than
that of actual receipts and disbursements, unless such other basis
does not clearly reflect its income, may, subject to regulations by
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the
Secretary of the Treasury, make its return upon the basis upon
which its accounts are kept, in which case the tax shall be com
puted upon its income as returned . . . .164

It was this provision that first allowed use of the accrual
method of accounting for tax purposes now found in section
446(c)(2). One introductory accounting textbook explains accrual
accounting for financial accounting purposes (as opposed to tax
purposes) in the rhetoric of the matchlng principle.
Accrual accounting "attempts to record bie financial effects on an
enterprise of transactions and other evehts and circumstances ...
in the periods in which those transactions, events, and circum
stances occur rather than only in the periods in which cash is re
ceived or paid by the enterprise." In other words, accrual account
ing consists of all the techniques developed by accountants to
162. See 103 T.C. at 289, 294-95.
163. See Nolan, supra note 15, at 1175 n.58; Gunn, supra note 14, at 4 n.18; An
derson, 269 U.S. at 435.
164. Revenue Act of 1916, § 13(d), 39 Stat. 756, 770, quoted in Anderson, 269 U.S.
at 435.
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apply the matching rule. 165

That is, accrual accounting, for financial accountants, is the
matching principle personified. It makes no sense to financial
accountants to label any method of accounting deviating from
the matching principle as an "accrual" method.
The taxpayer in United States v. Anderson, 166 the Yale &
Towne Manufacturing Company, used the accrual method of ac
counting in keeping its books and filed its income tax return for
1916 and 1917-the tax years at issue-using this method. Yale
& Towne, which was engaged in the manufacture of munitions,
was required to pay a federal munitions tax on its 1916 profits.
On its books, Yale & Towne created an account entitled
"reserves for taxes," listing various kinds of taxes for which it
became liable by reason of its 1916 operations, including the
munitions tax at issue. Although these reserves were deducted
on its books in 1916, Yale & Towne did not deduct the muni
tions tax for income tax purposes until 1917, the year in which
the tax was actually assessed and paid.
The Commissioner argued that since Yale & Towne accrued
the tax on its books in 1916 under the accrual method of ac
counting, it must also deduct the taxes for federal income tax
purposes in 1916, not 1917, thus substantially increasing the
taxpayer's 1917 tax bill. 167 This view was supported by Treasury
Decision 2433, issued in January 1917 but prior to Yale &
Towne's preparation of its 1916 tax return. It provided that tax
payers using the accrual method of accounting could accrue lia
bilities, including reserves for liabilities the "amount of which or
date of maturity" 168 were not definitely determinable. The deci
sion included procedures for adjusting the reserves when the lia
bilities became definite and also provided that if " 'accrual or
reserves' did not reflect true net income, the taxpayer would not
165. BELVERD E. NEEDLES ET AL.,

PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING

103 (2d ed. 1984) (quot

ing Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts

No. 1, Objectives of Financial Reporting by Business Enterprises 'II 44 (1978) (emphasis
added). As examples of the matching principle at work, the text lists deduction of the
cost of goods sold, i.e., the inventory method of accounting, and allocation of the cost of a
building over the years that benefit from its use, i.e., depreciation.
166. 269 U.S. 422 (1926).
167. 269 U.S. at 435-36. The increased income tax rates in 1917 accompanying
WWI explains the Commissioner's desire to flout conventional wisdom and argue that
the deduction should have been taken earlier rather than later.
168. Id. at 438.
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be permitted to make its return on any other basis than that of
'actual receipts and disbursements.' "169 The Court agreed with
the Commissioner that Yale & Towne must deduct the tax in
1916.
The Court first rejected the taxpayer's argument that sec
tion 12(a), providing the "general" rule that taxes are deductible
when paid, trumps the "exception" in section 13(d) on which the
Commissioner relied in requiring 1916 accrual of the taxes. In
so doing, the Court traced the enactments of sections 12(a) and
13(d). 170 It described how businesses "found [it] impracticable to
comply strictly" with the cash method of accounting. Treasury
regulations predating section 13(d) thus authorized the use of
inventories and allowed the deduction of accrued but unpaid lia
bilities-except for taxes paid. 171 It was this early regulatory ex
ception for taxes that Yale & Towne relied upon in arguing that,
when Congress essentially codified these regulations by enacting
section 13(d), it carved out taxes. 172 The Court, however, con
cluded that the purpose underlying the enactment of section
13(d) was clear and to the contrary.
It was to enable taxpayers to keep their books and make their re
turns according to scientific accounting principles, by charging
against income earned during the taxable period, the expenses in
curred in and properly attributable to the process of earning in
come during that period; and indeed, to require the tax return to
be made on that basis, if the taxpayer failed or was unable to
make the return on a strict receipts and disbursements basis. 173

The Anderson Court also rejected the taxpayer's alternative
argument that the munitions tax did not accrue until 1917 be
cause a tax cannot be considered accrued until it is due and
payable. 174 In rejecting this argument the Court enunciated Ian
169. Id.
170. Id. at 437-40.
171. Id. at 439.
172. As the Court rephrased the argument:
From this it is argued that Congress, by reenacting in § 12(a) of the Act of 1916
the corresponding provisions of the earlier acts, adopted the settled administrative
practice, and that accordingly under that act, as well as under the earlier acts
and Treasury regulations, taxes could be deducted only in the year when paid.
Id. at 439.
173. Id. at 440.
174. Id. at 440-42.
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guage that was later seized upon as the accrual test in tax ac
counting: the all events test.
In a technical legal sense it may be argued that a tax does not
accrue until it has been assessed and becomes due; but it is also
true that in advance of the assessment of a tax, all the events
may occur which fix the amount of the tax and determine the lia
bility of the taxpayer to pay it. In this respect, for purposes of ac
counting and of ascertaining true income for a given accounting
period, the munitions tax here in question did not stand on any
different footing than other accrued expenses appearing on appel
lee's books. In the economic and bookkeeping sense with which
the statute and Treasury decision were concerned, the taxes had
accrued. 175

While it seems clear that the Court was merely attempting to
capture the standard for accrual of an expense from within the
financial accounting perspective that it was importing, the so
called all events test has taken on a life of its own in the tax
arena. 176 Later cases adopted it as the talisman for tax accrual,
and Treasury regulations now use it as the standard for deter
mining not only when expenses must be deducted but also when
income must be included under the accrual method. 177 That
evolution was not inevitable. The Court was merely trying to ar
ticulate the essence of what financial accountants were trying to
capture in the accrual idea-the matching principle. The lan
guage was descriptive only. The Court could just as easily have
said that if an item is accrued for financial accounting purposes,
then it must be accrued for tax purposes, avoiding the all events
language entirely. But, as will be seen, the elevation of this lan
guage to an exalted talisman was, with hindsight, fortunate, for
it provided a means by which accrual accounting in tax could
evolve in a manner that accorded with the tax values that are
ignored in financial accounting.
Several points are clear from this discussion. It is clear that
the Court believed that Congress intended to import "scientific
accounting principles" into income tax accounting, that the
Court believed that such principles embodied the matching rule,
175. Id. at 441.
176. Cf Raby & Raby, Consistency, supra note 31 (deriding the "legalistic all
events test").
177. See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-l(c)(l)(ii). Cf. I.R.C. § 461(h) (the only place in the
Code mentioning the all events test).
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and that the matching rule required deduction of the munitions
tax in 1916. It is equally clear, however, that the Court did not
attribute any tax value other than administrative ease to this
migration of financial accounting into tax accounting. The "im
practicability" of the cash method for many businesses drove the
enactment of section 13(d)-nothing more. Administrability is
an important tax value, but, as will be shown, larger tax values
may come to outweigh it in particular contexts.
2. Financial Accounting as "Science"?
The Anderson Court's characterization of accounting "princi
ples" as "scientific" implies both a uniformity and an underlying
theoretical base that was not accurate in the field of accounting
when the Court issued its decision in 1926. 178 While the roots of
financial accounting practice are ancient, 179 "most organized ef
forts at developing accounting theory have occurred since
1930."180 There was no national organization of accountants un
til 1905 when the American Association of Public Accountants
was formed, renamed in 1917 the American Institute of Ac
countants and eventually becoming the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (the AICPA). 181 In 1916 the Ameri
can Association of University Instructors in Accounting was or
ganized, renamed in 1935 the American Accounting Association
(the Association). 182 These two organizations became the instru
ments for the development of accounting thought. 183
In many ways, they operated independently of one another,
with different priorities and approaches to accounting thought.
The Association took a "top-down" approach, attempting to de
fine broad standards from a conceptual point of view and distill
applications from them. The AICPA adopted a "bottom-up" style,
178. In the same year that Anderson was decided, William Z. Ripley, a professor of
economics at Harvard, published a scathing article in the Atlantic Monthly on the inade
quacies of corporate financial reporting. See JAMES DON EDWARDS & HOMER A BLACK,
THE MODERN ACCOUNTANT'S HANDBOOK 7 (1976). See also WILIJAM Z. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET
AND WALL STREET ch. 7 (1927).
179. A "surprisingly elaborate accounting system" had been used in Greece since
the fifth century B.C. See MCCULLERS & SCHROEDER, supra note 26, at 1.
180. Id.
181. STEPHEN A ZEFF, AMERICAN ACCOUNTING AsSOCIATION: ITS FIRST 50 YEARS 1916
1966, at 4 (1966).
182. Id. at 4, 33-38.
183. STOREY, supra note 68, at 39-40.
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approaching issues in a piecemeal and more practical fashion, 184
eschewing until 1958 any notion of "principles" that went be
yond "a distillation of experience."185
Because the [AICPA] made principles equivalent to conventions
and procedures, it ruled out the possibility of malring a complete
and comprehensive codification. The Association, on the other
hand, attempted from the outset to formulate a complete and
comprehensive set of standards by which to evaluate rules and
procedures. Accordingly, it used a conceptual approach and was
led to a consideration of some underlying assumptions of account
ing practice. This method also inevitably led to some propositions
which were in conflict with principles distilled from practice, that
is, to standards which were not accepted by practicing account
ants.
It is not surprising, then, that the [AICPA] ... had more im
pact on the practice of accounting than did the pronouncements of
the Association. 186

A brief review of the history of how accounting thought was de
veloped by these two organizations may be helpful in putting
the "science" of accounting into context.
In 1924 the Association formed a committee to draw up a
revised constitution in order to add research as a function of the
Association. Two years before Anderson was decided, "account
ing practice was characterized, according to the committee, by
'absurdities and inconsistencies,' for 'much of the theory is made
up of carelessly considered ideas ... and is loose, uncodified,
and difficult to apply with any degree of uniformity.' "187 The
committee dismissed the notion that practitioners would spear
head improvements in practice and theory. "Practitioners have
little time and less inclination to undertake adequate considera
tion of theory. They are not interested, as a rule, in testing its
application from a scientific point of view. With rare exceptions,
their writings are not scholarly and indicate hasty consideration
184. See id. at 40-58.
185. Id. at 47.
186. Id. at 47-48; KELLER & ZEFF, supra note 62, at 3 (noting that while the Associ
ation "joined the attempt to crystallize thinking on 'generally accepted accounting princi
ples,' yet it was the [AICPA's] efforts that attracted the greatest attention and respect").
187. STOREY, supra note 68, at 29 (quoting Report of the Committee on Revision of
the Constitution and By-laws, Papers and Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Meeting (Feb.
1925)).
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and treatment of subjects presented." 188 Nothing was accom
plished, however, in the way of research in the next four years.
Writing in 1928-two years after Anderson--0ne member impa
tient with this lack of progress wrote:
Students and writers debated alternatives, without any sense of
obligation to make a choice, reach a conclusion, establish a stan
dard, or propound a rule. Discussions and published papers were
rambling, diverse, and indeterminate; they showed erudition and
deliberation, coupled with indecision and irresponsibility. Teach
ers for the most part viewed and reported on existing practice,
[but] made little attempt to guide it.
To many of us this seemed like an ignoble role for presump
tive leaders in academic work. . . . I voiced the conviction that
teachers should be leaders, not followers, and should concentrate
on what ought to be done, not merely on what was being done. 189

The stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression
that followed brought dissatisfaction with accounting practices
to a head, leading to the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933 ·
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 190 The latter act vested
in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) the authority
to regulate accounting practices at publicly held companies. 191
While the SEC has chosen to focus primarily on disclosure mat
ters, leaving the profession to develop accounting practices, it
has retained an oversight role. 192
Even before 1933, however, the air of impending regulation
was strong enough to cause the AICPA to begin a collaboration
with the New York Stock Exchange in 1932, leading to publica
tion in 1934 of Audits of Corporate Accounts .193 The AICPA Com
mittee was chaired by George 0. May, and the work of the Com
mittee was chiefly his product. 194
188. Id.
189. Id. at 29-30 (quoting Howard C. Greer, Benchmarks and Beacon.s, 31 THE Ac.
COUNTING REv. 3-4 (1956)).
190. EDWARDS & BLACK, supra note 178, at 7-8.
191. Id. at 8.
192. KELLER & ZEFF, supra note 62, at 2-3. "[W)hile the SEC has the authority to
decide arbitrarily what constitutes 'generally accepted accounting principles,' this au
thority has usually been exercised in the form of persuasion rather than edict.n MCCUL
LERS & ScHROEDER, supra note 26, at 11.
193. EDWARDS & BLACK, supra note 178, at 7.
194. KELLER & ZEFF, supra note 62, at 2.
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This proved to be a seminal document. Not only did it set
forth principles to be followed in financial reporting but it also
led to the first standard form of auditor's report and to a require
ment that the financial statements of companies applying for list
ing with the Exchange be independently audited. 195

The new form of certificate created with this agreement was im
portant for two reasons. It shifted emphasis from the balance
sheet to the income statement. It also required the accountant
to sign a statement that the documents "fairly represent, in ac
cordance with accepted principles of accounting consistently
maintained by the Company during the year under review," the
Company's operating results for the year. 196 This phrase was
soon changed to the "generally accepted accounting principles"
with which we are familiar. But no attempt was made to define
what these "principles" were beyond the five broad statements
included in the report. 197 Indeed, "[t]he Securities and Exchange
Commission, through its chief accountant, seriously questioned
the significance of the term 'generally accepted accounting prin
ciples.' "198 Writing in 1939--thirteen years after Anderson-Ste
phen Gilman said, "[A]ccountants are in the unenviable position
of having committed themselves in their certificates as to the
existence of generally accepted accounting principles while be
tween themselves they are quarreling as to whether there are
any accounting principles and if there are how many of them
should be recognized and accepted." 199
Meanwhile, the Association, through its Executive Commit
tee, published in 1936 a list of twenty principles of accounting
affecting corporate reports in the Association's Journal, The Ac
counting Review. 200 The four and one-half page paper was cau
tiously entitled, "A Tentative Statement of Accounting Principles
Underlying Corporate Financial Statements." 201 Some of the
enunciated "principles" departed from current practices. 202 Few
practicing accountants subscribed to the Review, and the docu
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id.
GILMAN, supra note 37, at 170.
Id. at 170-71.
Id. at 171.
Id.
Id.
MCCULLERS & SCHROEDER, supra note 26, at 2.
ZEFF, supra note 181, at 42.
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ment garnered little attention. 203 Those practitioners "who did
see it felt that the teachers were trespassing on a preserve that
belonged to practitioners. Only practitioners and the practition
ers' organization, they believed, were justified in speaking for
the accounting profession. The [AICPA] itself took no official no
tice of the 'Tentative Statement.' "204
In 1938, the AICPA formed the Committee on Accounting
Procedure, which assumed the task of issuing pronouncements
in the form of Accounting Research Bulletins regarding account
ing practice and procedure in order to establish "generally ac
cepted accounting principles."205 Because of the AICPA's piece
meal, practical approach to "principles" as meaning "acceptable"
rather than meaning "conceptually defensible,"206 however, the
bulletins resulted in the sanctioning of a wide variety of
practices.
The bulletins were successful against the working of a sort of
Gresham's law of accounting procedures in which "bad" practices
threatened to drive out "good" ones. As a result, however, ac
countants increasingly found themselves with a superabundance
of "good" practices. One development in accounting . . . has been
an increase in the number of important areas in which numerous
alternative methods and procedures have been sanctioned. Al
though some of these alternatives have been clearly superior to
others, even the poorest have often been able to squeeze past the
minim.um barriers and have been cloaked with the respectability
inherent in "general acceptance." This development was appar
ently not anticipated by the leading accountants of the thirties,
although it was probably inherent in an approach which empha
sized disclosure and consistency rather than specific principles. 207

The committee's work thus came under increasing criticism.
In the 1950s, the controversy over "uniformity" versus "flexi
bility" of accounting practices erupted, and it was sensed by an
increasing number of practitioners and educators that the succes
sion of arguments over "right," "best," or "true" accounting princi
ples and practices-including the uniformity-flexibility contro
versy-should somehow be brought closer to resolution by a more
203. Id. at 40-43.
204. Id. at 42.
205. MCCULLERS & SCHROEDER, supra note 26, at 5.
206. See supra notes 57-76 and accompanying text (discussing meaning attached to
"generally acceptable accounting principles").
207. STOREY, supra note 68, at 49.
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concentrated research effort toward developing a body of account
ing theory. Thus was established the [AICPA's] Accounting Re
search Division in 1959, together with a 21-member Accounting
Principles Board to replace the 21-member Committee on Ac
counting Procedure .... It was hoped that the Board would com
mission research studies on major accounting questions and
would use the findings from these studies as a theoretical base
from which to derive logically consistent principles and
practices.208

So it was not until 1959 that there was any real institutional ef
fort by the AICPA to go beyond practice to theory-to the "sci
ence" alluded to in 1926 by the Anderson Court.
But that effort, too, was doomed to fail. The failure was due
to "the fundamental weakness of a private sector group attempt
ing to carry out a regulatory function without the authority to
do so."2°9 The Accounting Principles Board (APB) had no author
ity to enforce its mandates. The SEC was the sole enforcer. That
led to two consequences. First, it led the APB to reject proposi
tions that it deemed too controversial. If it adopted proposals
that were routinely ignored, its respectability would be under
mined. "Although highly regarded scholars did a commendable
job in finding basic postulates and broad principles of account
ing, the APB promptly rejected the studies as being 'too radi
cally different from present generally accepted accounting prin
ciples for acceptance at this time.' "2io Second, it prompted power
struggles between practicing accountants and the APB, leading
practitioners to seek relief from Congress. A few examples from
the 1960s and early 1970s--dealing with accounting for business
combinations, accounting for the investment tax credit, and
mark-to-market accounting for marketable securities--give a fla
vor of the dynamics of the time.
After talring an initial unequivocal position on accounting for bus
iness combinations based on principle, which would have ruled
out pooling-of-interests accounting, the APB was hit by intense
pressures to modify that position. As the months went by and
pressures mounted, the APB backed down step by step to a weak
position under which poolings remain alive and well and living in
208. KELLER & ZEFF, supra note 62, at 3. Cf id. at 39-130 (containing a collection
of articles published between 1960 and 1966 debating whether there is a core theory in
accounting and how it might be deduced).
209. EDWARDS & BLACK, supra note 178, at 12-13.
210. Id. at 9.
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the United States today. Industry and the accounting profession
joined in fighting the APB. Some groups wrote to key congres
sional committees suggesting that this subject should more appro
priately be left to the legislative and regulatory functions of the
federal government. Others threatened to sue the APB if the
Opinion was issued. 211

With respect to the investment tax credit enacted in 1961, the
APB had a strong majority of the opinion that the credit was
equivalent to a cost reduction and that the only permissible way
to account for the credit would be to amortize its effect over the
211. Id. at 10. Cf Elizabeth MacDonald, Merger-Accounting Method Under Fire,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 1997, at A2. The article describes how business combinations can
be accounted for under either pooling-of-interest accounting or purchase accounting.
Under pooling-of-interest accounting, the combined companies simply add together the
book value of their assets and liabilities. Under purchase accounting, the goodwill gener
ated on the combination, equal to the excess of the purchase price over the book value of
the acquired entity, must be amortized over periods as long as 40 years. These future
deductions thus penalize future earnings, reducing the profit picture. Pooling-of-interest
accounting avoids this hit against future earnings. The article describes a FASB propo
sal to restrict or end pooling-of-interest accounting by 1999. The proposal generated such
controversy that FASB soon made noises about backing otr. See Elizabeth MacDonald,
FASB May Back Off From Its Threat 7b Limit or End 'Poolings of Interest,' WALL ST. J.,
July 1, 1997, at A4. Cf Calvin H. Johnson, Time to Get Out of the Pool: Pooling Method
for Acquisitions, 76 TAX NOTES 810 (Aug. 11, 1997); Robert Willens, Suppressing Good
will in a Nonpooling of Interests Context, 75 TAX NOTES 701, 701 (May 5, 1997) (noting
that "where pooling status cannot be attained, accounting alternatives available to at
least minimize goodwill will be enthusiastically pursued"); infra notes 216-220 and ac
companying text (noting the susceptibility of FASB to popular pressure). But the plot
continues to thicken. In February of 1998, FASB reported that it was continuing to con
sider restricting the use of pooling accounting and that it was also considering requiring
purchasers to set out the separate components of acquired goodwill and amortize each
over periods shorter than the 40 years that apparently is not atypical practice today.
Amortization over shorter periods would reduce earnings more dramatically than amor
tization over 40 years. See Elizabeth MacDonald, FASB Renews Bid to Tighten Merger
Accounting, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 1998, at A3. Most recently, however, FASB seems to be
considering abandoning ship altogether. It now is considering allowing companies that
use purchase accounting to eliminate the write-off of goodwill entirely if they could show
that the goodwill has not lost value in order to make the abandonment of pooling more
palatable. See Elizabeth MacDonald, FASB May Change M&A Accounting to Favor Cash
Over All-Stock Deals, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 1998, at A3 (quoting a member of the FASB's
executive advisory council as saying, "This could really be big."); Melody Petersen, Mar
ket Place, WALL ST. J., May 13; 1998, at CS (noting that "in a surprising twist" FASB
might allow •all the benefits of pooling and then some" by requiring purchasing account
ing, which allows assets to be revalued to fair market value, instead of pooling, which
carries over book values, but easing up on the requirement to amortize goodwill). The
irony here is obvious. Prior to the adoption of section 197, purchased goodwill was not
amortizable for tax purpose, while it was amortizable for financial accounting purposes.
See supra note 150. If these recent FASB proposals become practice, purchased goodwill
will not be required to be amortized for financial accounting purposes, though it is now
amortizable for tax purposes. Talk about two ships passing in the night!
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useful life of the acquired asset. 212 Several large public account
ing firms flouted the guidance, however, and reported the effects
in the single year in which the asset was acquired. 213
Business executives and professional accountants went directly to
members of Congress with the story that the APB was trying to
remove an economic incentive granted by Congress. No amount of
accounting logic about matching costs and revenues could over
come this economic argument--and legislative challenge. Con
gress responded by writing into law that no taxpayer shall be re
quired to use any particular method of accounting for the credit.
Here was a display of raw power that should forever be a lesson
to those who wish to set rules without having authority to do
so.214

In 1971 the APB considered requiring mar~etable securities to
be marked to market, with changes in market value included in
income currently without realization. Several chief executives of
insurance companies complained to the SEC "and effectively
forced the APB to drop the project."2 15
Hence, the APB was replaced by the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) in 1973. Unlike the APB, whose mem
bers were all from the AICPA, the members of the FASB include
representatives from various organizations. 216 Moreover, the
members are paid and work full time, unlike the APB members,
who were unpaid volunteers and who had full-time jobs apart
from their APB responsibilities. 217 But FASB, like the APB, re
mains without real authority. "The success of the FASB ... de
pend[s] on the willingness of the SEC to support it on controver
sial issues."218 And practitioners can still turn to Congress when
212. EDWARDS & BLACK, supra note 178, at 11-12; MCCULLERS & ScmtoEDER, supra
note 26, at 6.
213. EDWARDS & BLACK, supra note 178, at 6.
214. Id. at 12.
215. Id. Also at this time, leasing companies began lobbying Congress to head off
any attempt by the APB to require capitalization of leases. Id.
216. MCCULLERS & ScHROEDER, supra note 26, at 7-9.
217. Id.
218. EDWARDS & BLACK, supra note 178, at 13. The FASB issues four different
kinds of pronouncements:
1. Statements of Financial Accounting Concepts-releases designed to establish
the fundamentals upon which financial accounting stand&rds are based.
2. Statements of Financial Accounting Standards-releases indicating required ac
counting methods and procedures for specific accounting issues.
3. Interpretations-modifications or extensions of issues related to previously is
sued FASB Statements, APB Opinions or Accounting Research Bulletins. They re
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FASB threatens to issue an unpopular accounting standard. For
example,
[FASB] underwent the embarrassment of issuing a standard
for accounting for income taxes and then, in the face of wide
spread criticism, backing down and changing the standard.
And perhaps most humiliating, the threat of Congressional
action forced the board to retreat from a proposal to make compa
nies treat the value of stock options handed out to employees as
an expense. It settled for requiring companies to put in their foot
notes to financial statements what the cost would have been had
they treated it as an expense.21s

Finally, "[c]ritics say the Big Six are not speaking on behalf of
what they think is best accounting [when they address FASB
proposals] but on behalf of what they think their customers
want."22°
It is clear from this brief synopsis that financial accounting
was no more based in science in 1926 than tax accounting itself,
and its scientific pedigree remains in doubt today if "scientific"
means that accounting "rules" are uniformly rooted in theory
rather than practice and that there is widespread uniformity in
accounting practices. Regarding the matching principle itself,
this discussion reveals that the matching principle in financial
accounting did not come to central prominence until the 1930s
with the shift in emphasis from the balance sheet to the income
statement, and the distillation of the matching principle from
principle to practice continues to result in a variety of "accept
able" treatments. "The basic form of financial accounting as a
process of cost allocation based on the matching of revenues and
expenses crystalized [during the late 1930s]."221 But "[b]asic
agreement involving the goal to be achieved did not result in
agreement regarding the method of reaching it. Acceptance of
matching as the basis of income determination did not result in
quire the support of a majority of the Board.
4. Thchnical Bulletins-guidance on accounting and reporting problems issued by
the staff of the FASB.
MCCULLERS & 8cHROEDER, supra note 26, at 10.
219. Floyd Norris, From the Chief Accountant, a Farewell Ledger, N.Y. TIMES, June
1, 1997, § 3, at 4. "It became obvious that if we had pursued the expense-recognition re
quirement there was a virtual certainty that we would have been overruled by either
Congress or the S.E.c.• Id. (quoting former FASB chairman Dennis R. Beresford).
220. Id.
221. 8ToREY, supra note 68, at 19-20.
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a single theory for its application."222
Whether or not financial accounting was sufficiently "scien
tific" in 1926 to warrant the characterization, it is not surpris
ing that the Court looked to an outside discipline for help in giv
ing shape to this relatively new term "income." With little or no
developed literature and thought regarding what the term "in
come" should mean in tax terms, the Court often borrowed from
other areas of thought in the early years of the income tax. For
example, there were early disagreements regarding whether
gain from the sale of an asset-capital gain-was properly con
sidered "income" for tax purposes in view of the fact that such
gains were not considered "income" in everyday parlance223 or
for trust accounting purposes. 224 That is, if a trust instrument
prescribed that income from the trust's assets should go to the
beneficiary with the corpus going to the remainder, capital gains
went to the remainder. They were considered additional capital,
which could produce income for the beneficiary, not income it
self. With increased understanding of tax values, which of
course have nothing to do with how the return on a trust corpus
should be divided between current beneficiaries and the remain
der, these early questions regarding whether capital gain was
"income" were eventually put to rest. 225 The role of financial ac
counting in tax accounting, in contrast, remains ambiguous.
3. The Other Early Cases: Drawing the Line at "Contingent"
Liabilities

Anderson cannot be understood simply as a decision to defer
to the Commissioner, who asked for the 1916 deduction accrual
in lieu of 1917 accrual. In American National Co. v. United
States, 226 decided little more than a year after Anderson, the Su
preme Court stuck by its guns and permitted a taxpayer to ac
crue deductions earlier than the Commissioner thought would
clearly reflect income. The taxpayer was the receiver for the F.B.
222. Id. at 41.
223. In Victorian times, it was not unusual to think of gains from selling assets as
•capital• that would itself produce periodic -mcome.9 See DODGE ET AL., supra note 20, at
49.
224. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Origins of Capital Gains Taxation: What's
Law Got to Do With It?, 39 Sw. L.J. 869 (1985).
225. Cf Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920); Commissioner v. Glenshaw
Glass, 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
226. 274 U.S. 99 (1927).
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Collins Investment Company, which used the accrual method of
accounting in keeping its books and filing its tax return for
l917, the year at issue. 227 The Company was in the business of
making secured real estate loans and selling the paper to inves
tors. The real estate loans were five-year balloon loans with
semi-annual interest payments at 5 percent. These notes were
sold to investors. Each of the borrowers also executed a second
note in favor of the company equal to 10 percent of the amount
loaned. These notes were due in two years and were interest
free. These "commission notes" generated the Company's income,
and the Company accrued the total amount of these notes in the
year executed. At first, the Company sold the five-year notes
through brokers, paying a commission for the services, but by
1917 it sold the notes directly to investors. As an enticement to
investors, the Company gave the buyers a "Guarantee" or "bo
nus contract," under which the Company agreed to pay the in
vestor 1 percent of the note's principal amount during each of
the five years the note was outstanding. (Thus, the investor's re
turn was increased from 5 percent to 6 percent.) The Company
accrued the full face amount of these "bonus" payments in the
year the loans were sold to investors both on its books and tax
return. The Commissioner argued that only "such portion [of the
bonus contracts] as became due within the year"228 could be ac
crued. 229 The Commissioner won in the lower court, but the Su
preme Court reversed, holding in favor of the taxpayer, saying,
These contracts were not analogous to obligations to pay interest
on borrowed money, but were expenses incurred in selling the
loan notes in as real a sense as if under its original system of do
ing business the Company had paid these amounts to brokers as
fees for selling the loans or given them notes for such fees. The
Company's net income for the year could not have been rightly
determined without deducting from the gross income represented
by the commission notes, the obligations which it incurred under
the bonus contracts, and would not have been accurately shown
227. The statement of facts is drawn from id. at 101-03.
228. Id. at 103.
229. As the Court recounted:
The Government, although conceding that the bonus contracts "represented
an expense" of the Company's business, contends that their total amount was not
deductible as an expense "incurred" in 1917, on the grounds that only a part of
the obligations "accrued" within that year, and that the method used by the Com
pany in keeping its books did not clearly reflect its true income.

Id.
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by keeping its books or making its return on the basis of actual
receipts and disbursements. The method which it adopted clearly
reflected the true income. And, just as the aggregate amount of
the commission notes was properly included in its gross income
for the year-although not due and payable until the expiration
of two years-so, under the doctrine of the Anderson case, the to
tal amount of the bonus contracts was deductible as an expense
incurred within the year, although it did not "accrue" in that
year, in the sense of becoming due and payable. 230

Note that, as in Anderson, the Court upheld reporting consistent
with the taxpayer's treatment of the item for financial account
ing purposes. 231
When it came to contingent liabilities, however, the Court
was willing to defer to the Commissioner's desire to delay the
deduction of reserves created on the taxpayer's books, notwith
standing the earlier Treasury Decision 2433, quoted in Ander
son, that expressly allowed accrual of reserves for contingent li
abilities, and notwithstanding that such reserves were accrued
on the taxpayer's books for financial accounting purposes. In the
1930 case of Lucas v. American Code Company, 232 the Company
fired an employee in 1919 who was under contract to work for
18 more years and who was to be paid by commissions on sales.
The employee brought a suit for breach of contract, which re
sulted in a judgment in his favor of $21,019.19. The Company
appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the judgment in
1923, at which time the Company paid the damages.
After the employee filed suit, the Company immediately cre
ated on its books a reserve in 1919 equal to $14,764.79, the
amount of unpaid commissions for the year. It increased the re
serve by $32,994.09 in 1920. The 1921 books were not yet closed
when the trial resulted in the $21,109.10 judgment, and the
Company adjusted its reserve account for 1921 to equal the
damage award. It sought to deduct the amount in 1919, arguing
that
230. Id. at 105.
231. Cf. Conimissioner v. Ox Fibre Brush Co., 281 U.S. 115 (1920) (affirming, con
sistent with the taxpayer's financial accounting, a 1920 deduction for bonuses awarded
and paid by the Board of Directors in that year for services performed by officers in
prior years, rejecting the Commissioner's argument that the bonuses accrued in the ear
lier years in which the services were performed).
232. 280 U.S. 445 (1930). The statement of facts is drawn from id. at 447-48.
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all the facts which gave rise to the liability were fixed in that
year; that dam."ages must be assessed as of the date of the breach;
that the loss therefore occurred in that year; and that it is imma
terial that the amount of the damages was not determined or
paid until later. 233

The Court, in an opinion by Justice Brandeis, upheld the
Commissioner's denial of the accrual, using language heavily re
lying upon deference to the Commissioner to determine whether
an accounting method clearly reflects income.
And the direction that net income be computed according to the
method of accounting regularly employed by the taxpayer is ex
pressly limited to cases where the Commissioner believes that the
accounts clearly reflect the net income. Much latitude for discre
tion is thus given to the administrative board charged with the
duty of enforcing the Act. Its interpretation of the statute and the
practice adopted by it should not be interfered with unless clearly
unlawful. 234

The Court reasoned that because the Company contested the li
ability, it was uncertain whether or not any amount would be
paid.235 The Court explicitly distinguished Anderson and Ameri
can National Company on these grounds, since the taxpayer's
obligation to make the future payments listed in the reserve ac
counts was certain. 236 Recall that the Court refused to defer to
the Commissioner's desire to defer reserve accruals in American
National Company, 237 so the outcome in American Code Com
pany cannot be understood simply as knee-jerk deferral to the
Commissioner whenever the Commissioner asked for it under
the clearly reflect income language. The Court perceived a dif
ference in substance in these two cases that justified deferring
to the Commissioner only in the contingent liability scenario.
In Brown v. Helvering, 238 decided four years later, Justice
233. Id. at 448.
234. Id. at 449.
235. Id. at 450-51.
236. Id. at 452. The Court also argued that the Company did not, in fact, set up a
reserve for the damages incurred. Rather, the reserve on the taxpayer's books equaled
the commissions owing to the employee under the contract. Because the employee had a
duty to mitigate damages, actual damages might not-indeed did not-approach the
amount of commissions that went unpaid under the contract. Id. at 451-52. The Court
thus seemed to imply that the usual force that financial accounting has in this context
loses force when the bookkeeping itself appears lax.
237. See supra notes 226-231 and accompanying text.
238. 291 U.S. 193 (1934).
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Brandeis went even farther than mere deference to the Commis
sioner in denying accrual of reserves for contingent liabilities.
He concluded that such accruals are not allowable unless "au
thorized specifically by the Revenue Acts, or by any regulation
applying them,"239 notwithstanding their use for financial ac
counting purposes. Arthur Brown, as a general agent for fire in
surance companies, was entitled to "gross overriding c.ommis
sions"240 from the companies based on the net premiums derived
from local agents working under him. Policy holders paid premi
ums in advance for insurance coverage of one, three, or five
years. If they canceled coverage, they were entitled to receive a
return premium, payable by the general agent. 241 The Commis
sioner argued that Brown should be taxed on the full commis
sions received during the year. Brown, in contrast, argued that
he should be able to accrue a deduction for a reserve for cancel
lations expected to occur in future years based on past experi
ence. 242 Brown established the reserve for "return commissions"
on his books in 1923. The years before the Court were 1923,
1925, and 1926. The Court agreed with the Commissioner, deny
ing deduction for the accounting reserve because the liability
was not "fixed and absolute."243
It is true that where a liability has "accrued during the taxable
year" it may be treated as an expense incurred; and hence as the
basis for a deduction, although payment is not presently due, . . .
and although the amount of the liability has not been definitely
ascertained. But no liability accrues during the taxable year on
account of cancellations which it is expected may occur in future
years, since the events necessary to create the liability do not oc
cur during the taxable year. Except as specifically provided by
statute, a liability does not accrue as long as it remains
contingent. 244
239. Id. at 205.
240. Id. at 195.
241. Id. at 196.
242. Id. at 195. Alternatively, he argued that he should be able to delay accruing a
portion of the commissions until future years. Citing North Am. Oil Consol. u. Burnet,
286 U.S. 417 (1932), the Court denied delaying the income accrual. "When received, the
general agent's right to [the commissions] was absolute. It was under no restriction, con
tractual or otherwise, as to its disposition, use or enjoyment." See infra notes 319-414
and accompanying text (considering the accrual of prepaid income).
243. Brown, 291 U.S. at 201.
244. Id. at 200 (citations omitted).
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Citing Lucas v. American Code Company, the Court said that
"[m]any reserves set up by prudent business men are not allow
able as deductions."245
The Court continued to deny accrual of reserves for contin
gent liabilities in later cases. For example, in Spring City Foun
dry Co. v. Commissioner,24f> the Court disallowed a deduction for
an addition to a reserve for partially worthless bad debts be
cause the statute did not specifically allow it; the statute al
lowed deduction of only wholly worthless debts. With respect to
the taxpayer's argument that "good business practice"247 de
manded accrual of the reserve, the Court foreshadowed Thor
Power Tool 248 in noting that the goals of financial accounting
may not be consistent with tax accounting.
But that is not the question here. Questions relating to allowable
deductions under the income tax are quite distinct from matters
which pertain to an appropriate showing upon which credit is
sought. It would have been proper for the taxpayer to carry a sus
pense account awaiting the ultimate determination of the amount
that could be realized upon it, and thus to indicate the status of
the debt in financial statement's of the taxpayer's condition. But
that proper practice, in order to advise those from whom credit
might be sought of the uncertainties in the realization of assets,
does not affect the construction of the statute, or make the debt
deductible in 1920, when the entire debt was not worthless, when
the amount which would prove uncollectible was not yet ascer
tained, rather than in 1923 when that amount was ascertained
and its deduction allowed. 249

Thus, the Court sanctioned for tax accounting purposes a
deviation from financial accounting when the latter allowed de
duction of contingent liabilities. And the all events test, which
was articulated in Anderson merely as an attempt to encapsu
late the matching rule of financial accrual accounting, fortui
tously became the means that the Court used to depart from fi
nancial accounting in the tax realm: Because the liability was
contingent, all the events had not occurred to establish the fact
245. Id. at 202.
246. 292 U.S. 182 (1934). See also Dixie Pine Prod. Co. v. Commissioner, 320 U.S.
516 (1944) (denying accrual of a tax that was contingent and contested by the taxpayer);
Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281 (1944) (same).
247. Spring City Foundry, 292 U.S. at 189.
248. See supra notes 38-56 and accompanying text (discussing Thor Power Thal).
249. Spring City Foundry, 292 U.S. at 189-90.
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of liability. Yet, the Court nowhere explicitly discussed why the
contingency of the liability should prevent accrual for tax pur
poses when it does not prevent accrual for financial accounting
purposes. It need not have seized upon the all events language
of Anderson; it could have said that the Anderson language was
nothing more than an attempt to incorporate financial account
ing principles into tax accounting and allowed the deduction of
the contingent liability since it is allowable for financial ac
counting purposes. The Court nevertheless chose to defer to the
Commissioner's discretion under the "clear reflection" language
in this context but not in the fixed liability context. 250 But the
Commissioner likewise did not explain why tax accrual was not
appropriate for contingent liabilities. While the Spring City
Foundry Court seemed to recognize that tax accounting and fi
nancial accounting have different goals, it never articulated any
tax value that would be undermined by deductions for contin
gent liabilities in accordance with financial accounting practices.
Though not discussed explicitly, the implied reasoning of
the Court's pool of future-payment cases up until this point can
be inferred. The Court allowed accrual of reserves for future
payments, consistent with financial accounting, when the future
payment was sure to be made-even when the Commissioner ar
gued that current accrual failed to reflect income clearly. 251
When the reserve was for a future payment that was contingent,
however, the Court deferred to the Commissioner's desire to dis
allow accrual as not clearly reflecting income, even though such
accruals were consistent with the taxpayer's financial account
ing. 252 The Court must therefore have implicitly reasoned that
250. "Presumably, the result [in the contingent liability case of Brown v. Helvering]
would have been different if the agent had sought to deduct a future refund obligation
arising from a policy already canceled." Jensen, Premature Accruals, supra note 11, at
454.
251. Anderson, 269 U.S. at 422 (upholding Commissioner's desire for 1916 accrual
of·noncontingent tax instead of 1917 accrual); American Nat'l Co., 274 U.S. at 99 (deny
ing Commissioner's challenge to 1917 _accrual of noncontingent future expenses con
tracted for in 1917). In both cases, the taxpayer's tax reporting was consistent with the
taxpayer's financial accounting of the item.
252. American Code Co., 280 U.S. at 445 (upholding Commissioner's challenge of
1919 accrual of contract damages that the taxpayer was challenging in court and which
were not paid until 1923 after the taxpayer was held liable); Brown, 291 U.S. at 193 (up
holding Commissioner's challenge of 1923, 1925, and 1926 accruals of future premium
repayment obligations that were not certain to ripen); Spring City Foundry, 292 U.S. at
182 (upholding Commissioner's challenge to accrual of partially worthless bad debts);
Dixie Pine Prod. Co., 320 U.S. at 516 (upholding Commissioner's challenge to accrual of a
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the contingency of the liability is the determining factor regard
ing the appropriateness of deferring to the Commissioner's
power to disallow the accrual of reserves for future payments.
While allowing a deduction for contingent liabilities is consistent
with the conservatism of financial accounting, a reduction in
taxes, the Court implied, should result only from amounts that
are certain (except for de minimis uncertainty) to be paid.
4. Coming to Understand the True Tax Value at Stake: The
Anti-Tax Arbitrage Value and the Income-Tax Value Revisited
Although the Court disallowed accrual of reserves for future
liabilities only if the liability was contingent, the contingency of
the liability is not really the problem-<>r at least not solely the
problem-from the vantage point of tax values. The real prob
lem is that the liability was to be paid in the future-period.
Viewed from the perspective of the individual taxpayer, 253 a cur
rent deduction for a payment that will certainly be made but
not until some point in the future results in violation of tax val
ues. One way to think about this issue-perhaps the most com
mon way-is to observe that it would violate the anti-tax arbi
trage value. Alhough appreciation of the tax-arbitrage
opportunities in the context of premature accruals was not wide
spread until the early 1980s, the Code has long contained provi
sions that recognize the tax value of disallowing transactions
that profit solely because of the existence of the income tax.
For example, since 1917 254 the predecessor of section
265(a)(2) has prohibited deductions of interest incurred on debt
used to purchase or carry bonds that produce interest that is ex
empt from federal income tax. Absent the denial of the interest
deduction, a taxpayer could make a profit borrowing at an inter
est rate higher than the interest rate of the bonds purchased if
the interest paid was deductible and the interest received was
not includible. Take Profiteer, who borrows $100,000 from Na
tional Bank at 10 percent interest to purchase $100,000 of tax
exempt municipal bonds yielding 7 percent interest. Assume
tax that the taxpayer was contesting); Security Flour Mills Co., 321 U.S. at 281 (same).
In each case, the taxpayer's tax reporting was consistent with the taxpayer's financial
reporting of the item.
253. For a two-party analysis, taking into account the taxation of the recipient, see
infra notes 452-482 and accompanying text.
254. See Stanley A. Koppelman, Tax Arbitrage and the Interest Deduction, 61 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1143, 1151 (1988).
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Profiteer is in the 40 percent tax bracket. If the interest paid on
the loan were deductible, the transaction would produce a profit
after tax:
Interest received (less zero tax)
$7,000
less Interest paid ($10,000) reduced by
tax saved ($4,000)
6,000
Profit (after taxes)
$1,000

Without the tax system, this transaction produces an economic
loss for Profiteer, but with the tax system Profiteer makes out
nicely. 255 The system's reaction is to deny the interest deduction,
preserving the economic loss and denying the tax-arbitrage
profit. 256 Thus, there is an anti-tax-arbitrage value inherent in
255. Appreciation for this phenomenon is what reduces the likelihood of implemen
tation of a system for indexing the basis of assets to reflect inflation. If we index the ba
sis of assets for inflation, we must also index the basis of debt instruments, assets
owned by lenders. When debt basis is increased, a portion of what is nominally called
"interestn on the debt really becomes a return of "principal.9 That would produce terrible
perception problems, since it would look as though borrowers, such as homeowners, were
being "penalizedn by being denied a deduction for a portion of what they consider "inter
est, n while lenders were being "favoredn by allowing them to exclude from gross income
(as the return of borrowed principal) what is nominally called "interest.n See DODGE ET
AL., supra note 20, at 601.
Indexing the basis of assets except debt--to avoid these perception problems-would
be absolutely disastrous, allowing well-informed taxpayers to engage in tax arbitrage
and make a profit solely from the Treasury. Assume a taxpayer purchases an asset for
$1,000, which increases in value by 10% over one year, with $1,000 of borrowed money
at 10% stated interest per year. The taxpayer sells the property for $1,100 at the end of
the first year and repays the $1,000 debt plus the $100 in "interest,n realizing not a
dime of economic profit or loss. This should be a wash for tax purposes as well.
But assume further that inflation is 5% for that year, increasing the asset's basis to
$1,050 and reducing the nominal $100 sale gain to $50 under a system of basis indexa
tion. If the stated "interestn of $100 is fully deductible, unreduced by that same inflation
factor, the taxpayer reports a tax loss of $50 from the property ownership, even though
there was no economic loss. Indeed, taxpayers would be able to report tax losses on prop
erty that showed a real economic profit! In short, the perception problems and complexi
ties of indexing debt make it unlikely, but indexing debt is absolutely essential if we in
dex the basis of other assets.
256. This example is deliberately simplistic in order to illustrate the basic idea of
tax arbitrage. A comprehensive discussion of the tax arbitrage literature is beyond the
scope of this Article, including arguments that anti-tax-arbitrage provisions are unwise
since the market will fully or partially capitalize tax subsidies or even that anti-tax
arbitrage provisions retard full capitalization. See Koppelman, supra note 254, at 1172
92 (discussing the relationship between anti-tax-arbitrage provisions and market adjust
ments for tax incentives).
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the income tax structure, created by such provisions as section
265. 257 .
The ability to engage in tax arbitrage in the context of pre
mature accruals is illuminated in the following excerpt.258
Assume that an accrual-method florist injures a two-year-old
pedestrian with his delivery truck. To settle his liability, the flo
rist agrees to pay the victim $100,000. fifteen years from now
(year 16), just when the child should be starting college. Because
the liability arose in connection with the florist's business, the
settlement payment is clearly a deductible item under § 162. But
when?
Since the settlement agreement establishes both the fact and
the amount of the florist's liability, the all-events test would allow
the florist to accrue and deduct the $100,000 payment in year 1
when the agreement is made, not in year 16 when payment oc
curs. Furthermore, the florist would be allowed to accrue the full
$100,000 face amount of the liability in year 1, not just the pres
ent cost of providing a year-16 payment of that amount.
To understand the significance of this outcome, assume that
the florist is taxed at 36% and that the correct after-tax com
pound interest rate for figuring present value is 8%. If the
$100,000 were paid to the victim in year 1, the florist would have
a present tax saving of $36,000 ($100,000 x .36) from this deduc
tion to offset against the $100,000 settlement payment. Accord
257. There are times when the Code will consciously depart from the anti-tax
arbitrage value in the name of other nontax values. For example, the low-income hous
ing credit in section 42 can produce a profit from the tax system with respect to transac
tions that would not otherwise be economically profitable. Cf Treas. Reg. § 1.42-4 (pro
viding that section 183, which can deny deductions for economically unprofitable
activities, will not apply to reduce deductions attributable to ownership and operation of
a building eligible for the low-income housing credit). That, however, is precisely the in
tention behind section 42: to encourage the building of low-income housing that would
not otherwise be built because not economically profitable.
Another example is the deduction for qualified residence interest under section
163(h)(3), even though the imputed income from owner-occupied housing is tax-exempt.
Whether wise or not, whether it works or not, the deduction is there for nontax reasons:
to encourage home ownership. And interest incurred on loans to purchase property
whose income is deferred due to the realization requirement and then is taxed at the
lower capital-gains rates also produces tax arbitrage.
The point is that, as with all tax values (including the administrability value itself
at times!), the Code does not uniformly respect the anti-tax-arbitrage value. When the
Code explicitly departs from it, the taxpayer prevails. But the value is itself part of the
statutory text and should inform judgment when it is unclear whether a particular
transaction is covered by an "exception." In other words, the exceptions do not under
mine the anti-tax-arbitrage value itself; they are the exceptions that prove the rule.
258. The excerpt is from DODGE ET AL., supra note 20, at 460-61. My thanks to Cliff
Fleming, whose calculator crunched these numbers.
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ingly, the net cost to the florist of his negligence would be
$64,000 ($100,000 - $36,000). But on the actual facts, the pay
ment will be deferred for fifteen years. This will create a windfall
profit for the florist that can be illustrated in two ways.
First, we can compare the florist's year-I tax saving ($36,000)
with the present cost of the year-I6 payment. Under our interest
assumption, this present cost is only $3I,524. That is, if the flo
rist invests only $3I,524 in year I at 8% after-tax compound in
terest, the investment will grow over the next fifteen years to
$IOO,OOO and will fully fund the year-I6 payment to the victim.
The florist's year-I deduction is not, however, limited to the
$3I,524 present cost; the florist deducts the full $100,000 in year
I and saves $36,000 in tax. Thus, instead of incurring a $64,000
net cost for his negligence, the all-events test would give him a
$4,476 net profit ($36,000 year-I tax saving - $3I,524 present cost
of year-I6 payment).
The florist's windfall can be demonstrated a second way by
comparing the future value of the year- I tax saving against the
future cost of the settlement payment. Thus, if the florist invests
his $36,000 year-I tax saving at 8% after-tax compound interest
for the next fifteen years, the investment will grow to $114,I98,
and the florist will have a $I4,I98 profit when he pays $100,000
to the victim. This amount ($I4,I98) is simply the sum that
would be produced by investing the florist's present value profit
of $4,476 (calculated above ...) for fifteen years at 8% after-tax
compound interest. Thus, the two ways of illustrating the florist's
windfall are economically equivalent.
More important, regardless of which way you prefer 19 under
stand the florist's good fortune, he has clearly swung from a
$64,000 net cost for incurring a tort liability to a net profit (a
$4,476 profit if present tax saving is compared to present cost
and a $I4,I98 profit if the future value of the tax saving is com
pared to the future ·cost of the settlement). Furthermore, the
profit does not result from any daring act of entrepreneurship or
any creative business innovation; it results purely because the
tax system creates a deduction/payment mismatch. 259
259. While these numbers are extreme for the sake of illustration, the principle op
erates whenever a deduction for a payment is allowed in a year prior to the year in
which the taxpayer actually makes the payment. Current deduction reduces the after
tax cost of the payment from what it would have been if the deduction were delayed un
til the year of payment.
For an alternative approach to this issue, see infra notes 455-486 and accompanying
text (discussing two-party matching).

1998]

THE MYTH OF MATCHING

95

As Professor Gunn memorably put it, "If this is the law, well
advised accrual-method businesses should cancel their liability
insurance and run down pedestrians at the rate of at least one a
year."260
But perhaps the better way to think about this issue today
is to observe that deduction of the $100,000 in year 1 would vio
late the income-tax value, effectively allowing the investment re
turn on the $100,000 (which the florist retains in hand) to go
untaxed between years 1 and 16. The investment return, while
nominally included on the taxpayer's tax return, is effectively
free from tax unless we require the $100,000 investment produc
ing the return to itself be taxed in year 1 (through the denial of
a deduction). This is because allowing deduction of an invest
ment is the economic equivalent of exempting from tax the re
turn on the investment. 261 Only if we both tax the $100,000 in
year 1 by denying a year-1 deduction and tax the investment re
turn as it accrues will that return effectively be taxed. And fail
ure to tax it is inappropriate if we are seeking to tax "income"
rather than "consumption." The nominal inclusion of the invest
ment return on the $100,000 in the tax base can lull the deci
sionmaker into a false convinction that no damage to the tax
base of "income" results if we allow financial accounting norms
to control. The nominal inclusion can be misleading to those
who do not understand the yield-exemption phenomenon and
the difference between an income tax and consumption tax. At
bottom, taxpayers should not be able to use accrual accounting
to effect trucing a particular item under a consumption-tax re
gime rather than an income-tax regime without clear evidence
from Congress that this result was intended.
In other words, the financial accounting value that expenses
should be matched with related income in the same accounting
period in order to avoid misleading roller-coaster profits has no
independent tax value. While the florist might be forced by his
financial accountants to reduce his year-1 income statement to
reflect' the future tort liability in order to avoid overstating the
florist's profitability, the only tax value reflected in a year-1 de
260. Gunn, supra note 14, at 26. See also Calvin H. Johnson, Silk Purses From a
Sow's Ear: Cost Free Liabilities Under the Income nu, 3 AM J. TAX POL'y 231, 233-36
(1984) (providing another example).
261. See supra notes 81-93 and accompanying text (comparing consumption truces
to the income true).
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duction is administrative ease in allowing the taxpayer to keep
only one set of books. But because the taxpayer must keep two
sets of books in any event (because of differing depreciation
schedules and other differences), this administrability value
should give way when it ·conflicts with other tax values in a
magnitude that is more than de minimis. The income-tax value
is a strong one and should counsel against allowing current ac
cruals for future payments unless the deferral is so small (in ei
ther amount or in time) that administrability trumps.
This discussion illustrates that the passage of time is thus
important to financial accounting and tax accounting for very
different reasons, and this is the crux of the matter (and this
Article). The passage of time is important to the financial ac
counting system because of the multiyear progression of the
profit picture, where trends are critical to those interested in
the accountant's information. Reporting related income and out
lays in the same year is consistent with this perspective of time
and the goal of providing accurate profit trends over multiple
years. When payments are actually made or receipts are actually
in hand in a multiyear picture is unimportant from this perspec
tive. The reporting of gross receipts and expenses upon receipt
and payment may actually, because of bunching, mislead those
who rely on the financial accountant's information. It is impor
tant to stress that no payment obligations, such as a tax, arise
from the accountant's tabulation of "income" for any particular
year. The timing of income inclusions and deductions are impor
tant only for the picture of economic health they portray over
time.
The passage of time is important to the tax accounting sys
tem, in contrast, because real liabilities arise year by year based
on when items are reported, and the time value of money affects
the real definition of the tax base that produces those tax liabili
ties. A tax base of "income" seeks both to tax the making of an
investment (through denial of deduction for capital expendi
tures, for example) and to tax the return on the investment. Al
lowing a year-1 deduction for payments not yet made, when
there has not yet been a wealth decrease, effectively exempts
from tax the investment return on that cash between the time
of deduction and payment. While deferring deduction might
make sense for financial accounting when the goal is to provide
an accurate portrait of the profit picture over time, it distorts
the tax base for tax purposes, turning the tax on "income" into a
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tax on "consumption" for the item at issue solely because of the
happenstance of the taxpayer's method of accounting. Thus, the
terms "clearly reflect income" have very different meanings ·in
the financial accounting world and in the tax world.
Because the Supreme Court deferred to the Comffiissioner's
requests to defer tax accrual of deductions that are accrued for
financial accounting purposes only in cases of contingent liabili
ties, however, lower courts wishing to defer to the Commis
sioner's wish for deduction deferral were forced to cabin the ar
gument for deferral in this pigeonhole. Thus, in the often-cited
case of Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 262 the Commis
sioner argued, and the Fifth Circuit agreed, that a contract pay
ment that was not contingent under the contract's terms but
was not to be made until far into the future, perhaps more than
twenty years, was nevertheless "contingent" for tax purposes
and thus not properly accrued.
Mooney manufactured and sold small airplanes. 263 With
each purchase, it provided the buyer with a so-called Mooney
bond, which entitled the buyer to a $1,000 payment when the
aircraft was retired. Retirement could occur more than twenty
years in the future. The court implied that Mooney accrued. the
full $100,000 for financial accounting purposes in the year of
sale, and it sought to do so for tax purposes as well. With a
prelude that seemed to embrace the matching principle from fi
nancial accounting as a tax value as well, 264 the court first spe
cifically rejected the Commissioner's argument that the all
events test was not satisfied. It nevertheless agreed that current
deduction would not clearly reflect income. The tax arbitrage
problem or, alternatively, the income-tax value were not identi
fied by either the Commissioner or the court; in 1969 neither
the tax arbitrage possibilities in the premature deduction con
text nor the yield-exemption phenomenon and the income-tax
value were fully appreciated. But something, apparently, just
did not "seem right" about a current deduction for an amount to
be paid so far in the future, 265 and the feeling was enough for
262. 420 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1969).
263. The facts are drawn from id. at 401-02.
264. See id. at 402-04.
265. See Jensen, Premature Accruals, supra note 11, at 477-78:
There is no evidence that the time value of money influenced the Commissioner
and those courts which [disallowed current deductions for future payments. But] it
is probable that economic concerns played an implicit [role]. An obligation to be
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the court to defer to the Commissioner's authority, even though
there were no legal contingencies involving the future payment.
While not relying on the Supreme Court's contingent liability
cases, the court squeezed the facts, if a bit uncomfortably, into
the spirit of those cases by focusing on the practical contingen
cies that might prevent payment because of the substantial de
lay involved. 266 It also raised the matching principle as a defen
sive weapon: Because of the long interval between the time the
obligation was incurred and actual payment, it was unrealistic
to view the liability as an "expense of doing business in the cur
rent year ...."267 In other words, proper matching itself did not
require current accrual. Once again, the court seemed to accept
the matching principle as a tax value.
Even when appreciation of the tax arbitrage possibilities
and the income-tax value in this context became more wide
spread with more sophisticated understanding of the time value
of money, some commentators and Congress were unable to
sever completely their attachment to the notion that the match
ing principle, as implemented by financial accountants, has in
dependent value in the tax arena as well. There are two ways to
fix the problem in accounting for future payments. Year-1 deduc
tions could be discounted to their true present cost. In the florist
example recounted above, that amount would be $31,524. 268 Al
ternatively, the deduction could be deferred until the year of
payment and deducted in full. The florist would deduct $100,000
in year 16 when paid. 269 These methods are economically
fulfilled in the distant future may have met the technical requirements for deduct
ibility, but something must have seemed amiss.
266. The longer the time between the issuance of the bond and payment under it,
"the less probable it becomes that the liability, though incurred, will ever in fact be
paid." 420 F.2d at 410.
267. Mooney, 420 F.2d at 410.
268. DODGE ET AL., supra note 20, at 461:
The deduction would then generate a year-1 tax saving of $11,349 ($31,524 x .36).
Over the next fifteen years, the $31,524 present cost would grow, at 8%, to
$100,000, the $11,349 year-1 tax saving would grow to $36,000, and the net cost
to the florist of the year-16 settlement payment would be $64,000 ($100,000 
$36,000), the same cost as if he had paid the $100,000 to the victim in year 1.
Id.
269. Id. "At that point, the florist would have $36,000 of year-16 tax savings to off
set against the $100,000 year-16 payment, and his net cost would be $64,00(}-the same
as if he had paid $100,000 to the victim in year l." Id.
A third possibility proffered by a few critics would be to allow a year-1 deduction
discounted to present value using a pre-tax rate of return (instead of an after-tax rate)
coupled with annual deductions reflecting the increase in the present value of the liabil
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equivalent. Perhaps the tax value of administrability favors the
delayed deduction alternative, to avoid the task of discounting
to present cost, but otherwise no tax value points to a prefer
ence of one of these methods over the other. Yet, writing in
1980, Aidinoff and Lopata, who readily recognized the tax arbi
trage problems inherent in current deductions for future liabili
ties, 270 nevertheless advocated that the year-1 deduction dis
counted to present cost was the only correct solution-because of
the matching principle.
One of the basic principles embodied in the concept of accrual
accounting is the matching in the same period of revenues and
the costs of earning such revenues. Indeed, the purpose of permit
ting taxpayers to utilize the accrual method of reporting, the Su
preme Court itself has stated in United States v. Anderson, is to
enable them to "make their returns . . . by charging against in
come earned during the taxable period, the expenses incurred in
and properly attributable to the process of earning income during
that period. 271
ity that occurs during the year as the liability approaches maturity. See Noel B. Cun
ningham, A Theoretical Analysis of the Tux Treatment of Future Costs, 40 TAX L.. REv.
577, 583-85 (1985) (describing the position of M. Bernard Aidinoff, Gerald Brannon,
Emil Sunley, and others). The sum of the annual deductions would equal the face
amount of the future payment. Coupled with the year-1 deduction, thia alternative is
more generous than either of the other two, which are economically equivalent. As Cun
ningham put it, "This alternative differs from the first two in both value and theory. It
is more generous than the others, and is based upon the premise that to properly mea
sure income, increases in the present value of a future liability must be taken into ac
count." Id. at 585. The advocates of this alternative argue that it is the only method that
satisfies economic neutrality.
ff a liability is incurred or if the amount of an existing liability increases, the lia
bility or increases reduces net wealth (computed on an accrual basis), and thus
reduces income. By its very nature, the present value of a liability underlying a
premature accrual obligation increases each year as the time for performance ap
proaches. The critics argue that to properly measure income the obligor's income,
these increases must be taken into account. Since the deferral rule [of § 461(h)]
fails to do this, the critics argue that investments involving premature accrual ob
ligations are overtaxed. By taJring these investments more heavily than others,
the deferral rule creates a bias against them, and makes them relatively less
attractive.
Id. at 591. Professor Cunningham proceeds to argue convincingly against the perceived
neutrality of this alternative and in favor the of the section 461(h) deferral approach.
See id. at 599-621.
270. M. Bernard Aidinoff & Benjamin B. Lopata, Section 461 and Accnial-Method
Thxpayers: The Treatment of Liabilities Arising from Obligations to be Performed in the
Future, 33 TAX LAw. 789, 824 (1980) (referring to "windfall" that would occur without
discounting to present value).
271. Id. at 796-97 (footnotes omitted).
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They failed to recognize the Court's own blind acceptance of the
matching principle in Anderson in an era when independent tax
values were not developed and other areas of law were imported
into the tax realm out of sheer necessity to fill the void of tax
thought at the time. And they unquestioningly accepted the no
tion that matching continues today to have independent value in
the tax realm as well, requiring a preference for year-1 deduc
tion, though at a discounted value. 272 Thus, they thought that
the Mooriey court's conclusion "that fifteen to thirty years is sim
ply too long a gap between accrual and payment is open to seri
ous question."273 "[F]rom the point of view of the correct match
ing of income and related expenses . . . the taxpayer should
have been permitted a deduction in the same year as the reve
nues from the sale of the planes to which the 'bonds' logically
related were taken into income, "274 though they did concede that
the deduction should be discounted to present cost in order to
prevent the "windfall"275 that would otherwise occur on deduc
tion of the full face amount. 27s
When Congress enacted section 46 l(h) in the Tax Reform
Act of 1984277 to address the problem of deductions for future li
abilities, it, too failed to eradicate completely the matching prin
ciple from its misplaced pedestal in the tax realm. And the
Commissioner's prior failure to elucidate the real problem in de
ductions for future liabilities is to blame. Instead of articulating
the tax base distortion that occurs with the undiscounted deduc
tion of future liabilities under its "clear reflection" authority-as
it should have-the Commissioner often argued prior to 1984
that the all events test required that deductions could not be ac
crued until "economic performance" occurred by, for example,
rendering future services. 278 "The original theoretical justifica
272. See id. at 811-18.
273. Id. at 801. See also infra note 370 and accompanying text (regarding Professor
Malman's similar questioning of Mooney).
274. Aidinoff & Lopata, supra note 270, at 803.
275. Id. at 824.
276. lil the course of an article arguing that the discounted year-1 deduction is
preferable to the delayed deduction, Gordon T. Butler also accepts too facilely the pro
position that matching for the sake of matching is a tax value. See Gordon T. Butler,
l.R.C. § 461(h): Thx Fairness and the Deduction of Future Liabilities, 26 U. MEM. L. REv.
97, 112 (1995) 'Matching' is a goal of financial reporting and, to a limited extent, of
tax accounting as well.")
277. Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 91(a), 98 Stat. 494, 598.
278. See Jensen, Premature Accruals, supra note 11, at 457-60, 477.

c·

1998]

THE MYTH OF MATCHING

101

tion for the performance requirement is lost in the mists of an
tiquity, "279 though it "seem[s] to be based rather loosely on
matching."280 It is likely based on the idea that economic per
formance is likely to bring the timing of the deduction closer to
the time of payment, because once performance has occurred,
the performer is going to want to be paid. Congress adopted the
idea wholesale in section 461(h).
Congress rejected the year-1 deduction for future liabilities
at a discounted rate as too cumbersome. 281 It should have, there
fore, required delay in deduction until the time of payment in
all cases. Instead, however, it provided that the all events test is
not to be considered met any sooner than the time of economic
performance, and "payment" constitutes economic performance
under the statute only in cases of worker's compensation pay
ments and payments of tort liabilities. 282 If the liability arises
out of the provision of property or services to the taxpayer or by
the taxpayer, then economic performance occurs as the property
or services are provided. 283 Congress delegated authority to the
Treasury Department to determine when economic performance
occurs with respect to liabilities that are not described in the
statute. 284 The statute also provides that deduction of future lia
bilities is allowable prior to economic performance if the all
events test is satisfied, the deferral is de minimis (using an
eight and one-half-morith benchmark), the item is reported con
sistently, and either the item is immaterial or accrual in the
year that the all events test is satisfied "results in a more
proper matching against income than accruing such item in the
taxable year in which economic performance occurs."285
While only in the exception language, the matching princi
ple has made it into the statute! It perhaps can be defended
279. Id. at 477.
280. Gunn, supra note 14, at 36.
281. See Jensen, Premature Accruals, supra note 11, at 480.
282. See I.R.C. § 46l(h)(2)(C). Professor Calvin Johnson has argued to me that "ec
onomic performance" will defer deduction until the party on the other side of the trans
action would likely demand the payment of interest and thus is an appropriate tool for
determining the proper timing of the expense deduction. One simple response to that is
that interest will not always be demanded or willingly paid upon economic performance.
The only sure cure for the problem described here is to delay deduction until actual
payment.
283. See I.R.C. § 461(h)(2)(A) & (B).
284. See l.R.C. § 461(h)(2)(D).
285. See I.R.C. § 461(h)(3).
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here, however, since the exception itself is premised on allowing
deference to financial accounting norms when damage to tax
values is de minimis and thus the administrability value pre
dominates. The objectionable part of the statute is the use of an
ything other than payment as "economic performance" under the
general rule. As Professor Jensen has noted, "a premature ac
crual is still possible if a lag time between economic perform
ance and payment exists and economic performance occurs
first."28 6
Congress should eliminate these shortcomings, as well as
the ambiguities of trying to determine "economic performance"
for certain categories of transactions, by amending section
461(h) to delay accrual of future liabilities until payment-pe
riod. That is the only cure that precisely matches the ailment of
premature accruals described earlier.
5.

Modem Decisionmaking

What should courts and the Treasury Department, within
its rulemaking powers, do in the meantime? When discussing
the "clear reflection standard," they should forthrightly discuss
the real tax value at stake in this context under time value of
money principles-the anti-tax-arbitrage and income-tax val
ues-and forthrightly dispel the lingering notion that the
matching principle found in financial accounting is a tax value
as well. In light of these premises, they should bend over back
wards in situations that are not clearly addressed by the statute
to conclude that deductions for future payments must be de
ferred until the payments are made, unless the deferral is so in
substantial that the tax value of administrability (assumed to
inhere in allowing deduction at the same time shown on the tax
payer's books for financial accounting purposes) takes prece
dence over these tax values.
As an example of the Treasury Department at work, con
sider the question of when economic performance should be
deemed to occur with respect to jackpot payments made by pro
286. Jensen, Premature Accruals, supra note 11, at 483. Moreover, there should be
no theoretical problem with the deduction of prepayments of the costs of services or
property prior to economic performance, so long as the all events test is satisfied and
payment does not constitute a capital expenditure. Because most prepayments providing
future benefits do constitute capital expenditures, not many would be deductible in any
event. See supra notes 81-125 and accompanying text (discussing capitalization).
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gressive slot machines. A progressive slot machine is one that
has a jackpot that progressively increases until a gambler pulls
the winning combination. These machines can take as long as
35 months to pay off, though they pay off in an average of four
and one-half months. 287 In United States v. Hughes Properties,
Inc.,'J.88 a case decided after enactment of section 461(h) but deal
ing with a year not subject to it, the Supreme Court concluded
that the all events test regarding the casino's liability to pay the
amount added to the jackpot each year accrued at the end of
each year. When does economic performance occur for purposes
of years governed by section 461(h)? "If providing entertainment
constitutes the provision of services and gamblers are enter
tained by merely playing slot machines provided by a casino, ec
onomic performance occurs as the machines are played."289 In
that case, deductions would continue to be allowed at the end of
each year equal to the portion of the jackpot tallied that year.
But Treasury Regulations issued under the authority of section
461(h)(2)(D) provide that economic performance occurs only
upon payment. 290 The statutory language does not clearly cate
gorize gambling activities, so there was room for appreciation of
the anti-tax-arbitrage value and income-tax value to lead the
Treasury to opt for payment as economic performance, a sound
approach to statutory interpretation.
The progressive jackpot situation does not fit easily within any of
the statutory definitions of economic performance. When doubt
remains about the time of economic performance after legitimate
attempts have been made to apply those definitions, the deduc
tion should be deferred until payment. In other words, when in
doubt, defer. 291

The Supreme Court's performance, on the other hand, has
left much to be desired. In 1986 and 1987, within ten months of
each other, the Court decided two cases considering whether fu
ture liabilities had accrued for purposes of the all events test:
287. See Erik M. Jensen, The Supreme Court and the Timing of Deductions for Ac
crual-Basis Taxpayers, 22 GA. L. REV. 229, 235 (1988) [hereinafter Jensen, Supreme
Court].
288. 476 U.S. 593 (1986). See infra notes 295-302 and accompanying text (further
discussing the case).
289. Erik M. Jensen, Economic Peformance and Progressive Jackpots: A Better
Analysis, 45 TAX NOTES 635 (Oct. 30, 1989) [hereinafter Economic Performance].
290. See Treas. Reg. § 1.461-4(gX4).
291. Jensen, Economic Performance, supra note 289, at 636.
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United States v. Hughes Properties, lnc., 292 and United States v.
General Dynamics Corp. 293 Neither case involved years in which
the economic performance requirement applied. Writing in 1988,
Professor Jensen summarized the Court's performance as
follows:
The time value of money dominates the current theoretical tax
literature, and timing is an important practical issue as well. All
other things being equal, informed taxpayers seek to accelerate
deductions and to defer the inclusion of income. On an issue of
such importance, one expects the Supreme Court, when it exer
cises its discretionary jurisdiction twice within such a short pe
riod of time, to promulgate well-crafted, thoughtful opinions.
But the Court wrote as neither craftsman nor theoretician.
The cases apply the same prong of the "all-event" test, which ad
dresses the timing issue. Nevertheless, the cases fit together
poorly, if at all, and the Court's attempted reconciliation reflects
an analysis made at the most mundane conceptual level. Moreo
ver, the two decisions are of surprisingly limited scope. The Tax
Reform Act of 1984 substantially modified the law governing the
time of deductions, but neither case involved facts governed by
the new statute. Finally, in the cursory majority opinion in Gen
eral Dynamics, the Court made a misleading suggestion about the
law after the Tax Reform Act of 1984 and advanced an ill
considered proposition about the construction of tax statutes. In
deed, the opinion evidences an astonishing lack of both research
and analysis. Shoddy judicial work warrants criticism for its own
sake, and criticism is particularly justified when the Supreme
Court misreads, and therefore possibly misdirects, post-1984
law. 294

AB noted earlier, Hughes Properties concerned the timing of
casino deductions for payments to be made when a gambler pul
led the winning combination on a progressive slot machine. The
Court decided the case by focusing on the bald language of the
all events test and the contingent liability body of case law de
cided under it, divorced from the time value of money revolution
in tax thought that had occurred. In short, it ignored the intel
lectual history of the matching principle in the tax law re
counted here. It sought simple refuge in the talisman that the
292. 476 U.S. 593 (1986).
293. 481 U.S. 239 (1987).
294. Jensen, Supreme Court, supra note 287, at 230-31.
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all events test had come to occupy. 295 The opinion could have
been written in the 1940s.
There was no dispute regarding the amount of the liability,
the second prong of the all events test. Rather, the parties and
Court framed the issue as whether all the events had occurred
to establish the fact of liability, the first prong. 296 The govern
ment sought to fit within the contingent liability cases.
[The casino's] obligation to pay a particular progressive jackpot
matures only upon a winning patron's pull of the handle in the
future.... [U]ntil that event occurs, [the casino's] liability to pay
the jackpot is contingent and therefore gives rise to no deductible
expense. Indeed, until then, there is no one who can make a
claim for payment. 297

The casino, on the other hand, argued that
there was a reasonable expectation that payment would be made
at some future date, that the casino's liability was fixed and ir
revocable under Nevada law, that the accrual of those amounts
conformed with generally accepted accounting principles, and that
deductibility effected a timely and realistic matching of revenue
and expenses. 298

The Claims Court allowed the accrual because, in part, "[a] con
trary result would mismatch [the casino's] income and
expenses."299
The Supreme Court affirmed the Claims Court and allowed
the accrual. After reciting the all events test and its centrality
to tax accounting, it mechanically described the contingent lia
bility cases, concluding that the liability must be "final and defi
nite in amount," "fixed and absolute," and "unconditional"300 to
be accruable. It then proceeded to evaluate the parties' argu
ments regarding whether the liability to pay the amount shown
on the jackpot's meter was sufficiently "fixed" at the end of each
year to justify accrual, concluding in the end that it was.
295. The Court, citing a 1961 case, confirmed that the all events test was the
"touchstone• for determining accrual of deductions and was "a fundamental principle of
tax accounting." Hughes Properties, 476 U.S. at 600.
296. See Treas. Reg. § l.461-l(a)(2).
297. Hughes Properties, 476 U.S. at 597.
298. Id. at 598.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 600.

106

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TAX POLICY

[Vol. 15:17

[The casino's] liability, that is its obligation to pay the indicated
amount, was not contingent. That an extremely remote and spec
ulative possibility existed that the jackpot might never be won,
did not change the fact that, as a matter of state law, [the casino]
had a fixed liability for the jackpot which it could not escape. 301

Perhaps the relatively short deferral means that the out
come is not particularly troublesome, but the weak opinion cer
tainly is. One can imagine an opinion that would have been
much more effective in curbing misunderstanding and misuse of
the matching principle, in explicitly articulating and promoting
more widespread understanding of the underlying tax values
that are at stake, and in promoting coherent development of the
law in this and related areas. The Court should have taken this
opportunity-its first since the development of tax thinking that
illuminated the real problem at issue-to review the evolution of
the legal and intellectual currents that brought the state of the
law to where it was.
The Court should have first explained that the language of
the all events test it articulated in Anderson those many de
cades ago was an attempt to encapsulate the matching principle
of accrual financial accounting in the early days of the income
tax, when independent tax thought was fledgling, at best. The
Court should have recounted how the contingent liability cases
were the first to allow the Commissioner to depart from accrual
financial accounting treatment under the "clear reflection" au
thority, but that current thinking has shown how current deduc
tions for future payments violate tax values even if future pay
ment is absolutely certain. The Court should have explained
how the matching principle in financial accounting has no inde
pendent tax value other than administrative convenience in al
lowing the taxpayer to use financial accounting records in filing
its tax return. The Court should have explained how the pas
sage of time is important to financial accounting and tax ac
counting for very different reasons. The Court should have ex
plained that financial accountants wish to match revenues and
related profits in the same time period (regardless of when re
ceived or paid) in order to show an accurate picture of the profit
progression over multiple years to parties who will make deci
sions based on that profit progression. The Court should have
301. Id. at 601-02 (footnote omitted).
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explained that the timing of receipt and payment, an irrele
vancy for purposes of financial accounting, has independent tax
significance since such timing can alter the very tax liability
that results from the process of computing the tax yardstick
"income"-because of the time value of money. Matching reve
nues and expenses in the same period for tax purposes-while
perhaps aesthetically satisfying-actually distorts the tax mea
surement when there is a significant delay in receipt or pay
ment. It then could have concluded, if it wished, that because
the payment deferral in this case was minimal-averaging no
more than a year-the administrative convenience value of al
lowing the taxpayer to use its financial accounting records out
weighed the income-tax value.
Indeed, had the Court written an opinion like this a few
years before the 1984 economic performance amendments, the
amendments could have been much simpler and more straight
forward. Congress would have needed only to craft a bright line
de minimis rule in order to avoid case-by-case determinations
regarding how much delay is too much. That is, Congress could
have provided that deductions accrue at the later of accrual for
financial accounting purposes or payment, with an exception al
lowing accrual before payment if the delay is within, say, the
eight and one-half months that Congress seized upon in the re
curring items exception of section 461(h)(3). Instead, we got a
mechanistic, narrow opinion, which failed to illuminate the big
picture or failed even to recognize the advancements and refine
ments in thought that had occurred since cases decided in the
Anderson era. 302
The Court wrote precisely the same kind of tunnel-vision
opinion in General Dynamics,303 mired in the narrow language of
the first prong of the all events test, with the only difference be
ing that the taxpayer lost and was denied deduction accrual.
General Dynamics304 self-insured its employee health plan, reim
bursing employees who filed claims for covered medical care. It
302. The dissent did not do any better. Justice Stevens, with whom Chief Justice
Burger joined, also couched his mechanistic opinion within the contours of whether or
not the liability was "fixed." Because the obligation to pay the liability would disappear
if the casino surrendered its operating license under Nevada law, Justice Stevens be
lieved the liability was not sufficiently fixed to be accruable. See id. at 607-09 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
303. 481 U.S. at 239.
304. The facts are drawn from id. at 241-42.
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sought to accrue deductions for reimbursements that had not
yet been approved, and thus not yet paid to employees, for med
ical care provided to the employees in the tax year. The deduc
tions included reimbursements with respect to claims that had
been filed with General Dynamics but not yet approved as well
as claims that were not yet filed with General Dynamics but
were, from past experience, expected to be filed. The Govern
ment did not challenge the evidence regarding the number of
claims, asking the Court to resolve the case solely on the issue
of which event was the final event fixing the taxpayer's liability
to reimburse the employee: the filing of a claim form or the re
ceipt by the employee of covered medical care. The Court de
cided on the former and denied deductions for unfiled claims.
General Dynamics was . . . liable to pay for covered medical ser
vices only if properly documented claims forms were filed. Some
covered individuals, through oversight, procrastination, confusion
over the coverage provided, or fear of disclosure to the employer
of the extent or nature of the services received, might not file
claims for reimbursement to which they are plainly entitled. Such
filing is not a mere technicality. It is crucial to the establishment
of liability on the part of the taxpayer. Nor does the failure to file
a claim represent the type of "extremely remote and speculative
possibility" that we held in Hughes did not render an. otherwise
fixed liability contingent.305

As this decision was rendered prior to enactment of the
Americans With Disabilities Act, 306 which makes unlawful cer
tain kinds of disability discrimination against employees in the
workplace, the Court's ultimate conclusion, within the parame
ters the Court set for itself, is perhaps not surprising. But once
again, the contours of those parameters are themselves open to
criticism. Once again, the Court bypassed the opportunity to
bring order to chaos by writing more broadly of the issue in its
intellectual and historical context, choosing instead to focus on
applying the controlling "test" in, a manner that amounts to sim
ple disagreement with the lower court on the particular facts
before it. No guidance can be gleaned from the opinion.307 More
305. Id. at 244-45 (footnote and citation omitted).
306. 42 u.s.c. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
307. Because the Court's approaches were so fact bound and because the 1984 en
actment of section 461(h) diminished the role of the all events test for all years after
1984, Professor Jensen puzzled over the Court's decision to grant certiorari in Hughes
Properties and General Dynamics. See Erik M. Jensen, Hughes Properties and General
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over, the Court misleadingly implied that for future years, to
which the economic performance requirement of section 46 l(h)
would apply, the reimbursements would not be deductible until
paid.308
Justice O'Connor's dissent, joined by Justices Blackmun and
Stevens, was likewise too narrow in its approach, focusing on
the language of the all events test, wholly detached from the un
derlying tax values at stake. She simply disagreed that the case
was adequately distinguishable from Hughes Properties. 309 She
believed that the issue was whether the filing of a claim form
was a trivial step. Believing it was, she characterized it as a
mere "ministerial act." Displaying a lack of understanding of the
underlying tax values at stake, she cited an income accrual case
for this proposition:
[l]n Continental Tie & Lumber Co. v. United States, the Court
held that an accrual basis taxpayer should immediately include
as income a federal payment to railroads created by statute, but
neither claimed by the taxpayer nor awarded by the Federal Gov
ernment until years later. The Court explained that although no
railroad had any vested right to payments under the statute until
a claim was made by the railroad and awarded by the Interstate
Commerce Commission, "[t]he right to the award was fixed by the
passage of the Transportation Act. What remained was mere ad
ministrative procedure to ascertain the amount to be paid."
Clearly, the right to reimbursement for medical benefits under
any of the medical benefits plans at issue in this case arises once
medical services are rendered; the filing and processing of a claim
is purely routine and ministerial, and in the nature of a formal
contingency, as correctly perceived by the courts below. 310

AB discussed in a later section, the Continental Tie & Lumber
case may itself have been an unwise decision. 311 At the least, it
is clearly unwise to cite income accrual cases in the deduction
context, and vice versa. While they are similar in the sense that
they are the flip sides of the same coin, the time value of money
Dynamics: The Supreme Court, the All Events Test, and the 1984 Tux Act, 32 TAX NOTES
911, 911-13 (Sept. 1, 1986); Jensen, Supreme Court, supra note 287, at 282.
308. See 481 U.S. at 243 n.3; Jensen, Supreme Court, supra note 287, at 256-69;
Treas. Reg. § l.461-4(d)(6){i) (confirming that economic performance occurs as medical
care is provided to the covered employee).
309. See 481 U.S. at 247-51 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
310. Id. at 250 (citation omitted) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
311. See infra notes 415-426 and accompanying text (discussing the accrual of in
come not yet received).

110

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TAX POLICY

[Vol. 15:17

analysis that should serve to defer the deduction in the future
expense scenario should also serve to delay the income inclusion
in the future receipt scenario, an issue discussed in greater de
tail in part C. The point here is that Justice O'Connor and her
fellow dissenters did not even seem to question whether an in
come accrual case and deduction accrual case raised distinct
issues.
In short, none of the four opinions in Hughes Properties and
General Dynamics is commendable in its form and approach to
the real tax values at stake and to the history of thought in this
area. Through its example, the Court's opinions cemented a nar
row focus on the language of the all events test, though with the
economic performance requirement that test becomes less impor
tant. It encouraged taxpayers and lower courts to engage in con
structing "imagined contingencies"312 and their likelihood of ac
tual occurrence in determining whether the test was satisfied or
whether the contingent liability cases should be deemed to con
trol instead of focusing on the underlying tax values at stake.
And they did nothing to dispel the notion that the matching
principle of financial accounting has independent tax relevance.
As noted earlier, one purpose of this Article is to encourage
courts to do better with their rhetoric, since opinions allow the
courts to educate and further sound development of the law.
The Tax Court, also dealing with a pre-1984 tax year (and
thus dealing only with the all events test and the clear reflec
tion gloss without the added economic performance require
ment), did better in the 1994 case of Ford Motor Co. v. Commis
sioner. 313 Ford entered into a series of structured settlements in
1980 with respect to various personal injury and accidental
death claims. 314 The injuries allegedly resulted from manufactur
ing defects in vehicles manufactured by Ford. Ford sought to ac
crue as a tax deduction in 1980 the entire face amount of the
settlement awards, totaling $24,477 ,699, even though the
awards were to be paid out over various periods, the longest of
which was 58 years. Ford purchased single-premium annuities
for a total cost of $4,424,587 to cover the structured settlements.
The payments under the annuities were structured to mirror
312. Jensen, Supreme Court, supra note 287, at 243.
313. 102 T.C. 87 (1994).
314. The facts, a bit simplified for purposes of discussion, are drawn from id. at
87-91.
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Ford's structured settlement payments. Ford owned the annui
ties and remained responsible for the deferred payments under
the structured settlement. For financial accounting purposes,
Ford deducted $4,424,587 in 1980. The Commissioner argued
that only $4,424,587 was allowed as a tax deduction in 1980,
which was essentially the present discounted value of the future
payments. While the Commissioner argued both that the all
events test was not satisfied and that the clear reflection stan
dard required the discount to present value, the Tax Court
reached only the second argument, agreeing with the
Commissioner.
The opinion is noteworthy for choosing to rely on the clear
reflection standard instead of trying to shoehorn the analysis
into the contingent liability exception for accrual under the all
events test, as the Supreme Court did in Hughes Properties and
General Dynamics. Unlike these earlier decisions, the Tax court
opinion explicitly recognized that the real problem was not only
the contingency of the future payment because of the long time
delay. Using an example much like the florist example recounted
earlier, 315 the Tax Court discussed how the delay between deduc
tion and even a certain payment results in tax arbitrage, a vio
lation of tax values. 316 (It did not mention that an alternative
way of looking at the problem here is that it violates the in,.
come-tax value.) The court recognized that, with 1980 deduction
of the undiscounted face amount of the future payments, Ford
could realize a profit for tax purposes that it would not realize
had the tort claims never been filed. The court concluded that
prevention of such tax arbitrage by allowing only a discounted,
present value deduction of the future payments was thus within
the Commissioner's discretion under the clear reflection
language.
The Tax Court explicitly rejected the taxpayer's argument
that the matching principle required allowing full deduction of
the undiscounted amount of the future liabilities in 1980.
[Ford] argues that [the Commissioner's] position mismatches in
come and expense. We do not agree. . . .
In the instant case, we think that the method of accounting
[Ford] used for financial reporting purposes resulted in a better
matching of its income and expenses than the method used for
315. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
316. See 102 T.C. at 92-94.
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tax purposes. Although a basic principle of financial accounting is
the matching of income with related expenses, the principal pur
pose of tax accounting is the accurate reflection of the taxpayer's
income, a concept which does not necessarily correlate with the
goal of financial accounting. In the instant case, for financial re
porting purposes, [Ford] expensed only the costs of the annuities
it purchased, which were not exceeded by the present value of the
deferred payments it was obligated to make. As we see it, the
true economic costs of [Ford's] losses to the tort claimants are the
amounts it paid for the annuities.... Consequently, the accrual
method of accounting which [Ford] used for financial reporting
purposes resulted in the proper matching of income and expense
and clearly reflects petitioner's income. s1 7

One wishes that Ford had accrued the full face amount of the
obligations for financial reporting purposes, requiring the court
to expressly reject the taxpayer's financial reporting of the item
for tax purposes and to expressly reject the matching principle
as a tax value. The court's language seems to accept the notion
that matching is also a tax goal; it just so happened that the
goal was satisfied in this case with a deduction limited to pres
ent value. And perhaps the court's approach could have been
more firmly rooted in the intellectual evolution in thought that
is described here: a more robust account of the origins and de
velopment of the all events test to import accrual accounting
into tax accounting for administrative ease, the first deviations
from financial accounting principles in the contingent debt
cases, the growing realization that the delay in payment is as
troublesome as the contingency of the payment, in light of the
anti-tax-arbitrage value and income-tax value, which have long
been rooted in statutory language and structure. 318 The Ford
317.. Id. at 103-04 (citations and footnotes omitted).
318. Perhaps such a fuller opinion might have persuaded the three dissenting
judges that the clear reflection standard supported the Commissioner's position. The
clear reflection standard surely is malleable enough to evolve with tax thinking that
demonstrates that a taxpayer's chosen method of accounting violates tax values evident
in the Code's language in other provisions. The dissenters believed that time value of
money principles simply had no root in statutory language and structure until 1984 and
that the majority's opinion resulted in retroactive application of the spirit, though not
the letter, of the economic performance requirement of section 46l(h). See 102 T.C. at
112-13 (Gerber, J., dissenting). (Had section 461(h) actually applied, the deductions for
the settlement payments would have been delayed until made. See I.R.C. § 461(hX2XC).)
In essence, the dissent implied that the clear reflection standard had an understood, fi
nite meaning prior to 1984 that did not include time value of money notions. At bottom,
then, the majority and dissent essentially disagreed over the scope of the Commis
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opinion is nevertheless to be commended for its forthright reli
ance on the clear reflection language and its primary reliance on
tax values in determining what "clear reflection" means in the
present day.
C. ACCRUAL ACCOUNTING-INCOME

1. Prepaid Gross Receipts
For financial accounting purposes, gross receipts are not in
cluded in income, even if in· hand, until they are earned
through, for example, the provision of future services or the fu
ture delivery of goods. Under the matching principle, the ex
penses incurred to produce those gross receipts are deducted in
that same future period. 319 When should prepaid income be in
cluded in income by the accrual basis taxpayer for tax purposes,
in view of the fact that the taxpayer has the cash in hand (and
thus the ability to pay taxes in the year of receipt) and in view
of the material discussed in parts A and B above?
One way of looking at the problem is to observe that the
failure to include the prepaid income in the year of receipt
would have precisely the same economic effect as immediate de
duction of future payments, because "deferral of income is tanta
mount to inclusion coupled with an acceleration of the future ex
penses that are estimated will be incurred in earning that
income."320 Thus it would violate the anti-tax-arbitrage value for
the same reasons delineated through the earlier florist example.
Assume, for example, that our accrual basis florist from the
earlier example321 receives $100,000 in year 1 for flowers to be
delivered in year 16.322 Assume for now that the florist will in
cur costs of $100,000 in year 16 to purchase the flowers from
the wholesaler. For purposes of financial accounting, the florist
would not include the $100,000 in income until it is earned in
year 16, when the florist would also deduct the $100,000 costs
incurred in performing the contract under the matching princi
sioner's discretion under the clear reflection standard and what factors are permissible
to consider under that standard.
319. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
320. DODGE ET AL., supra note 20, at 470.
321. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
322. The example is outlandish, but it is helpful to stick with the same example
for purposes of illustration. For more extended numerical illustrations of the time value
of money, see Fellows, supra note 89, at 730-33.
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ple, yielding no profit for the year-16 income statement. 323 What
would happen if the florist similarly deferred inclusion of the
$100,000 cash in hand until year 16 for tax purposes, yielding
no tax liability in year 1? The economic effect would be the
same as if the florist included the full $100,000 in income in
year 1 and then deducted the $100,000 future expenses in year
1 (resulting in the year-1 zero tax bill). But the first florist ex
ample showed that accelerating the $100,000 deduction to year
1 without discounting violated tax values. Thus, under the same
time value of money analysis, the florist should include the
$100,000 in income in year 1 when it is received. 324
There is another, equally valuable (perhaps better) way to
view the problem here: Failure to include the receipts when re
ceived violates the income-tax value by effectively exempting
from tax the investment return on the receipt between the time
of payment and inclusion. Regardless of whether we force the
taxpayer to include the $100,000 prepaid gross receipts in in
come in year 1, the year of receipt, the return earned on those
receipts when they are invested will be included over the years
in the taxpayer's gross income as it accrues. But even though
the return is nominally accrued in gross income as it accrues, it
is not effectively taxed if we allow the taxpayer to exclude the
year-1 receipt. This is because allowing deduction of an invest
ment (or the equivalent, allowing an exclusion of the prepaid re
ceipt in this case) is the economic equivalent of not allowing the
deduction but exempting from tax the return. 325 Only if we both
tax the prepaid receipt in year 1 on receipt and tax the invest
ment return as it accrues will that return effectively be taxed.
And failure to tax it is inappropriate if we are seeking to tax
"income" rather than "consumption." Use of the accrual method
should not allow taxpayers to effect taxation of a particular item
under a consumption-tax regime rather than income-tax regime
323. This "no profit" scenario when the florist has the investment value of the
$100,000 for 16 years prompted Professor Johnson to argue that the deferral of prepaid
income until earned makes no sense for financial accounting purposes as well. See John
son, •Earned• Requirement, supra note 36, at 395-402.
324. The result should be the same even if the future costs are less than $100,000,
say $80,000. The $20,000 excess of the prepaid income over the undiscounted future
costs still represents a better ability to pay taxes in year 1, when the cash is in hand,
than in year 16.
325. See supra notes 81-93 and accompanying text (comparing consumption taxes
to the income tax).
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without clear evidence from Congress that this result was
intended.
The immediate inclusion of prepaid income coupled with
delayed deduction of future expenses under section 461(h) that
will be incurred in performing services or delivering goods for
that prepaid income demonstrates most forcefully that the
matching principle is not a tax value. This situation, however, is
the one thought the most "unfair" by those who believe the
matching principle to be a tax value. 326 Yet, it is not unfair in
light of the differing roles that time plays in the financial ac
counting world and tax world. While the timing of actual receipt
and payment is unimportant for financial accountants, the tim
ing of gross income inclusions and expense deductions will dis
tort the actual tax liability owing under the measuring stick of
"income" if such receipts and expense payments are reported in
periods that differ substantially from actual receipt and pay
ment because of the time value of the money in the hands of the
taxpayer. Far from being "unfair," requiring inclusion of prepaid
gross receipts while deferring deduction of the expenses of earn
ing that income until those costs are actually paid conforms
most closely to the actual wealth accession and actual loss ac
companying that receipt and payment. Moreover, and most im
portant, it ensures that the investment income does not effec
tively escape taxation (even though it is nominally taxed), as it
would under a consumption-tax regime.
But because the matching principle has had such a strong
hold on the thinking of many thinkers and jurists, especially un
til the 1980s when time value of money principles came to the
fore, courts and commentators were uncomfortable with this sit
uation. They gave lip service to matching as a tax goal because
they did not fully understand that there is no reason matching
should be deemed to be a tax value. Yet, at the same time some
thing simply must not have "seemed right"327 with the deferral
of cash actually in hand, for in a celebrated trilogy of cases in
the 1950s and 1960s, the Supreme Court agreed with the Com
missioner that failure to include such receipts in the particular
cases before the Court failed to reflect income clearly. Because
neither the Court nor the Commissioner understood back then
326. See infra notes 365-376 and accompanying text (describing work of Professor
Malman).
327. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
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the time value of money analysis, the reasoning contained in
those cases was mostly beside the point. 328 The faulty analysis,
however, opened the door for the inappropriate deferral of pre
paid gross receipts on different facts.
In the 1957 case of Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commis
sioner, 329 the taxpayer included in income for tax purposes for
each year only the portion of prepaid membership dues that it
recorded on its books for financial accounting purposes as being
earned in that year. 330 Membership dues were prepaid for one
year, and the taxpayer credited on its books 1/12 of the income
at the end of each month of the twelve-month contract. The
Commissioner relied on the "claim of right doctrine" in arguing
that the taxpayer should accrue the entire amount in the year
received. 331 The taxpayer argued that the accrual method of re
porting its income for financial reporting purposes clearly re
flected its jncome for tax purposes as well, but the Court de
ferred to the Commissioner under the clear reflection standard
in a short passage:
The pro rata allocation of the membership dues in monthly
amounts is purely artificial and bears no relation to the services
which petitioner may in fact be called upon to render for the
member. [The clear reflection language] vests the Commissioner
with discretion to determine whether the petitioner's method of
accounting clearly reflects income. We cannot say, in the circum
stances here, that the discretionary action of the Commissioner,
sustained by both the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals, ex
ceeded permissible limits. 332

Implied, perhaps, in the Court's language regarding "purely
artificial" allocations that bore no relation to any services that
the taxpayer might have to perform is the notion that matching
is indeed a tax value, but that if the taxpayer cannot show
when future expenses will be incurred the matching rationale is
not a justification for deferring income in hand to match such
328. For this reason, the Court's performance might be more easily forgiven than
its performance in Hughes Properties and General Dynamics, supra notes 292-312 and at
accompanying text. It simply did not know any better in the 1950s and 1960s, and at
least it got to the right result. There was no excuse for the 1980s Court to be so una
ware of the underlying tax values at stake.
329. 353 U.S. 180 (1957).
330. The facts are drawn from id. at 188-89.
331. See infra note 347 (discussing the doctrine).
332. 353 U.S. at 189-90 (footnotes omitted).
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uncertain future expenses. 333 In a loose sense, this analysis is
simply the flip side of the coin of the contingent liability analy
sis that the Court seized upon in the future payment context a
decade earlier to sanction deviation from financial accounting
standards. 334 In that context, the contingency of the future lia
bility gave the Court the excuse to defer to the Commissioner's
power under the clear reflection standard and bless deviation
from financial reporting (and the matching principle embodied
there) on the deduction side. Here, the contingency of future ex
penses to which the gross receipts should be matched gave the
Court the excuse to defer to the Commissioner and bless devia
tion from financial reporting on the income side. But, as will be
explored below, just as the contingency was not the real problem
in the future payment context, but rather the delay between de
duction and payment, so the contingency or certainty of the fu
ture expenses in this context is not the real problem, but rather
the delay between receipt and inclusion. Again, the economic
value of the time between reporting wealth receipts and losses
and actually receiving or parting with such wealth is at the
heart of the matter.
In the 1961 case American Automobile Association v. United
States, 335 the American Automobile Association (AAA) chose to
press the case again, this time with better statistical evidence
regarding the rate at which future costs would be incurred. 336
Like the Automobile Club of Michigan, AAA filed its tax returns
using the same accrual method of accounting that it used in
keeping its books and included in income for each month only
the portion of prepaid membership dues that were considered
"earned" in that month. Therefore, the portion of prepaid dues
attributable to months falling in the following taxable year was
not reported in the year of receipt but rather was "deferred [as]
unearned income reflecting an estimated future service expense
to members."337 As in the earlier case, the Commissioner con
333. "[Automobile Club of Michigan] has been recognized as one that simply held
that, in the absence of proof that the proration used by the taxpayer reasonably matched
actual expenses with the earning of related revenue, the Commissioner was justified in
rejecting the taxpayer's proration.n American Automobile Ass'n v. Commissioner, 367
U.S. 687, 703 (1961) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
334. See supra notes 226-252 and accompanying text.
335. 367 U.S. 687 (1961).
336. The facts are drawn from id. at 688-90.
337. Id. at 688.
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tended that the prepaid dues must be included in income in the
year of receipt under Automobile Club of Michigan. AAA, how
ever, attempted to distinguish that case, even though in both
cases there was a failure to match deduction and inclusion with
actual timing in the loss of wealth or receipt of wealth. AAA
argued:
Michigan does not control this case because of a difference in
proof, i.e., . . . in this case the record contains expert accounting
testimony indicating that the system used was in accord with
generally accepted accounting principles; that its proof of cost of
member service was detailed; and that the correlation between
that cost and the period of time over which the dues were
credited as income was shown and justified by proof of
experience. 338

The Court again held for the Commissioner, requiring inclu
sion of the prepaid income in the year of receipt. The Court con
cluded, essentially, that no statistical evidence would be suffi
cient because future services are performed solely at the
demand of individual members. The Court rejected an approach
that established the rate of future costs by looking to service de
mand from the members as a pool.
The Code exacts its revenue from the individual member's dues
which, no one disputes, constitute income. When their receipt as
earned income is recognized ratably over two calendar years,
without regard to correspondingly fixed individual expense or per
. formance justification, but consistently with overall experience,
their accounting doubtless presents a rather accurate image of
the total financial structure, but fails to respect the criteria of an
nual tax accounting and may be rejected by the Commissioner. 339

Because both the time and extent of the future services provided
to individual members could not be established in view of the
demand nature of the services, deferring income to match ex
penses that might never arise is not necessary to reflect income
clearly under the matching principle, the Court apparently rea
soned. "Not only did individually incurred expenses actually
vary from month to month, but even the average expense va
ried-recognition of income nonetheless remaining ratably con
338. Id. at 691.
339. Id. at 692.
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stant."340 Thus, the exercise of the Commissioner's discretion
under the clear reflection language was not "unsound."341
As additional support for its holding, the Court cited the en
actment and subsequent retroactive repeal of sections 452 and
462, which would have allowed the treatment AAA sought.
Those sections would have sanctioned conformance of tax ac
crual accounting with GAAP, specifically allowing deferral of
prepaid income and allowing the deduction of reserves for future
liabilities. 342 They were retroactively repealed because, appar
ently, inadequate transition rules would have allowed some in
come to escape inclusion entirely and would have allowed double
deductions for some expenses.343 Moreover, Congress had mean
while enacted section 455, which allows deferral of prepaid mag
azine subscription income until earned, specifically rejecting a
proposal to extend such treatment to automobile club subscrip
tions. 344 The Court took this as an indication that Congress was
actively considering the matter of the proper treatment of pre
paid dues of automobile clubs and thus chose to defer to Con
gress on the issue. 345
The four dissenters thought that AAJl(s pool evidence was
sufficient to justify deferral of the income in order to match fu
ture expenses incurred in servicing the member contracts:
[AAA] proved, and the Court of Claims found, that the method of
accounting employed by the petitioner during the years in issue
was in accord with generally accepted commercial accounting
principles and practice, was customarily employed by similar tax
payers, and, in the opinion of qualified experts in the accounting
field, clearly reflected [AAA's] net income. 346

The dissent argued that the "claim of right" doctrine, upon
which the Commissioner relied in Automobile Club of Michigan
though not in AAA, applies to determine whether or not a re
ceipt is income, not whether a receipt must be accrued in ad
vance of performance. 347 It similarly rejected any notion that the
340. Id. at 693.
341. See id. at 698.
342. See id. at 694-97.
343. See id. at 698 n.12; id. at 708-09 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
344. Congress has since done so. See I.R.C. § 456.
345. See 367 U.S. at 708-09 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
346. Id. at 698 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
347. See id. at 699-700 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Properly understood, the "claim of
right doctrine is indeed a when-is-income doctrine, not a what-is-income doctrine. The
9
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annual accounting requirement requires accrual before the in
come is earned for financial reporting purposes. 348 Finally, it saw
no mandate in the enactment and subsequent repeal of sections
452 and 462 to defer to Congress the job of deciding this
issue. 349
Neither the majority nor the dissent recognized the real
problem regarding the delay in time between receipt of wealth
and the reporting of that wealth in income for tax purposes. AB
noted earlier, time value of money principles were not well un
derstood in this era. Both the majority and dissent seemed to
accept uncritically that the matching principle from financial ac
counting was a tax accounting value as well. While they never
explicitly said so, that acceptance pervades the opinions: Their
essential point of disagreement was whether there was suffi
cient evidence of the rate at which future costs would be in
curred to justify deferring income in hand to a future period to
match those future costs. Neither the Court nor the Commis
sioner recognized that AANs income inclusion reflecting this
wealth accession already in hand would be diluted if it were de
ferred to a future year. That the tax liability attaching to one
dollar of income will be less in real dollars, because of the time
value of money, if that income can be deferred for one year is
something that every law student learns today in the basic in
come tax class. But this distortion in taxation was simply not
appreciated well at this point in the intellectual history of
taxation.
The Supreme Court did not change its approach two years
later in Schlude v. Commissioner. 350 The Schludes operated a
dance studio. 351 Pursuant to contracts entered into with their
students, they received prepaid gross receipts for a specified
number of dance lessons to be given in the future. The contracts
claim of right doctrine originated in North Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417
(1932). The taxpayer in that case received funds in 1917 as the result of a lower court
decree. The decree was being appealed, however, which meant that the taxpayer might
have had to disgorge the funds if the lower court decree were reversed. The receipt
clearly constituted "income"; the question was whether it was income in 1917, when re
ceived, or when the appeal confirmed the taxpayer's right to keep the funds. The Court
held that the funds were includable in income in 1917. Later repayment, if it occurred,
would raise a deduction issue.
348. See 367 U.S. at 701-02 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
349. See id. at 703-11 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
350. 372 U.S. 128 (1963).
351. The facts, somewhat simplified, are drawn from id. at 130-33.
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varied from five lessons to 1,200 hours of instruction to two les
sons per month for life. None of the lessons were scheduled for
certain dates or times; the students arranged for the lessons to
which they were entitled at their future convenience. The con
tracts were nonrefundable. The Schludes, who used accrual ac
counting for purposes of keeping the dance studio's books, re
ported the prepaid gross receipts over time as lessons were
taught (or as contracts were canceled without lessons). "Three
certified public accountants testified that in their opinion the ac
counting system employed truly reflected the net income in ac
cordance with commercial accrual accounting standards."352 The
Commissioner argued that the prepaid gross receipts should be
included in income upon receipt for tax purposes in order to re
flect income clearly for tax purposes, and the Court once again
agreed.
The Court felt that the interim enactment of section 456,353
which extended to taxpayers like AAA the income deferral it
sought, justified its deference to Congress, which seemed to be
"treating this problem by precise provisions of narrow applica
bility."354 More important, the Court noted that the Schludes' sit
uation was essentially the same as that in Automobile Club of
Michigan and AAA. The Schludes could not establish either the
time or the extent of future services to be rendered since the
dance lessons were scheduled only on demand by the students.
[T]he Court rejected the taxpayer's system as artificial since the
advance payments related to services which were to be performed
only upon customers' demands without relation to fixed dates in
the future. The system employed here suffers from the very same
vice, for the studio sought to defer its cash receipts on the basis
of contracts which did not provide for lessons on fixed dates after
the taxable year, but left such dates to be arranged from time to
time by the instructor and his student. Under the contracts, the
student could arrange for some or all of the additional lessons or
could simply allow their rights under the contracts to lapse. But
even though the student did not demand the remaining lessons,
the contracts permitted the studio to insist upon payment in ac
cordance with the obligations undertaken and to retain whatever
prepayments were made without restriction as to use and without
352. Id. at 132.
353. See supra notes 342-345 and accompanying text (describing analogous
provisions).
354. 372 U.S. at 135.
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obligation of refund.... Clearly, services were rendered solely on
demand in the fashion of the American Automobile Association
and Automobile Club of Michigan cases.

Because of the time value of money distortion that would
result if there were a receiptlinclusion mismatch, the cases de
nying deferral were correct. But once again, the opinions did not
discuss the real underlying tax values at stake. Indeed, they
seemed to solidify the notion that the matching principle is a
tax value. All the talk of whether there was sufficient certainty
regarding the time and extent of future services was really be
side the point. Yet, the language hovered out there (and contin
ues to hover to this day) for lower courts to work with, and
while some courts have resisted it,355 it has resulted in inappro
priate deferral in cases not involving the performance of services
only on demand.
The most celebrated case 356 is Artnell Co. v. Commis
sioner.357 Chicago White Sox, Inc., received substantial revenue
early in the 1962 baseball season, attributable to ticket sales,
broadcasting and television rights, and sales of parking books. 358
It used the accrual method of accounting, and normally its taxa
ble year ended on October 31. Before May 31, 1962, however,
Artnell Company acquired all the stock of Chicago White Sox,
Inc., which was liquidated on that date. As of May 31, the books
of White Sox, Inc., showed as deferred unearned income the por
tion of the prepaid gross receipts received that was allocable to
games to be played after May 31. As. the successor in interest to
Chicago White Sox, Inc., Artnell Company filed the final tax re
turn for Chicago White Sox, Inc., and it did not include the de
ferred prepaid gross receipts, including these receipts instead on
Artnell Company's first tax return. The Commissioner argued
that the prepaid receipts were includable on receipt under the
355. See, e.g., RCA Corp. v. United States, 664 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
457 U.S. 1133 (1982) (disallowing deferral of prepaid services income); Union Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. United States, 570 F.2d 382 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978) (disal
lowing deferral of prepaid interest); Hagen Adver. Displays, Inc. v. Commissioner, 407
F.2d 1105 (6th Cir. 1969) (disallowing deferral of prepaid sales income).
356. See also Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. United States, 585 F.2d 988 (Ct. Cl. 1978)
(allowing deferral of prepaid interest until earned); Collegiate Cap and Gown Co. v.
Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 960 (1978) (allowing deferral of prepaid cap and gown
rental fees); Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1367 (Ct. Cl.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 867 (1976) (allowing deferral of prepaid services income).
357. 400 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1968).
358. The facts are drawn from id. at 982-83.
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clear reflection standard and the Supreme Court trilogy and
thus should have been included on the final return of Chicago
White Sox, Inc. The Seventh Circuit rejected the claim:
All three [of the Supreme Court cases] held, upon consideration of
the particular facts, that the commissioner did not abuse his dis
cretion in rejecting a deferral of income where the time and ex
tent of performance of future services were uncertain. . . .
The uncertainty stressed in ti.se decisions is not present
here. The deferred income was allocable to games which were to
be played on a fixed schedule. Except for rain dates, there was
certainty. We would have no difficulty distinguishing the instant
case in this respect. 359

Knowing both the time and extent of future costs that will
be incurred with respect to the prepaid gross receipts is impor
tant in determining whether deferral of the gross receipts is re
quired in order to match such expenses only if the matching
principle is accepted as a tax value. As already described, how
ever, there is no tax reason to encourage the matching of gross
receipts with related expenses in the same tax period (except
administrative ease in allowing the taxpayer's financial account
ing books to control), while there are strong tax reasons why
deferral of cash in hand should not be allowed even if the tim
ing and extent of future costs are certain. Even if there are no
contingencies regarding related future costs, deferring the in
come inclusion to match those costs understates those inclusions
or, alternatively viewed, effectively exempts from tax the invest
ment return on the receipt arising between the time of receipt
and the time of inclusion. As with premature deductions for fu
ture expenses, the contingency of the item is really not the prob
lem; the reporting/payment mismatch is the problem because of
the time value of money. There is simply no tax significance to
the "earned" requirement of financial accounting; receipt of the
cash is the significant tax event. 360
Neither courts nor the Commissioner have recognized in
their writings that the deferral of prepaid income is the flip side
of the coin of the immediate deduction of future expenses.
Neither have they realized that allowing deferral of the income
effectively exempts the investment return on the receipt from
359. Id. at 983-84.
360. Moreover, some prepayments linked to the future performance of services are
pure profit, with no related future expenses.
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tax, as though the receipt were being taxed under a consump
tion-tax regime. The Supreme Court did not cite its contingent
liability cases 361 in the trilogy of prepaid income cases, even
though they are essentially based on the same reasoning the
Court used. Artnell demonstrates how lower courts since then
have been mired in the "uncertainty" element of the future
costs.
In 1971, the Commissioner issued Revenue Procedure 71
21,362 which allows accrual method taxpayers to defer the inclu
sion in gross income of amounts received in one taxable year for
services that, under the terms of the contract, must be per
formed by the end of the next succeeding taxable year, even if
services must be performed only upon demand. The one-year
deferral rule applies only to prepayments for services, not pre
payments of rent or interest. The ruling contains no reasoning.
One reason why the Commissioner might have felt compelled to
issue this ruling was to reduce litigation. Like the recurring
item exception in section 461(h), 363 it might not be unreasonable
to allow financial reporting (deferral) to control so long as the
deferral is de minimis. The one-year rule might be considered a
reasonable place to draw the line, but Revenue Procedure 71-21
should be viewed as nothing more than that. It is not based in
tax theory. Congress, as it did in section 461(h), should draw the
line in the statute regarding how much deferral is too much and
make clear that deferral beyond that line is impermissible. In
the meantime, it would be nice to see the proper time value of
money analysis articulated in a prepaid gross receipts opinion or
ruling, using the clear reflection standard as its basis.
As with the issue of deduction of future liabilities, commen
tators were slow to let go of the matching principle in the tax
arena with respect to prepaid gross receipts prior to the mid
1980s when time value of money principles became more widely
understood. For example, writing in 1981, Professor Laurie
Malman364 seemed at first to recognize that the deferral of pre
paid income had the same economic consequences as the prema
ture deduction of a future liability. 365 Yet, she believed Artnell to
361. See supra not.es 226-252 and accompanying text.
362. 1971-2 C.B. 549.
363. See supra not.e 285 and accompanying text.
364. Laurie L. Malman, Treatment of Prepaid Income-Clear Reflection of Income
or Muddied Waters, 37 TAX L. REv. 103 (1981).
365. For example, in discussing Brown v. Helvering, see supra mites 238-245 and
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be rightly decided and disagreed with lower courts after the tril
ogy who failed to distinguish the Supreme Court cases and al
low deferral if future performance was certain. Similarly, Profes
sor Alan Gunn, writing in 1984, argued that while undiscounted
deductions for future liabilities fail to reflect income clearly, 366
prepaid gross receipts could be deferred until earned without
distortion. 367 Professor Malman's bottom line conclusion was that
"[d]eferral should be allowed if the contract between the parties
requires performance and the facts and circumstances indicate
that performance is reasonably certain."368 Discounting the dis
tortion of the economic value of the income inclusion due to the
time value of the deferral, she blessed even twenty- or thirty
year deferrals. She did not appear to recognize that allowing
deferral would be tantamount to exempting from tax the invest
ment return on the receipt between the time of receipt and in
clusion, violating the income-tax value.
But in the end, arguments based solely on the length of the pe
riod of deferral would be nothing more than the government's
age-old fear of allowing unrestricted funds to go unreported for a
long time.... [T]he reasoning of Mooney can be criticized and, as
long as a date for reporting (based on performance) can be pre
dicted with reasonable certainty, deferral would still seem to be
appropriate. 369
accompanying text, she wrote, "The Commissioner argued that since the taxpayer had
earned and received the commissions when he sold the policies, the deduction of a re
serve for possible cancellations (the effective equivalent of excluding a portion of the
commissions from income) before they actually occurred was inappropriate." Maiman, id.
at 108. Similarly, she described Schuessler v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 722 (5th Cir.
1956), as a case "permitt[ing] the analogue of deferring prepaid receipts by allowing the
present deduction of a reserve for future expenses." Maiman, id. at 111. Though shear
gued for the deferral of prepaid income, she maintained that "this article's analysis of
prepaid receipts does not propose the allowance of a present deduction for future esti
mated expenses." Id. at 154.
366. See Gunn, supra note 14, at 25-32.
367. See id. at 20-25. Professor Gunn ultimately argues, however, for immediate
taxation of prepaid receipts. See id. at 25. Like Professor Halperin, he considered treat
ing prepayments as below-market loans in order to tax the payor on the foregone inter
est and thus relieve the economic incentive that can otherwise encourage prepayments
where they would otherwise not occur, principally when the payor is unable to deduct
the cost of the goods or services purchased with the prepayment. See id. at 20-25 (using
prepaid tuition plans to illustrate the principal); infra notes 478-481 and accompanying
text (considering this argument in more detail). Because such treatment is not currently
available, however, he argues that immediate taxation of prepaid receipts would more
often discourage tax-motivated behavior changes. See Gunn, supra note 14, at 25.
368. Maiman, supra note 364, at 151.
369. Id. at 154. As the following excerpt shows, she did understand the economic
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She seemed to accept the notion that the matching principle
is a tax value without explaining why reporting gross receipts
and related expenses in the same period has tax value. "For tax
purposes, it is also appropriate to defer advance receipts on the
basis of this matching notion, since deferral reflects the accrual
method, and, equally important, deferral does not distort in
come."370 She failed to explain her gauge of what "distort" means
in the tax sense, however, as opposed to the financial accounting
sense. She asserted: "If a taxpayer receives an advance of $120
for the performance of a service which will generate $60 of ex
penses, the current inclusion of the full $120 without a corre
sponding current deduction of $60 distorts income in a very real
sense."371 She did not, however, explain what that very real
sense is. She seems to wish to look at the taxpayer's bottom line
net income over a multiple-year period for a single transaction
and report the outcome for that single transaction in a single
tax year. But it is not clear why reporting $120 of gross receipts
in income in year 1 and $60 of expense deductions in a future
year distorts income for tax purposes-which is about annual ac
cessions to wealth and losses in wealth-rather than financial
accounting purposes. Reporting the $120 wealth accession in
year 1 accurately reflects the increase in wealth actually real
ized by the taxpayer in that year. The cash is in hand and-un
like the principal of a loan, the taxation of which is deferred un
til repaid372-is not subject to an absolute obligation to repay.
value of the deferral; she simply rejected its importance, choosing the matching principle
as the superior good. In defense of her choice, she pointed to the deferral allowed with
respect to the receipt of loan proceeds.
Commentators contend, however, that distortion arises because taxpayers re
ceiving advance payments for future performance are receiving an economic bene
fit (measured by the value of the use of funds) and should be taxed on this bene·
fit.... However, the economic benefit which results from the present use of funds
in some cases may be no greater than the benefit enjoyed by a taxpayer who re·
ceives borrowed funds. Yet the tax laws have long held that no income results
from the receipt of borrowed funds.
Id. at 152-53. She seemed to make no distinction between the obligation to repay
amounts to a lender and the necessity to spend money (i.e., incur expenses to third par·
ties) as a part of earning gross receipts from customers.
370. Id. at 147.
371. Id.
372. The taxation of loan proceeds, like prepaid receipts, is also a matter of timing,
not whether an item is "income." See generally Geier, Debt-Discharge Theory, supra note
17, at 146:
(T]he taxation of loan proceeds is, at its simplest, a matter of timing. Loan pro
ceeds must be taxed at some point in time. Current law chooses to place the tax
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Similarly, the $60 payment of expenses in a later year repre
sents a decrease in wealth in that year. Deferring the gross re
ceipts inclusion to a later year when the cash is in hand under
states the wealth accession in the only real sense that counts
the economic sense-just as would deducting the $60 future pay
ment in year 1 without discounting it to present value. 373 If the
gross receipts inclusion is to be deferred until the year in which
the $60 deduction is taken, it must be augmented to an amount
above $120 to reflect the time value of the dollars in the tax
payer's hands, just as a year-1 deduction of the expense payevent at the point of repayment of the principal by excluding the loan proceeds
from gross income on receipt but trucing the income used to repay the principal
amount.
Professor Malman was convinced by the loan analysis.
The arguments for excluding loans or deposits from income would seem applicable
to the deferral of prepaid receipts. In each case, the funds received are burdened
by an offsetting obligation. In the case of advance receipts, as long as future per
formance is reasonably assured, there is a preexisting, offsetting obligation-a
contractual obligation as binding as that of repayment-and income should be re
ported at the time of that offsetting obligation.
Malman, supra note 364, at 154.
In my opinion, this misperceives the borrowing exclusion. The proceeds of a loan are
excluded from gross income only because the present value of the repayment obligation
precisely equals the current receipt-and that fact is known at the time of receipt--so
that there is no accession to wealth. Indeed, if the present value of the repayment obli
gation is less than the present receipt, even a portion of the proceeds of a "loan" are in
cludable in many situations. See infra notes 305-313 and accompanying text (discussing
section 7872). The relationship between gross income and the expenses incurred to pro
duce that gross income is so immensely imprecise that any analogy to the loan exclusion
is unpersuasive. The accession to wealth equal to the amount of the gross receipt in year
1 cannot be negated in the same way, as there is no assurance-except in the most ex
traordinary situations, which should not be used to create a general rule-that the pres
ent value of future expenses incurred will precisely equal the amount of the present re
ceipt, negating the accession to wealth. The relationship between gross income and
expenses is simply too tenuous to analogize it to the relationship between the receipt
and repayment of loan proceeds. In other words, while Professor Malman wished to al
low deferral under the loan analogy upon a showing only that future performance is cer
tain, deferral based on a loan analogy requires that there be repayment in cash and that
the amount of future repayment be certain as well. Cf Johnson, •Earned" Requirement,
supra note 36, at 386 ("Whether the prepayment is for goods or services, the considera
tion for the profit element cannot be used to offset cash and cause the cash to be treated
as a loan.").
373. Professor Malman, on the other hand, argued that the Supreme Court's tril
ogy distorted income in the economic sense, though by failing to account for the time
value of the money in the taxpayer's hands, it is unclear in what sense she was using
the term "economic." She wrote, "If the Supreme Court's decision in Schlude and the rest
of the trilogy is read as requiring that income be taxed on receipt, regardless of when
earned, the Supreme Court has prescribed a method of accounting that at least in an ec
onomic sense distorts income." Malman, supra note 364, at 117.
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ments would clearly reflect income only if it were discounted
from $60 to their present value. 374 Deferring inclusion to a later
year at the unaugmented $120 face amount distorts income in
the tax sense (even if it might comport with financial accounting
norms375 ) by understating the year-1 wealth accession in the ec
onomic sense, or, alternatively viewed, by effectively exempting
the investment return on the receipt from tax, as though the re
turn were being treated under a consumption-tax regime in
stead of an income-tax regime.
In attempts to avoid inclusion of prepaid income under the
trilogy, taxpayers began to argue that the amounts received
were not, in fact, prepaid gross receipts for future services or
the future delivery of goods but rather were the proceeds of a
loan-a "deposit."376 Because loans are not taxed until repaid
with ~r-tax dollars, 377 characterization of the prepaid receipt
as a loan allowed the taxpayers to argue for deferral by exclud
ing the amounts under the common-law "borrowing exclusion."
This alternative characterization of such receipts finally reached
the Supreme Court in 1990 in Commissioner v. Indianapolis
Power & Light Co. 378 The Court's performance, as in Hughes
Properties and General Dynamics, showed once again that it had
not participated in the understanding of time value of money
principles that had occurred in tax academia.
The Indianapolis Power & Light Company (IPL), an accrual
basis taxpayer, required customers with poor credit ratings to
make deposits equal to twice their estimated monthly bills. 379
IPL paid 6 percent interest on deposits that were held for at
least twelve months. The deposits were refunded on termination
of service or upon an earlier demonstration of acceptable credit.
The refund was usually made in cash or by check, but the cus
tomer could choose to have the refund amount applied against
future electric bills. IPL argued that it had an absolute obliga
tion to repay the deposits, either in cash or in kind, and thus
the deposits were excludable from gross income as the proceeds
374. See supra notes 258-286 and accompanying text.
375. But see Johnson, "Earned" Requirement, supra note 36, at 395-402 (arguing
that deferral of prepaid receipts is inconsistent with financial accounting purposes as
well).
376. See Malman, supra note 364, at 139-42; supra note 369.
377. See supra note 372.
378. 493 U.S. 203 (1990).
379. The facts are drawn from id. at 204-07.
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of a loan. The Commissioner argued that deposits that serve to
secure the payment of future income are properly analogized to
advance payments for goods or services and thus are includable
on receipt under the Court's earlier trilogy of prepaid receipts
cases.
The Court stated that "the issue turns upon the nature of
the rights and obligations that IPL assumed when the deposits
were made."380 It then went on to quote Commissioner v. Glen
shaw Glass that income is "undeniable accessions to wealth,
clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete do
minion"381 and to conclude that IPL lacked "complete dominion"
over the deposits because the repayment obligation was abso
lute. Thus, the Court allowed exclusion of the deposits under the
borrowing exclusion. 382
IPL hardly enjoyed "complete dominion" over the customer depos
its entrusted to it. Rather, these deposits were acquired subject to
an express "obligation to repay," either at the time service was
terminated or at the time a customer established good credit. So
long as the customer fulfills his legal obligation to make timely
payments, his deposit ultimately is to be refunded, and both the
timing and method of that refund are largely within the control
of the customer. 383

Perhaps surprisingly, the Commissioner did not make an alter
native argument that would also require immediate inclusion:
that the receipt, if not prepayments for electricity, were never
theless includable because accompanied only by a contingent
rather than absolute--Obligation to repay. The contingency is re
flected in the "so-long-as" language of the above quotation. A re
380. Id. at 209.
381. Id. (quoting 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955)).
382. The Court's reliance on the dominion and control language of Glenshaw Glass
in a case concluding that the amount received could be excluded under the borrowing ex
clusion is confusing. As noted earlier, see supra note 291, the borrowing exclusion is
based on the accession to wealth language of Glenshaw Glass. The proceeds of a bona
fide loan are excludable from gross income only because the present value of the repay
ment obligation precisely equals the current receipt-and that fact is known at the time
of the receipt-so that there is no accession to wealth. The dominion and control lan
guage of Glenshaw Glass is perhaps helpful in justifying inclusions under the assign
ment of income doctrine, see, e.g., Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940), and in justi
fying exclusions of some forms of in-kind personal consumption received by a taxpayer,
see, e.g., United States v. Gotcher, 401 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1968), but it is irrelevant to the
borrowing exclusion.
383. 493 U.S. at 209.
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ceipt coupled with only a contingent obligation to repay, even if
not an advance payment for goods or services, is includable in
the year of receipt under the claim of right doctrine. 384 Repay
ment, if the contingency occurs, raises a deduction issue in the
year of repayment. 385 While at least an arguable characteriza
tion of the actual facts of the case, neither the Commissioner
nor the Court raised it.
But that is quibbling. The Court's characterization of the re
payment obligation as absolute is not clearly wrong. 386 But even
if we accept the Court's "loan" characterization as reasonable
enough on the facts, the opinion again showed a lack of concern
for the time value of money that underlies the tax values at
stake. The loan at issue was at a below-market rate of interest.
(Even if 6 percent were a "market rate," the failure to pay inter
est for the first twelve months surely reduced the loan to a be
low-market loan.) Because money has value over time, the sub
stance of a loan with stated interest at below-market rates can
be characterized as a loan at a market rate of interest coupled
with a deemed payment from the lender to the borrower
(treated as compensation, a dividend, a gift, or some other pay
ment for tax purposes) which the borrower then uses to fund the
increased interest payment. With better appreciation of the time
value of money in the 1980s, Congress enacted section 7872 in
the Tax Reform Act of 1984,387 which accomplishes just this re
sult. In two influential articles, Professor Daniel Halperin ar
gued that all instances of prepaid gross receipts can be analyzed
under section 7872 precepts. 388 While not all agree with that po
384. See supra note 347.
385. This basic postulate of the tax law has one important exception pertaining to
the receipt of property in the employment context subject to a substantial risk of forfei
ture: The inclusion can be delayed until the property vests. I.R.C. § 83. This exception to
the usual rule was enacted because of the tax rate differential between ordinary income
and capital gain. Deferral results in more of the income inclusion being taxed at ordi
nary rates than would be the case with immediate inclusion.
386. The Court ultimately concluded that in those cases in which IPL kept the pro
ceeds, the transaction should be recast into two steps: (1) a repayment of the deposit
under its absolute obligation to repay followed by (2) immediate repayment from the
utility customer. "Although, for the sake of convenience, the parties may combine the two
steps, that decision does not blind us to the fact that in substance two transactions are
involved." 493 U.S. at 212.
387. Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 172(a), 98 Stat. 494, 699.
388. See Halperin, Disguised Interest, supra note 89; Halperin, 1984, supra note
89; infra notes 452-482 and accompanying text (discussing two-party matching in more
detail and revisiting deductions for future expenses and prepaid income from within this
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sition,389 the appropriateness of applying section 7872 to "true"
loans is almost beyond question. 390 And the Court bought the
loan characterization in Indianapolis Power & Light. In the con
text of that case, therefore, Professor George Yin noted:
[W]here inadequate interest is paid, the transaction is not com
pletely a loan. Rather, it must be bifurcated: a portion of the de
posit, reflecting the repayment obligation incurred by the utility,
should be treated as a loan; however, the balance, reflecting the
absence of adequate interest, is additional consideration-a pre
mium charge-paid by the customer to the utility presumably as
compensation for the additional risks associated with the non
creditworthy customers. The latter portion of the deposit should
have been taxed as income to the utility upon receipt. a91

This is precisely how section 7872 would tax the loan, once im
plementing regulations are issued. 392 Since the tax years at is
sue in Indianapolis Power & Light were 1974 through 1977,393
section 7872 did not apply. But the Court's decision was issued
in 1990-long after the economic realities underlying section
7872 were widely appreciated-and yet the Court failed once
context).
389. See, e.g., Johnson, "Earned• Requirement, supra note 36, at 408-10; JOSEPH M.
DODGE, THE LOGIC OF TAX 203-07 {1989) {recognizing the loan analogy in the prepaid re
ceipts context but defending full current inclusion on the grounds of both administrative
simplicity and consistency with other accrual principles).
390. The reason is that "real lenders do not give interest-free loans. . . . [T]here is
no such thing as an interest-free loan. If the interest was not stated, it is not because
there was no interest, but simply because the parties did not disclose it." Johnson,
"Earned• Requirement, supra note 36, at 387. One holdout to the notion that loans can
be truly interest-free is Professor Glenn Coven. See Glenn E. Coven, Redefining Debt: Of
Indianapolis Power and Fictitious Interest, 10 VA. TAX REv. 587 {1991).
391. Y"m, supra note 89, at 483.
392. The payment of the increased interest by IPL would be deductible, but this
payment would not negate in full the earlier inclusion. See id. at 483 n.55. Failure to ac
count for this below-market loan also undertaxes the utility customer, as the deemed in
terest payments are not included. This failure is tantamount to allowing the customer a
deduction for a nondeductible personal expense. See id.
To the extent provided in regulations, section 7872 applies to any loan •if the inter
est arrangements of such loan have a significant effect on any federal tax liability of the
lender or the borrower." l.R.C. § 7872{cX1XD). The Conference Report indicated that a
loan has such an effect if, among other things, it results in the conversion of a nonde
ductible expense into the equivalent of a deductible expense. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 861,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1019-20 {1984). Professor Y"m noted, however, that "no mention of
the possible application of section 7872 . . . is made in the . . . Revenue Procedure
describing how certain utilities can obtain the Commissioner's automatic consent to
change their method of accounting for customer deposits to be in accordance with Indi
anapolis Power. See Rev. Proc. 91-31, 1991-21 l.R.B. 27." Y"m, supra note 89, at 483 n.55.
393. See 493 U.S. at 205.
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again to grasp the time value of money. The Court was not
troubled at all by the below-market rate of interest on the cus
tomer deposits.
Nor is it especially significant that these deposits could be
expected to generate income greater than the modest interest IPL
was required to pay. Again, the same could be said of a commer
cial loan, since, as has been noted, a business is unlikely to bor
row unless it believes it can realize benefits that exceed the cost
of servicing the debt. A bank could hardly operate profitably if its
earnings on deposits did not surpass its interest obligations; but
the deposits themselves are not treated as income. Any income
that the utility may earn through use of the deposit money of
course is taxable, but the prospect that income will be generated
provides no ground for trucing the principal.394

Thus, IPL succeeded in gaining the one result that is clearly
inappropriate when tax values are well understood: deferral of
the inclusion by labeling the receipt as a "loan" subject to an ab
solute obligation to repay (instead of an includable receipt be
cause subject to only .a contingent obligation to repay) coupled
with the failure to bifurcate the loan to account for the below
market rate of interest.
Regulations applying section 7872 to the fact situation de
scribed in Indianapolis Power & Light may not come any time
soon. Determining the term of the loan is clifficult,395 and taxing
the utility customers on their deemed interest payments would
be similarly difficult. Professor Yin describes a way around the
obstacles that make application of section 7872 difficult on the
utility side. The economic effects of section 7872 with respect to
the utility could be replicated by requiring full inclusion of the
advance payment on receipt and then, if repayment does occur
after all, allowing an augmented deduction at that time to ac
count for what is now perceived as an "erroneous" inclusion. "A
method of rectifying that error after-the-fact is to provide the re
cipient with a deduction at the time of refund whose present
value (in year 0) equals the amount of the erroneous income in
clusion."396 He provides a helpful example to illustrate how an
394. Id. at 210 (footnote omitted).
395. Since the customer cannot call the loan on demand, it cannot be categorized
as a demand loan for purposes of section 7872(a) and thus must be characterized as a
term loan under section 7872(b).
396. Y'm, supra note 89, at 488.
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augmented deduction in the year of repayment can negate the
"erroneous" inclusion in the earlier year. 397 This approach would
likely need implementing legislation, however, which would no
doubt be difficult to accomplish. The augmented deduction
would be viewed by the typical voter unschooled in the nuances
of the time value of money as an unjustifiable subsidy to utili
ties and like taxpayers. And there is no easy indirect method of
trucing the utility customer on the imputed interest that would
arise under section 7872.398
In the absence of regulations implementing section 7872 in
this context, both full inclusion and full deferral arguably distort
income under time value of money principles. Full deferral dis
torts income by ignoring the time value of the money in the
hands of the taxpayer prior to the reporting of the receipt for
tax purposes. Because only a portion of the receipt should be
considered includable income upon receipt under section 7872,
however, full inclusion on receipt also distorts income if the re
ceipt is, with hindsight, recharacterized as truly a loan because
it is repaid.
So what should courts (and the Commissioner) do in the fu
ture with respect to prepaid gross receipts? First, there will al
ways be difficult factual distinctions to make, such as whether
the receipt really pertains to future goods or services or past or
present services. 399 Only in the case of future goods or services
can the taxpayer even attempt to raise the "earned" requirement
of financial accrual accounting in an attempt to prevent current
inclusion. 400 With respect to those situations that do deal with
397. Id.
398. See id. at 488-89.
399. See id. at 481 ("Sometimes, what may appear to be an 'early payment' is, in
reality, nothing more than a payment for a current reciprocal benefit.") (emphasis
added).
400. Compare Barnett Banks of FL, Inc. v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. 103 (1996), with
Signet Banking Corp. v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. 117 (1996), aff'd, 118 F.3d 239 (4th Cir.
1997). Decided the same day in the Tax Court, these cases demonstrate how the resolu
tion of this factual issue is often decisive. Both cases dealt with the issue of whether an
nual fees paid to credit card issuers could be included ratably over 12 months under Rev.
Proc. 71-21. The court allowed the deferral in Barnett Banks while, the same day, it de
nied the deferral in Signet Banking. In Barnett Banks, the court was convinced that the
fees pertained to future services performed for the cardholder over the course of the 12
months and thus were deferrable in part under Rev. Proc. 71-21. One important fact to
the court was the ratable refund of the fee if the cardholder canceled the card. In Signet
Banking, the annual fee was not refundable upon cancellation of the card, and the card
holder "agreement" recited that the fee was in consideration of the issuance of a card
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receipts not yet earned, courts and the Commissioner should
first explicitly reject the matching principle as a tax value. 401
They should explicitly review the history explored above re
vealing that accrual accounting was imported into tax account
ing only for administrative convenience and that, when tax val
ues conflict with the matching principle embodied in financial
accrual accounting, tax values should take precedence unless
the distortion is de minimis, as perhaps in the deferral allowed
under Revenue Procedure 71-21. They should explicitly discuss
in their reasoning the time value of money distortions that oc
cur in this context, explaining how the "test" focusing on the
time and certainty of future performance that evolved out of the
Supreme .Court trilogy took shape in an era when these tax val
ues were poorly understood and is irrelevant to the tax values
at stake. 402 Doing just that much would bring much needed coand the establishment of a credit limit. The court thus concluded that the fee was not
contingent on the rendering of any future services and thus no part was deferrable
under Rev. Proc. 71-21.
401. AB recently as 1996, the Tax Court continued to espouse the matching princi
ple as a tax value in the context of prepaid income. See Barnett Banks, 106 T.C. at 116:
"(I]f the credit card is cancelled, [Barnett] makes a pro rata refund ... [for] the number
of months remaining in the one-year period. Thus, if anything, [Barnetfs] method pro
vides a more reasonable matching of income and expense than what [the Commissioner]
seems to espouse.•
402. "[D]eferring taxation until a receipt is earned is bad economics, bad account
ing and bad tax law, even if the time the future services will be performed is known."
Johnson, •Earned" Requirement, supra note 36, at 379.
At this juncture, Notice 89-21, 1989-1 C.B. 651, and Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3(0(2),
which implements the position taken in the Notice, merit brief discussion. The Notice
and Regulations provide that a lump-sum payment received at the front end of a no
tional principal contract is not included in gross income on receipt under the Supreme
Court trilogy but rather is included in income over the term of the contract, essentially
as it is "earned." The Notice and Regulations take the position they do because of two
kinds of perceived abuse. Notional principal contracts requiring an up-front lump-sum
payment were often structured, prior to the issuance of the Notice, either in anticipation
of a change in ownership of a corporation with a substantial NOL carryover or just prior
to the expiration of the 20-year carryover period for net operating losses. Immediate in
clusion of the lump-sum payment allowed the corporation with an expiring NOL to use
it before it died, thus "refreshing" the carryover. Immediate inclusion of the lump-sum
payment allowed the corporation about to change ownership to use its NOL to offset the
inclusion without limitation. After the change in ownership, any remaining pre-change
NOL could be utilized by the corporation each year only to the extent of a dollar figure
arrived at by multiplying the value of the corporation prior to the change in ownership
by the long-term tax-exempt rate. See l.R.C. § 382. Notional principal contracts became
a strategy to use up the NOL prior to the change in ownership.
If deferring inclusion of the lump-sum payment distorts income for tax purposes for
the reasons discussed in the text, the issue boils down to deciding which is the greater
evil: a distortion of income by allowing deferral of prepaid gross receipts on the one
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herence to the future development of the law in this area.
Second, the "loan" theory should not be available to allow
deferral in cases not involving the possibility of a refund of the
prepaid receipts to the payor. That is, deferral under a "loan"
theory should not be allowed on the reasoning that future ex
penses, such as rent and salaries, will be incurred in connection
with the earning of the prepaid gross receipts and that such fu
ture expenses are analogous to the repayment of part of the
gross receipts (albeit to other parties), justifying loan treat
ment. 403 Similarly, deferral under the loan theory should not be
permissible in the case of prepaid receipts where there is no cer
tainty of a refund in the future if services are not performed or
goods not delivered. 404
hand or, on the other, the undermining of the 20-year carryover limitation in section 172
as well as the section 382 limitation. The 20-year limitation in section 172 is itself arbi
trary. Perhaps the only quasi-theoretical reason for requiring NOL carryovers to sunset
after a specified number of years is the argument that losses incurred so many years
earlier have a much less tenuous connection to the earning of current income. That is
not a very strong rationale, however. The possibility that the section 382 limitations
would be undermined is perhaps more serious. Whether "right• or "wrong9 in its choice
regarding the greater evil, though, the deferral approach required by the Notice and the
Regulations in this unique situation should not be universalized as broad theory. The
deferral still does distort income in the tax sense and should not be seen as any broad
sanctioning of the idea that income should properly be deferred in all cases until earned.
The distortion is seen as acceptable only because the threats to sections 172 and 382 are
perceived as grave enough to require it.
403. See supra notes 365-376 and accompanying text (describing Professor
Maiman's earlier view that the incurrence of future expenses that are certain can be
analogized to the obligation to repay loan proceeds, thus negating an accession to wealth
on receipt).
404. Cf supra note 401 (discussing the importance of the refund feature in Barnett
Banks and Signet Banking). See also Herbel v. Commissioner and Webb v. Commis
sioner, 106 T.C. 392 (1996). In these consolidated cases, the taxpayers owned all the
stock of a Subchapter S Corporation, Malibu Petroleum, Inc., which had contracted to
sell gas to Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. (Arkla) under a take-or-pay contract. When
Arkla failed to purchase gas or pay for the gas not purchased in the amounts allegedly
required under the contract, Malibu sued Arkla. In settlement of that suit, Arkla paid
$1,850,000 to Malibu, while amending the prior gas delivery contract to eliminate the
take-or-pay feature for a few years. The settlement agreement referred to the payment
as "a prepayment in advance for natural gas to be delivered by [Malibu] to [Arkla]," id.
at 398, for the remaining duration of the contract. Arkla was entitled to recoup the set
tlement payment through purchases of future gas, with 50% of such gas received with
out further payment until the prepayment was fully recouped. The settlement agreement
also provided that the prepayment would be refunded in cash if Malibu cancelled the
contract or if the wells ran dry. Malibu recorded the receipt on its books as the proceeds
of a loan, though no notes were executed and no interest was paid on the "principal.•
The Tax Court declined to accept the loan characterization, noting in passing that no in
terest was charged and focusing more heavily on the fact that the events that would
trigger a refund were not within the control of Arkla (as the court argued they were
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That leaves the most difficult situation (under the con
straints of current law at least): the treatment of prepaid re
ceipts where there is an absolute refund feature. If the recipient
· pays a market rate of interest on the prepayment, treatment as
a loan does not distort income. If, however, the recipient pays no
interest or below-market interest, the taxpayer will either be
overtaxed (full inclusion on receipt with an unaugmented deduc
. tion on repayment) or undertaxed (full deferral when a portion
of the receipt does not represent a loan but rather other income)
if section 7872 does not apply. In this situation of imperfect
choices, the best interests of the tax system points toward
overtaxation of the recipient when the present value of the
amount transferred (the true loan portion of the transfer) com
prises less than, say, 50 percent of the gross amount trans
ferred. In this scenario, one can justify treating the transfer as
more "not a loan" than a "loan." And with overtaxation as the
penalty for failing to pay a market rate of interest, the recipient
might be encouraged to pay market interest, resulting in an in
come inclusion on the customer side that also avoids taxation
absent application of section 7872. Overtaxation is the lesser
evil from an institutional standpoint, as the mere threat of
overtaxation would perhaps encourage a change in behavior that
leads to correct taxation of both parties. 405 Undertaxation would
encourage the opposite response. 406
For example, consider a recent Technical Advice Memoran
dum,407 which ruled that noninterest-bearing "membership de
posits" received by a country club were not advance payments of
membership fees but rather nontaxable loans. Members of the
country club were required to pay both regular membership
under the control of the customer-payors in Indianapolis Power & Light). After noting
that "income does not cease to be such because there is some likelihood that the recipi
ent may have to give it back," id. at 417, the court concluded that "the possibility that
the wells might become substantially depleted before the settlement payment is fully
recouped may reduce the certainty of Malibu's income stream, but it does not convert in
come into the equivalent of a deposit or a bailment." Id.
405. Cf. Julie A. Roin, Unmasking the •Matching Principle• in 7b% Law, 79 VA. L.
REv. 813, 823 (1993) (advocating potential overtaxation in mismatches that operate to
the detriment of the government and to the benefit of taxpayers in order to avoid ero
sion of the tax base as taxpayers change their behavior to exploit the loophole).
406. Cf. Coven, supra note 390 (deferral of prepaid receipts is appropriate if inter
est is charged and not appropriate in the absence of interest); Gunn, supra note 14, at
25 (concluding that immediate taxation of prepaid receipts would discourage tax
motivated prepayments).
407. T.A.M. 9735002 (May 5, 1997).
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dues as well as "membership deposits," which would be repaid
no later than thirty years from the date of acceptance as a
member or, if earlier, when the member resigns or when the
club terminates memberships. If a member fails to pay the regu
lar member dues, the membership may be terminated and ar
rears deducted from the membership deposit.
The ruling concluded that the deposits were excludable
loans for tax purposes because of the absolute obligation to re
pay the amounts in no later than thirty years.
In the present case, the Club has an obligation to refund the
member's deposit in 30 years if the deposit has not been repaid at
an earlier time. This obligation to refund is absolute and is not
premised on the occurrence of a contingency. Because of the
Club's obligation to repay, the deposits are not received by Tax
payer under a claim of right. Further, the deposits generally will
not be used to satisfy a member's delinquencies (except for any
amounts owed by a resigning member). A member's failure to pay
required dues results in the forfeiture of membership privileges,
and not in an immediate satisfaction from the member's deposit.
Therefore, the deposits should not be treated as advance pay
ments to Taxpayer in the year of receipt.
The Club's satisfaction of amounts a resigning member owes
to the Club from the member's deposit does not defeat the Club's
continuing obligation to repay the deposit to the member. How
ever, any amount by which the obligation to repay is reduced in
order to cure a delinquency in membership dues and charges con
stitutes gross income to Taxpayer in the year of reduction. 408

In other words, the author of the ruling declined to conclude
that, as in the Mooney Aircraft case,409 the repayment obligation
was so far down the road that repayment itself was doubtful, re
sulting in immediate inclusion. The absolute obligation to repay,
even though thirty years down the road, was enough to qualify
the payment as a "loan" for tax purposes under Indianapolis
Power & Light. 410
Moreover, the ruling also concluded that the loan was not a
"significant-effect loan" under section 7872(c)(l)(E) because the
Treasury Department has not yet issued regulations to give that
section effect. Citing the legislative history underlying section
408. Id.
409. See supra notes 262-267 and accompanying text.
410. See supra notes 379-395 and accompanying text.
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7872, the ruling recognized that "if a member of a club makes a
non-interest-bearing refundable deposit to a club in lieu of part
or all of his or her membership fee, the member is paying the
fee with money that has not yet been included in his income,
i.e., the investment income from the proceeds of the deposit, and
has, in effect, converted the fee into the equivalent of a deducti
ble expense."411 The author was visibly frustrated by the lack of
governing regulations that would allow taxation of the transac
tion under section 7872.4 12
The facts of this ruling illustrates the extreme distortion
that occurs in such scenarios. The present value of every $1 of
"membership deposit" is less than 17.5 cents at a 6 percent af
ter-tax interest rate. In other words, the "real principal" of the
loan is only 17.5 cents for every dollar transferred by the mem
ber. In extreme instances such as this, perhaps the Service
should argue-in the absence of section 7872 regulations-that
because of the extreme disparity between the amount of the
true loan between the parties and the amount actually trans
ferred, the amount transferred does not pass muster as a "loan"
at all. As mentioned earlier, such an all-or-nothing approach
overtaxes the Club by the amount of the "true loan," but the al
ternative exclusion of the entire proceeds is even more egre
giously wrong in view the fact that less than 20 percent of the
amount transferred constitutes the principal of a loan. Moreo
ver, the ruling encourages the structuring of abusive transac
tions of this sort. The presence of section 7872 should not stand
in the way of such a ruling. While the presence of section 7872
indicates that full inclusion is "wrong," it equally indicates that
full exclusion is also "wrong." In other words, section 7872 tells
us what would be the "correct" treatment, but it does not indi
411. TA.M. 9735002 (May 5, 1997).
412. The ruling said:
The legislative history of section 7872 of the Code indicates Congress envi
sioned that membership organizations that accept membership deposits like the
Taxpayer in the instant case would be covered by section 7872. Further, a below
market loan to a membership organization in lieu of part or all of a membership
fee was cited in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking regarding below market loans
to be an example of a loan that results in the conversion of a nondeductible ex
pense into the equivalent of a deductible expense, i.e., a significant effect loan.
However, since proposed regulations defining significant effect loans have not yet
been published, the loan cannot presently be classified as a loan under section
7872(c)(l)(E).

Id.
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cate which of two "incorrect" treatments should be applied in its
absence. When the present value numbers indicate that less
than 50 percent of the amount transferred constitutes the prin
cipal of a loan, it is more reasonable to treat the transfer as "not
a loan" than as a "loan."413
2.

Other Income

Accrual of income outside the prepaid gross receipts context
seems to be litigated less frequently than other accrual issues.
Yet, the time value of money principles developed above have
obvious implications for the accrual of income not yet received.
Just as allowing a full face amount expense deduction, undis
counted to present cost, significantly prior to payment under
states the true economic cost of the wealth reduction (and thus
fails to reflect income clearly in the tax sense), requiring a full
face amount inclusion of a gross receipt item, undiscounted to
present value, significantly prior to receipt overstates the true
economic benefit of the wealth accession.
Using the numbers from the earlier florist example for ease
of comparison,414 assume that Widget Co., an accrual basis tax
payer, is contractually entitled to receive $100,000 in year 16 for
services rendered in year 1. The all events test is satisfied in
year 1, since all the events have occurred to fix the right to re
ceive the $100,000 gross receipt, and the amount of the receipt
is known with precision. Even the matching principle from the
financial accountant's world should argue for full inclusion in
year 1, since the amount was "earned" with performance and
the expenses incurred to earn the income would have been in
curred in year 1. Yet, full inclusion of $100,000 in year 1 when
the payment will not be received until year 16 overstates the
wealth accession for tax purposes for the same reason that full
deduction by our florist of $100,000 in year 1 overstates the
year-16 wealth reduction: Both ignore the time value of money
between the payment date and the time it is taken into account
for tax purposes. Widget Co. should have to include only the
present value of that $100,000-or $31,524 under the assump
413. In the case of a demand loan rather than a term loan, where it would be im
possible to determine the portion of the amount transferred constituting the real princi
pal, overtaxation by requiring full inclusion would still be the better choice from an in
stitutional standpoint.
414. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
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tions stated in the hypothetical-if the inclusion occurs in year
1. Alternatively, the inclusion could be deferred until year 16
when actually received and included at the full $100,000 face
amount. In other words, the analysis mirrors the deduction of
future expen~es. Yet, no analogue to section 461(h) exists with
respect to the accrual of income that will be received in the fu
ture. If analysis is limited to whether the all events test is satis
fied, and if the clear reflection gloss fails to consider the time
value of money distortions that occurs with a full $100,000 ac
crual in year 1, Widget Co. will be overtaxed.
Perhaps not surprisingly in view of the evolution in the pre
mature deduction context, the Commissioner has responded to
the premature income context by squeezing the problem into the
"contingent income" box. Recall that, in the premature deduction
context, the courts and the Commissioner delayed current undis
counted deductions for future expenses (prior to enactment of
section 461(h)) by concluding that the expenses were really "con
tingent" and thus that all the events had not occurred to fix the
liabilities. 415 Even though delayed deduction was inconsistent
with the financial accountant's matching principle, tax values
were honored (though more implicitly than explicitly) by delay
ing the deduction through any means possible. The "contin
gency" of the future liability was the means seized upon to give
effect to tax values. Even when the future liability was not con
tingent under contract law, as in Mooney Aircraft, the court
squeezed the facts into the contingent liability pigeonhole by ar
guing that the significant payment delay itself made the future
payment uncertain in fact. 416 Neither the courts nor the Com
missioner explicitly recognized that the problem was really one
of the time delay between payment of the expense and account
ing for it under the tax system. The Commissioner is now
resorting to the flip side of this same analysis to allow deferral
of income that is not going to be received for some time. Such
an approach honors underlying tax values, but resort once again
to constricted, superficial modes of analysis under the language
of the all events test-in lieu of a forthright discussion of the
underlying tax values that should drive the analysis-is
unfortunate.
415. See supra notes 226-252 and accompanying text.
416. See supra notes 262-267 and accompanying text.
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For example, in a recent Technical Advice Memorandum,417
the Service confronted the issue of whether an accrual basis
public utility must include in gross income amounts attributable
to future rate increases that were mandated by the state Public
Utilities Commission. The amount of the future rate increases
were known with certainty and were scheduled to be phased in
over ten years. For the reasons discussed above, full face
amount inclusion of the rate increases in year 1, undiscounted
to present value, would overstate the utility's gross income and
thus not reflect income clearly in the tax sense because of the
time value of money. Either a discounted inclusion in year 1 or
delayed inclusion until the gross receipts were received would
clearly reflect income in the tax sense.
It would have been refreshing to see a forthright analysis,
using time value of money principles, that discussed the over
statement that occurs if future receipts, even if certain to occur,
are required to be included in income at full face value in a year
prior to receipt. The task would then focus on fashioning an ad
ministrable de minimis rule, just as section 461(h)(3) provides a
de minimis rule that allows current deduction of future ex
penses in situations that involve neither a large absolute
amount of money nor significant deferral, 418 and just as Revenue
Procedure 71-21 allows deferral of prepaid gross receipts if the
deferral is minimal. 419 Borrowing the yardstick from Revenue
Procedure 71-21 might be defensible for the sake of consistency,
since the underlying tax values at stake are the same. Under
that approach, acceleration of income at full face amount would
not clearly reflect income if it was not certain to be received by
the end of the following taxable year. Alternatively, the yard
stick of section 461(h)(3) (eight and one-half months beyond the
taxable year) could be adopted. Outside whatever de minimis
rule is considered reasonable, the income inclusion should either
be discounted to present value in order to reflect income clearly,
just as Ford's deduction for future expenses in a year prior to
enactment of section 461(h) was reduced to present cost,420 or
delayed until the year of receipt.
417.
418.
419.
420.

T.AM. 9715004 (Dec. 16, 1996).
See supra not.e 285 and accompanying t.ext.
See supra not.e 363 and accompanying t.ext.
See supra not.es 313-318 and accompanying t.ext.
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The revenue agent argued that the utility should immedi
ately accrue at full face amount the gross income attributable to
the mandated rate increases that would occur over the 10-year
period. The utility argued that it should not be required to in
clude the future rate increases until it provided electricity at the
increased rates (sort of an "economic performance" argument on
the income side). The Service did (correctly, in my view) con
clude that the utility need not include the rate increases in in
come until received, but it did so not under the analysis dis
cussed here but under the rationale that it was not certain that
the rate increases would in fact be received. The contingency
that the Commissioner relied upon was that the utility was not
entitled to receive the mandated increase until it actually sold
electricity under the new rates to customers-even though those
sales were virtually certain to occur.
What if the rate increases had related to past sales of elec
tricity? The clear implication under the ruling's stated reasoning
is that the future rate increases, though not yet received, would
be accruable at full face amount in year 1 in that case. Revisit,
for example, Continental Tie & Lumber Co. v. United States. 421
The Continental Tie & Lumber Co. was a railway company that
was seized and operated by the United States government for a
period during WWI. Because Continental Tie & Lumber sus
tained a deficit in operating income during the period of federal
control (compared to a pre-WWI test period), the company was
eligible for a government payment of $25,000 under the Trans
portation Act of 1920. The amount of the $25,000 award was de
termined and paid in 1923, though the act pursuant to which it
was awarded was enacted in 1920. Continental Tie & Lumber,
an accrual basis taxpayer, argued that the award was not in
cludable until received in 1923, while the Commissioner argued
that the income accrued in 1920 when the act was passed.
Any expense deductions attributable to the income at issue
in Continental Tie & Lumber would have already been taken
prior to the year the described statute was enacted, as the
award related to past operations of the railway. Allowing the
taxpayer to defer the income accrual would thus not serve any
421. 286 U.S. 290 (1932); supra notes 309-311 and accompanying text (discussing
Justice Connor's reference to the case in her dissent in General Dynamics). See also
Georgia School-Book Depository v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 463 (1943) (requiring current
accrual, undiscounted to present value, of future receipt).
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"matching" of income with expenses under financial accounting
rhetoric. Yet, current accrual at full face value in 1920, undis
counted to present value, would still violate tax values. While
the Court had by this time already demonstrated a willingness
to deviate from financial accounting values in order to protect
tax values by delaying current accrual of future deductions
under the "contingent liability" out, 422 it had no problem with re
quiring Continental Tie & Lumber to accrue the 1923 award in
1920, undiscounted to present value. The Court concluded that
the filing for the award and actual calculation of the amount of
the award were only ministerial acts that did not prevent ac
crual of the income. 423 The Court failed to understand that the
tax distortion arose not only in the case of contingent liabilities
or income but with any significant time delay between even a
certain receipt or payment and the tax accounting of the item
(unless the item is perhaps so small as to render the tax distor
tion minimal). 424 Because the Court has failed to progress be
yond the contingency analysis in the modern era, 425 it is ex
tremely doubtful that Continental Tie & Lumber would come out
any differently today. The Technical Advice Memorandum, focus
ing on the future performance required in order to be entitled to
receive the gross receipt, further implies that this is the case.
3. Final Thoughts
What should be clear by now is that-at least with respect
to true gross receipts and true expense items-income is most
422. The first case blessing a deviation from financial accounting treatment, i.e.,
the matching principle, to accord with tax values was decided two years earlier. See Lu
cas v. American Code Co., 280 U.S. 445 (1930); supra notes 232-237 and accompanying
text (discussing case).
423. See 286 U.S. at 295.
424. Indeed, Professor Yin has pointed out to me that the implications of this argu
ment mean that the constructive receipt doctrine is perhaps unsound unless the acceler
ation is minimal. Viewed solely from the perspective of the cash basis recipient, immedi
ate inclusion at full face amount (as opposed to an amount discounted to present value)
would seem to overtax the recipient. Perhaps the answer lies in switching vantage
points to that of Professor Halperin. See infra notes 451-461 (describing Professor
Halperin's work). If the payor deducts the amount immediately, even though not yet
paid, we need to tax the recipient on the interest component (the amount equal to the
difference between the discounted present value and the full face amount) immediately
in order to ensure that the interest component does not fall through the cracks and es
cape taxation to anyone. I admit that I have to give further thought to this problem.
425. See supra notes 292-312 and accompanying text (discussing the Hughes
Properties and General Dynamics cases).
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clearly reflected for tax purposes when the items are accounted
for in the same year as actual receipt or actual payment under
our current realization-based tax system426 unless the amount
deducted or included is adjusted to take account of the time
value of the mismatch between the time of payment and the
time it is taken into account for tax purposes, as in the Ford
case, 427 at least if we limit our analysis to the individual tax
payer rather than to the tax base as a whole. 428 (If an advance
receipt is not really an advance gross receipt but a "loan" be
cause of the absolute obligation to repay to the transferor the
amount of the principal, then partial exclusion under the princi
ples of section 7872 accurately reflects income. Moreover, if ex
penses are prepaid, they are not really expenses but "capital ex
penditures" that require capitalization in order to protect the
income-tax value. 429) Tax accounting for a significant gross re
ceipts item or expense item in a year significantly separated
from the year of receipt or payment distorts income for tax pur
poses if it is accounted for at full face value. The matching prin
ciple from financial accounting that drives "accrual" of an item
in the financial accounting world simply has no place in decid
ing whether the tax accounting of an item clearly reflects in
come in the tax sense, in view of the very different roles, pur
poses, and effects that timing has in the financial accounting
and tax worlds.
Accrual accounting for true gross receipt and expense items
was imported into the tax accounting world solely for taxpayer
426. In an ideal system that does not incorporate the realization requirement, or
which works around it, deduction would occur when costs are "incurred: using the no
menclature of Professor Fellows. But the amount and timing of the deduction would take
into account the time value of money principles central to the observations made in this
Article, which assumes continuation of our current realization-based system. See Fel
lows, supra note 89, at 792-801 (discussing how future costs would be accounted for
under a system that does not presuppose realization). See generally Jeff Strnad, Perio
dicity and Accretion Taxation: Norms and Implementation, 99 YALE L.J. 1817 (1990) (dis
cussing implementation issues for an income tax system that rejects the realization
requirement).
427. See supra notes 313-318 and accompanying text.
428. See infra notes 452-482 and accompanying text (considering two-party
analysis).
429. See supra notes 81-125 and accompanying text (discussing why outlays that
produce substantial future benefits must be capitalized under an income tax rather than
be characterized as "expenses" that are immediately deductible); Williamson v. Commis
sioner, 37 T.C. 941 (1962) (requiring capitalization of prepaid rent); Commissioner v.
Boylston Mkt. Ass'n, 131 F.2d 966 (1st Cir. 1942) (requiring capitalization of prepaid in
surance premiums); Johnson, After INDOPCO, supra note 90, at 1332-34.
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ease. In the great majority of everyday items, the use of accrual
· accounting from the financial accountant's world should not dis
tort income in the tax sense simply because significant delays of
gross receipts or payments are likely the exceptions rather than
the rule in the real world. But when those exceptions arise, and
a significant amount of money or significant deferral is at stake,
tax values, such as the anti-tax-arbitrage value and the income
tax value, should take precedence, requiring either delay of tax
accounting until the year of receipt or payment or a modification
of the amount of inclusion or deduction to reflect the time value
of the time differential.
A full shift to cash accounting is not necessary to protect
tax values in those cases where they are at risk. For administra
tive ease, it is quite reasonable to start with the taxpayer's ac
crual books that are kept for financial accounting purposes,
making adjustments at the margins for those relatively few
items that threaten tax values. The economic performance re
quirement of section 461(h), while unnecessarily complex (in
that it should simply look to the later of accrual or payment),
serves to protect tax values in the premature deduction context.
On the accrual of future income side, a similar delay in accrual
(or discount to present value) should occur outside the de
minimis context for the same reasons, even though the statute
fails to provide for this result and taxpayers must argue within
the "contingency" pigeonhole fashioned by the Commissioner
and the courts to succeed in delayed inclusion. Prepaid gross re
ceipts, until addressed through regulations under section 7872,
should in most cases be includable upon receipt-regardless of
the certainty of the extent and time of the future performance
for which the receipts are received-with "loan" characterization
(and thus exclusion) available only in cases in which the recipi
ent pays market-rate interest to the payor of the advance re
ceipt cum loan.
This emphasis on the cash basis of accounting for gross re
ceipts and expense items as most clearly reflecting income in
the tax sense in order to protect the anti-tax-arbitrage value
and income-tax value may be perceived by some to be flatly in
consistent with both the Service's increased efforts to require
cash basis taxpayers to switch to accrual accounting and the
1986 enactment of statutory limitations on use of the cash basis
of accounting. A closer look at each development, however,
shows that each can be explained without any unspoken pre
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sumption that accrual accounting of gross receipt and expense
items more clearly reflects income-again, solely for tax pur
poses-than cash accounting.
Since at least 1957,430 Treasury regulations have provided
that "[i]n any case in which it is necessary to use an inventory
the accrual method of accounting must be used with regard to
purchases and sales . . . ."431 And since at least 1958,432 they
have also provided that a taxpayer must use inventory account
ing whenever "the production, purchase, or sale of merchandise
is an income-producing factor." 433 Inventory accounting must be
used if the taxpayer carries an inventory from year to year. In
that context, inventory accounting requires that assets in an in
ventory pool (and related expenses) be capitalized and not be de
preciable, since inventory is not used up in the current year to
produce gross income. The basis of the inventory, unreduced by
depreciation, offsets the gross receipts from the sale. As dis
cussed in part A, the use of inventories is necessary to clearly
reflect income in the tax sense whenever there is a pool of mer
chandise that is sold over time, as the basis of the pooled mer
chandise, maintained from year to year, should not be eligible
for depreciation over a multiyear ownership period. Allowing de
preciation of assets in pooled inventory carried from year to
year would violate the income-tax value. 434
Such concerns are not present, however, where no pools of
inventory are maintained. Yet, these same regulations have in
creasingly caused the Commissioner to challenge cash basis ac
counting by taxpayers who predominantly perform services for
their customers but also sell property to the customers in con
nection with the services performed. These taxpayers do not
maintain a multiyear inventory stock; rather, they purchase
430. See T.D. 6282, 22 Fed. Reg. 10,686 (Dec. 25, 1957).
431. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-l(c)(2)(i). Unlike the practice today, there was no preamble
to the regulations in the Federal Register containing an explanation of the reasoning be
hind them. The likely reason was sheer adherence to financial accounting practices. AB
noted earlier, inventory accounting in financial accounting is an example of the match
ing principle. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. Thus, the rest of the "matching
principle"-accrual accounting-was likely imported into the tax realm for the sake of
consistency. The use of inventory accounting for a pool of inventory maintained from
year to year can be can be seen, in the tax world, as necessary to protect the income-tax
value. See supra notes 139-147 and accompanying text.
432. See T.D. 6336, 23 Fed. Reg. 9,290 (Dec. 2, 1958).
433. Treas. Reg. § 1.471-1.
434. See supra notes 139-147 and accompanying text (discussing accounting for ro
tatable spare parts).
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(and resell) items to customers on an as-needed basis. In this
particular context, the Commissioner's desire to argue that the
taxpayer must use inventory accounting because property sales
constitute an income producing factor seems to be merely the
means to force the use of the accrual method. The Commissioner
wishes to force accrual in these cases because the taxpayers
have substantial accounts receivable that will be taken into in
come at an earlier time. In other words, the Commissioner's ac
tion in many of these cases seems to be purely revenue driven;
it does not seem to be based on grand theory.
For example, in Sheahan v. Commissioner, 435 the taxpayer
was a construction contractor whose principal business was com
mercial roofing repair. He had never used inventory accounting
for the roofing materials he used in his business or the accrual
method of accounting, either for financial accounting purposes
or tax purposes. The taxpayer did not maintain a supply of roof
ing materials. Rather, he inspected each job site and purchased
the materials as they were needed and used for each job. He
therefore deducted the materials and supplies purchased for
each roofing repair job in the year of purchase. Unused materi
als and supplies were usually returned to the supplier for credit,
though leftover materials and supplies from jobs for its principal
customer, Dow Chemical Co., were sometimes earmarked for
other jobs. Because it had no year-end inventory, the taxpayer
claimed that it need not use inventory accounting and thus need
not use the accrual method.
The Tax Court, however, agreed with the Commissioner,
reasoning that use of inventory accounting, and thus the accrual
method, was required "because ( 1) the taxpayer separately
stated the cost of the roofing materials on the invoice, (2) the
cost of the roofing materials represented a substantial amount
of the total invoice, and (3) the taxpayer added a 25 percent
markup to the invoiced cost of the roofing materials."436 The fact
435. 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2842 (1992). See also Independent Contracts, Inc. v. United
States, 94-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) Cfi 50,135, aff'd per curiam, 40 F.3d 390 (11th Cir. 1994); Wil
kinson-Beane, Inc. v. Commissioner, 420 F.2d 352 (lat Cir. 1970), aff'g 28 T.C.M. (CCH)
450 (1969); Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 743 F.2d 781 (11th ·Cir.
1984); Thompson Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 3045 (1995); Applied Com
munications, Inc. v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 1473 (1989); Surtronics, Inc. v. Com
missioner, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 99 (1985); Epic Metals Corp. v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M.
(CCH) 357 (1984); Magnon v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 980 (1980).
436. Nolan, supra note 15, at 1184.
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that the taxpayer maintained no year-end inventory and pur
chased materials only for particular jobs as they were required
was irrelevant to the court. The taxpayer's use of the cash
method did not produce substantially the same results as the
accrual method 437 because the taxpayer's business generated
substantial accounts receivable. The accumulation of a sizable
amount of accounts receivable convinced the Tax Court that the
taxpayer had "crossed the line."438 It is not clear what "line" was
crossed, since cash basis taxpayers may wait until the account
receivable is paid before reporting the gross receipt, no matter
how substantial the receivables.
Similarly, in Independent Contracts, Inc. v. United States, 439
the taxpayer was a heating and air conditioning subcontractor
that used the cash method of accounting for both financial ac
counting and tax purposes. The company bid to supply and in
stall heating and air conditioning units for a fixed price. It pur
chased the units as needed and had them shipped directly to the
installation site (and thus did not carry an inventory of units at
year end). The District Court noted that accounts receivables
were almost ten times the amount of accounts payable and that
over 50 percent of the gross receipts could be attributed to the
materials. The court concluded that, given the "uncertain area
such as presented here" and "the present state of the legal pre
cedent," the "Commissioner should be accorded great defer
ence."440 Thus, it sanctioned the Commissioner's switch from the
cash method to the accrual method.
The fact that these cases were revenue driven rather than
based in tax theory is revealed by the Tax Court's resort to the
matching principle to support its decision to force use of the ac
crual method. The Sheahan court expressly argued that the
problem with use of the cash method by the taxpayer was the
mismatching of income and costs to produce that income when
those costs are deducted in years prior to the taxable years in
437. The "substantial-identity-of-results• test, first articulated in Wilkinson-Beane,
Inc. 11. Commissioner, 420 F.2d 352, 356 (1970), provides that, if the cash method of ac
counting produces substantially identical results as the accrual method of accounting,
the .Commissioner has abused his discretion in requiring a switch from the cash to ac
crual method.
438. 63 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2847.
439. 94-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) CJ( 50,135 (N.D. Ala.), aff'd per curiam, 40 F.3d 390 (11th
Cir. 1994).
440. Id.
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which the income is received. 441 The court, implying something
amiss here, noted that "petitioner managed to defer income to a
later year while currently deducting costs incurred to generate
that income."442 With the unmasking of the matching principle
as a tax value, no reasoning supports the accelerated inclusion
at full face value of gross receipts not yet received. 443 We have
already seen how delaying deduction under section 461(h) of ex
penses that will not be paid until the future while requiring in
clusion of prepaid income clearly reflects income for tax pur
poses even as it mismatches receipts and expenses and thus
fails to reflect income clearly for financial accounting purposes.
This scenario is no different. The costs that were deducted were
supported by current outlays, i.e., represented a current loss in
wealth. 444 The future gross receipts were not yet in fact received
and including them at full face value overstates the wealth ac
cession and thus fails to reflect income clearly for tax purposes.
The Independent Contracts court failed to engage in any reason
ing at all, deciding the case wholly on faith in the Commis
sioner's judgment in an area in which the court clearly felt itself
inexpert. The drive for revenue by the Commissioner, and noth
ing more, appears to be at the heart of these cases.
441. 63 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2847.
442. Id.
443. Perhaps the Internal Revenue Service will be less likely to resort to the rheto
ric of the matching principle in these cash method cases in the courts after issuance of
TAM. 9723006 (Feb. 7, 1997). There, the Service ruled that "in the case of a service pro
vider that is not required to maintain inventories, the failure of the cash method to
match income and expenses may not be used as a basis for disallowing use of the cash
method.n The taxpayer at issue was a cash method personal service corporation that op
erated several medical clinics. The corporation's accounts receivables increased signifi
cantly in the years at issue, and the corporation reported net operating losses. The cor
poration's purchases of merchandise as well as materials and supplies (including office
supplies) amounted to less than 8% of its gross receipts for the challenged years. Be
cause the sale of merchandise, such as bandages and medicines, was not deemed to be
an income-producing factor, the taxpayer could not be shunted into the accrual method
via the inventory rule of the Regulations. See Treas. Reg. § l.446-l(c)(2)(i). The revenue
agent nevertheless argued that the accrual method was warranted because of the severe
mismatch between expense deductions and gross income inclusions. AB noted above, the
Service rejected that reasoning. Note, however, that if the sale of merchandise had con
tributed a large enough portion of the corporation's gross income to be deemed an in
come-producing factor, the clinic would have been bootstrapped into the accrual method
under the inventory rule-even if the clinic did not maintain inventories of the merchan
dise from year to year.
444. The outlays were not capital expenditures, where current deduction would vi
olate tax values. See supra notes 81-125 and accompanying text.
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That theory often fails to inform the courts thinking in this
area was also displayed in a case in which the taxpayer won. In
Galedrige Construction, Inc. v. Commissioner, 445 the taxpayer
was engaged in the business of asphalt paving and related ser
vices. It used the cash method of accounting. The Commissioner
argued that because the taxpayer sold asphalt in the course of
his business, he must use inventories and, therefore, the accrual
method of accounting. Like the taxpayers in Sheahan and Inde
pendent Contracts, the taxpayer did not maintain a store of the
item at issue. Rather, it purchased asphalt for each job from a
supplier and took it directly to the job site, where it had to be
laid within two to five hours before it became rock hard and
would have to be thrown away. The Tax Court admitted that the
taxpayer's argument, i.e., because it carried no inventory from
job to job it could not be required to use inventory accounting
and thus the accrual method, had "commonsense appeal."446 Yet,
the court declared that the failure to carry inventory was "not
dispositive"447 of whether the taxpayer must use inventory ac
counting. The court instead focused myopically on the meaning
of the term "merchandise" in Treas. Reg. § 1.471-1 and con
cluded that it excluded material that must be used within so
short a time before becoming worthless. In other words, the tax
payer won for an irrelevant reason. The taxpayers in Sheahan
and Independent Contracts had the unfortunate luck to install
material that would not become worthless if not installed
quickly. Such a distinction should have no relevance in the tax
analysis. The important point is that none of these taxpayers
carried an inventory but rather purchased materials as they
were needed for each job.
Congress also seems to have at least implied that the ac
crual method more accurately reflects income for tax purposes
when it reduced the number of taxpayers able to use the cash
method of accounting in 1986 by enacting section 448, which
prevents use of the cash method of accounting by most C corpo
rations,448 partnerships with C corporations as partners, and tax
445. 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2838 (1997).
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. Apparently, the strength of the farm lobby and the American Bar Association
succeeded in exceptions for farming businesses and "qualified personal service corpora·
tions," including incorporated law firms. See l.R.C. § 448(b), (d).
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shelters. One portion of the legislative history supports such a
view. The House Ways and Means Committee Report states:
The committee believes that the cash method frequently fails to
reflect accurately the economic results of a taxpayer's trade or
business over a taxable year.... [The cash method] may result in
the recognition of income and expense items without regard to
the taxable year in which the economic events giving rise to the
items occurred and, therefore, generally is not in accord with gen
erally accepted accounting principles. 449

The very next sentence, however, provides an alternative rea
son. "The cash method also produces a mismatching of income
and deductions when all parties to a transaction use different
methods of accounting."
This second sense of "matching" is distinct from the GAAP
sense focusing on a single taxpayer's reporting of related income
and expense items. Rather, it refers to the matching of inclu
sions and deductions of an item between two separate taxpayers
to a transaction. For example, a cash method taxpayer will not
include an item of gross income until received, while an accrual
basis payor of that same item may be able to deduct the item in
an earlier year as an expense. This sense of matching is wholly
irrelevant for financial accounting_ purposes, where a single
transaction can be reported in very different ways by the parties
to the transaction without offending GAAP. 450 This alternative
"matching principle" is discussed next in section D. Suffice it to
say here that this alternative notion of matching, based on pro
tecting the system-wide tax base, may have been the more im
portant impetus for narrowing the class of taxpayers eligible to
use the cash method of accounting. This might be particularly so
since so many tax lawyers and judges continued even in the
1980s (indeed, as we have seen, continue even today) to recite
unthinkingly that the matching principle of GAAP constitutes a
tax value. It would have been easy to throw that into the mix to
support a proposal whose primary rationale was more subtle.
While that rationale is theoretical, the reasoning is not one
based on the superiority of financial accrual accounting (and the
matching principle that is the defining force in financial accrual
accounting) but rather on the tax values that can be under
449. H.R REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 605 (1985).
450. See supra notes 57-76 and accompanying text (discussing development of
GAAP).
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mined with systematic mismatch between two taxpayers with
respect to the reporting of a given transfer between them. ·Ironi
cally, as we shall see, the tax values that support matching
among taxpayers are of the same genre that we have seen re
quire deviations from the financial accountant's matching princi
ple with respect to accounting for gross receipt and expense
items of a single taxpayer. So let us get to it.
D. TWO-PARTY MATCHING

1. In General
Unlike the matters discussed in previous parts, this part
does not focus on the matching of deductions and inclusions of a
single taxpayer in the same period, the focus of the accounting
profession's "matching principle." Rather, this part briefly con
siders the matching of inclusions and deductions required by the
Internal Revenue Code between two separate taxpayers in cer
tain contexts. A short survey of this distinctive tax "matching
principle" deepens our understanding of the notion that tax val
ues are independent of financial accounting values and must be
understood on their own terms.
For financial accounting purposes, a payment made from
one business to another may permissibly be deducted in year 1
by the payor even though it is not included by the payee until
year 2. Financial accounting, in other words, has no system
wide consistency; it is entirely an individualized enterprise that
focuses wholly on the business before it, without regard to how
other parties to a transaction will account for the same matter.
This makes perfect sense if we recall the raison d'etre of finan
cial accounting: to provide interested parties with useful infor
mation about the economic health of the particular business
under examination. There is no system-wide dollar value gained
or lost with inconsistent reporting; there are simply no system
wide consequences at all, as there is no larger "system" in the
same sense as in the system-wide tax base.
Because the calculation of "income" for tax purposes results
in the payment of dollars to the Treasury, there are system-wide
consequences when two parties to a transaction report the tim
ing of deductions and inclusions inconsistently: Investment in
come-disguised interest income-that should be taxed to some
one can fail to be taxed to anyone, thus reducing overall
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Treasury receipts. While not precisely the same as the income
tax value discussed in earlier sections, the tax value sought to
be protected by requiring consistent reporting smacks of the
same idea, but the focus is slightly different. The common fea
ture of these tax values is protection of the tax base, ensuring
that income that ought to be taxed under an income tax, even
though it would not be taxed under a consumption tax, does not
escape taxation. While the income-tax value focuses more on en
suring that income of a particular taxpayer does not escape tax
ation, the provisions considered here seek to ensure that income
does not fall through the cracks between taxpayers.
The clearest examples of two-party matching in the Internal
Revenue Code are contained in sections 83(h), 267(a)(2), and
404(a)(5). Each of these provisions delays deductions to accrual
basis taxpayers for future payments made to cash basis taxpay
ers until the year in which the payee includes the item in in
come. While section 267(a)(2) applies to taxpayers who are re
lated in some way, sections 83(h) and 404(a)(5) apply to
payments of unvested and deferred compensation, other than
under so-called qualified plans, whether or not the parties are
related. Thus, there appears to be a "matching principle" unique
to tax. But just as with instances when the one-party version of
the matching principle seemed to apply in the tax context, two
party matching is not itself an independent value; it is descrip
tive only. The underlying tax value at stake is one of ensuring
taxation of the investment income earned with respect to the
delayed payments, which could be accomplished in ways other
than matching, meaning that matching is descriptive only; the
real value is to ensure taxation of investment income to
someone.
Professor Daniel Halperin's pathbreaking work in the
1980s451 explores this phenomenon. 452 Consider his example453 of
451. See Halperin, Disguised Interest, supra note 89; Halperin, 1984, supra note
89.
452. See also Cunningham, supra note 269; Mary Louise Fellows, Future Costs Re
considered: A Reevaluation of IRC Section 461(h), 44 TAX NO'l'Es 1531 (Sept. 25, 1989);
Daniel I. Halperin & William A. Klein, Tux Accounting For Future Obligations: Basic
Principles Revised, 38 TAX NO'l'Es 831 (Feb. 22, 1988); William A. Klein, Tux Accounting
for Future Obligations: Basic Principles, 36 TAX NO'l'Es 623 (Aug. 10, 1987); Alvin C.
Warren, Jr., The Timing of Taus, 39 NAT'L TAX J. 499 (1986); Donald W. Kiefer, The Tux
Treatment of a •Reverse Investment": An Analysis of the Time Value of Money and the
Appropriate Tux Treatment of Future Costs, 26 TAX NO'l'Es 925 (Mar. 4, 1985).
453. See Halperin, 1984, supra note 89, at 753.
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Employee, who uses the cash method of accounting and who is
entitled to a $1,000 bonus in year 0. The bonus is withheld by
her accrual basis Employer for one year and invested to earn 10
percent interest before tax. Both Employee and Employer are
subject to a marginal tax rate of 40 percent.
Case 1 considers the outcome under current law. Under sec
tion 404(a)(5), Employer's deduction for the $1,000 bonus is
delayed until year 1 to match the timing of Employee's inclu
sion. Employer thus must pay tax on the $1,000 in year 0, leav
ing $600 to invest. After earning 10 percent interest, or $60,
and paying tax of $24, Employer retains $636. Because the en
tire payment to Employee is deductible (including the portion
representing the interest return), Employer can, with an out-of
pocket cost of only $636, pay more than that amount to Em
ployee. If Employer pays $1,060 to Employee, at a 40 percent
marginal rate, it will save $424 in tax, and the net cost will be
$636. Employee pays tax of $424 on receipt of the $1,060 and
retains $636.
As Professor Halperin notes, however, this result could be
obtained via a route other than delaying Employer's deduction
to match Employee's inclusion, as considered in Case 2. We
could allow Employer an immediate deduction of $1,000 in year
0, but prohibit Employer from deducting the interest credited to
the Employee on the deferred funds. In that case, the entire
$1,000 would be available for investment in year 0. It would
earn $100 before taxes, leaving $60 after taxes or a total ac
cumulation of $1060 to distribute to Employee, with no further
deduction of the $60 investment return on the distribution to
Employee. Employee would pay tax of $424 and retain $636
the same outcome as in Case 1.
The crux, then, is the taxation of the interest income earned
on the delayed payment, not matching per se. This fact is made
even more clear by considering Case 3, where Employer is al
lowed to accrue the deferred payment in year 0, as in Case 2,
but then is not taxed on the interest return. Because the $1,000
is deducted in year 0, the entire amount is invested and earns
$100, as in Case 2. But because the interest is not taxed to the
Employer, unlike Case 2, Employee can receive the full $1,100
in year 1. After paying tax of $440 Employee retains $660 after
tax (instead of only $636, as in Cases 1 and 2). In other words,
deferral of tax by the cash basis Employee would permit the
Employee to obtain an advantage equal to the benefit of a tax
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free return on reinvestment of the net, after-tax interest-unless
the payor bears an extra burden because of a delay in its deduc
tion. The effect of these sections is to tax the payee's investment
income on the deferred payment to the payor in order to ensure
that it does not escape taxation altogether.
As Professor Halperin wrote,
It is not, I believe, widely understood that the key factor in
[current law, Case 1] is not the deferral of [Employer's] deduction
but the fact that [Employer] had to pay tax on the $60 of invest
ment income. If it did not, it would have accumulated $660 which
would have permitted a distribution of $1,100 to [Employee] as in
Case [3] .... That is why the result in [current law, Case 1] can
be obtained even if [Employer] is permitted to accrue the $1,000
expense (as in Case [2]), as long as no further deduction [for the
interest income paid to Employee] is permitted.
These examples illustrate that timing of deduction and in
come may not be crucial if the amount is adjusted to account for
the advantage or disadvantage of delay or acceleration. [Em
ployer] can in effect be taxed on [Employee's] investment income
whether it is allowed to use the cash or accrual method for com
pensation as long as the accrued deduction is limited to the cash
paid, discounted at [Employee's] after-tax rate of return and no
further deduction is allowed. Thus in Case [2], [Employer's]
$1,000 deduction is equal to the present value of the actual pay
ment of $1,060 discounted at 6 percent, the after-tax rate of in
terest. The equivalence of these two approaches, not as yet noted
in the case of compensation, has been explicitly recognized by
Congress in connection with [§ 461(h)]. 454

The bottom line is that the underlying tax value that drives
matching in sections 83(h), 267(a)(2), and 404(a)(5) is ensuring
that the investment return on the delayed payment does not es
cape taxation, which could otherwise occur when cash basis tax
payers do business with accrual basis taxpayers. Indeed, this is
one reason why use of the cash method was restricted in 1986
to reduce the loss of tax revenue that occurs when investment
income escapes taxation in transfers between cash and accrual
taxpayers not covered by sections 83(h), 267(a)(2), and
404(a)(5). 455
454. Id. See infra notes 463-473 and accompanying text (discussing application of
these ideas to section 461(h) and the problem of premature accrual of future outlays).
455. See supra notes 449-451 and accompanying text.
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In sections 83(h), 267(a)(2), and 404(a)(5), the interest re
turn is taxed to the payor rather than the payee, even though
the payee might seem to be the true beneficiary of the interest,
as though the Employer were investing the Employee's deferred
compensation on her behalf. 456 But in other situations, as Profes
sor Halperin explains, Congress has chosen to tax the benefici
ary on the interest income. For example, revisit the treatment of
original issue discount (OID). 457 Earlier, I described the OID
rules as being premised on the realization requirement, as they
require inclusion by the payee of final, passage-of-time gains. An
alternative way to view the treatment of the OID rules is that
they, like sections 83(h), 267(a)(2), and 404(a)(5), ensure taxa
tion of the investment return on the delayed interest payments.
Under the paradigm established in sections 83(h), 267(a)(2), and
404(a)(5), the payor could have been taxed on the reinvested re
turns by requiring accrual basis payors to delay their interest
deductions until the cash basis payees included the interest in
income. Unlike that paradigm, however, the OID rules tax the
payee, instead of the payor, on those returns by requiring the
payee to include the interest in income as it accrues. 458
Reinforcing the notion that the true tax value at stake here
is ensuring that disguised interest is taxed as such is section
7872, which shares this goal with the above sections but
which-unlike those sections--does not involve the matching of
inclusions and deductions between taxpayers. Consider an inter
est-free demand loan by a corporation to its shareholder. Under
section 7872, the corporation/lender is considered to receive an
annual interest payment that is returned to the borrower/share
holder as a dividend. Because the deemed payment to the corpo
ration of interest is includable and the deemed payment of a
dividend to the shareholder is not deductible, section 7872
serves to capture the investment income earned by the corpora
tion that would otherwise escape the tax base. It thus has more
in common with the sections discussed above than is apparent
456. One problem with this kind of surrogate taxation is that the tax rates of the
two taxpayers might not be the same. "[M]atching cannot stop shifting investment in
come to exploit a difference in tax rates." Halperin, Disguised Interest, supra note 89, at
512. See generally Fellows, supra note 452, at 1532-37 (considering the limitations of
surrogate taxation in more detail).
457. See supra notes 126-129 and accompanying text.
458. See Halperin, 1984, supra note 89, at 755-56.
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on its face. 459
Full implementation of the ideas described here in order to
protect the system-wide tax base is unlikely. As Professor Char
lotte Crane has written:
Although arguably attractive as a means of preserving the reve
nue base, such a generalized implementation of the [the ideas un
derlying two-party matching] would likely be highly undesirable.
Transactions which appeared similar from the facts known to the
taxpayer would have different results. Thus, for most of the tax
law, the most obvious place to stop has been with the information
that is within the reach of the individual taxpayer. It is the ex
ception when we seek to relate a taxpayer's tax consequences
with those of another, and we are apt to do so only when the tax
payers have a special ongoing relationship, or when the treat
ment for both can be dictated in a single statute. As a conse
quence, we sacrifice our ability to obtain the appropriate
aggregate tax base in favor of obtaining the appropriate individ
ual tax base. We seem to be much more willing to tolerate errors
in the aggregate tax base than in the individual tax base. And so
we focus on those matches that are within the taxpayer's history,
rather than within the history of enhancement. 460

But the consideration of "systemic matching," as Professor Julie
A Roin calls it, can lead to more informed tax policy choices.
Though the process of matching is no panacea for all of the ills of
the tax system, it can advance tax policy goals by isolating
problems and the causes of perceived problems. Once isolated,
these situations can either be solved or accepted as inevitable
side-effects of some other tax policy decisions. Even more impor
tant, the failure to match often leads to the mistaken adoption of
false solutions to nonproblems, creating undesirable economic
distortions. 461

These latest insights have been extended to two issues discussed
earlier in this Article: the premature accrual of expenses to be
paid in the future and the inclusion of prepaid gross receipts.
Our understanding of the outcomes argued to be appropriate
earlier under an individual taxpayer analysis can be deepened
459. See id. at 757.
460. Charlotte Crane, Matching and the Income Tux Base: The Special Case of Tux
Exempt Income, 5 AM. J. TAX POL'y 191, 225-26 (1986).
461. Roin, supra note 405, at 814.
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by approaching these issues from the perspective of the aggre
gate system-wide tax base.
2. Premature Accrual of Future Expenses Revisited
Recall our accrual basis florist, who agreed to pay $100,000
in year 16 to settle the tort claims of his victim. 462 The all
events test with respect to the payment is satisfied in year 1,
yet a year-1 accrual of the $100,000 liability, even if consistent
with the financial accountant's matching principle, would allow
inappropriate tax arbitrage as well as violate the income-tax
value because it fails to account for the time value of money.
Section 461(h) thus requires the florist to delay his $100,000 de
duction until year 16. An economically equivalent alternative,
rejected by Congress in enacting section 461(h), would allow the
florist to take his deduction in year 1 but would require the
amount of the deduction to be discounted to its present cost us
ing an after-tax rate of return, which was only $31,524 under
the assumed facts of the hypothetical. 463
Professor Halperin identified an alternative justification for
section 461(h) premised on the ideas discussed in subpart 1.
above. Section 461(h) "can be viewed as deferring the payor's de
duction not only to eliminate an unwarranted advantage to the
payor, but also to tax the payor on investment income when it
appears to be the only means of subjecting such income to
tax."464 Consider his example, comparable to our florist example.
In settlement of a lawsuit brought by F, E has agreed to
make a payment to F, three years hence, of $1,331 in lieu of a
current payment of $1,000. If E is not taxable on investment
earnings, it should be able to meet its obligation by setting aside
$1,000 today. This result can be achieved if E is permitted a de
duction of $1,000 currently (the present value of its $1,331 obliga
tion discounted at the pre-tax interest rate of 10 percent) and ad
ditional deductions for each year's interest. If 10 percent is
earned on the accumulated funds, the deduction for interest
would be $100 for the first year, $110 the second year, and $121
the third, or a total of $331. An immediate deduction of $1,331
more than offsets the tax on $331 of expected future earnings and
462. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
463. See id..
464. Halperin, 1984, supra note 89, at 759.
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reduces E's burden below $1,000.465

If we focus solely on E, then, a present deduction of $1,331 is in

appropriate, as it would effectively allow E "not just to avoid tax
on investment income which it is receiving but which is accru
ing to the benefit of the payee, but also to take an up-front de
duction to offset investment income to be earned in the fu
ture."466 But he goes on to consider a point not considered
earlier: that the proper treatment of E perhaps cannot be con
sidered without considering the treatment of F.
If F were to receive the $1,000 immediately, F would be
taxed on the $331 of interest income that would be earned in
the following three years. Suppose, however, that F is an ac
crual basis taxpayer and is required to accrue $1,331 immedi
ately upon the settlement even though the amount is not to be
received until year 3. 467 In that case, he is paying tax in year 1
on investment income that will not be earned until the future.
Professor Halperin posits that "[i]t may be reasonable to offset
this disadvantage by granting a corresponding advantage to
E,"468 though he concludes that it would be preferable to dis
count both the deduction and inclusion.
Now suppose that Fis a cash basis taxpayer. Then we are
suddenly back in the paradigm of sections 83(h), 267(a)(2), and
404(a)(5): We have a deferred payment between an accrual basis
payor and a cash basis payee. To ensure taxation of the invest
ment income earned on the deferred payment, we have several
choices. We can tax F currently, as cash basis payees are taxed
currently under the OID rules, 469 and allow E to avoid tax on
the investment income by allowing a year-1 deduction of $1,000
(the $1,331 future payment discounted to present cost using the
10 percent before-tax rate of return) as well as annual deduc
tions for the accrued interest. 470 Or we can tax E on the invest
ment income as a surrogate. That can be accomplished either by
requiring two-party matching regarding the deduction and inclu
465. Id.
466. Id.
467. See supra notes 415-426 and accompanying text (arguing that if we approach
this issue on the basis of individual taxpayers, as we have prior to this most recent
thinking, then accrual basis taxpayers should be able to reduce to present value their in
come inclusions if the income is not to be received until the future).
468. Halperin, 1984, supra note 89, at 759.
469. See supra notes 126-129 and accompanying text.
470. See Halperin, 1984, supra note 89, at 760.
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sion by deferring E's deduction to match the timing of Fs inclu
sion, as in sections 83(h), 267(a)(2), and 404(a)(5), or allowing E
an immediate deduction but only for the present value of the fu
ture payment discounted at the after-tax rate of return and al
lowing no further deduction. 471 Even though surrogate taxation
clearly is problematic when the two taxpayers are not in the
same tax bracket, Congress chose it, 472 and Congress chose to
implement it in section 461(h) through the deferral method
rather than the discount method-in all cases, even when the
payee is an accrual basis taxpayer that must (inappropriately)
accrue the $1,331 payment in year 1 without discounting it to
present value.
3. Prepaid Gross Receipts Revisited
Recall the treatment of the receipt of gross receipts by an
accrual basis taxpayer in a year prior to the corresponding de
livery of goods or services. With some exceptions, the recipient
must include the receipt in gross income in the year of receipt,
even though the receipt is not yet "earned" for financial account
ing purposes and thus would not be included in the year of re
ceipt under the matching principal.473 When viewed from the in
dividualized perspective of the recipient taxpayer, deferral
would allow just the kind of time value of money abuse that is
inherent in immediate undiscounted deduction of future ex
penses. The correctness of requiring immediate inclusion can be
buttressed by the ideas discussed in this part, which considers
the taxation of the other party to the transaction. Failure to tax
471. See supra notes 454-459 and accompanying text.
472. One reason why Congress might have chosen surrogate taxation is that it is
not always possible to identify who the payee will be at the time the investment income
is earned. There sometimes is no current F that could be truced, meaning that the in·
vestment income would escape trutation if E is not truced. Examples include the costs as
sociated with nuclear power plant decommissioning or mine reclamation. (On the other
hand, perhaps this is the kind of "income" that should not be taxed to anyone. See
Halperin, Disguised Interest, supra note 89, at 529.) Professor Halperin gives an addi
tional example of a doctor who self-insures.
Doctor G performs 1,000 operations per year. He knows that one patient is
likely to sue successfully for malpractice. Deciding to self-insure, he sets aside
$100x out of his current income. Who should be truced on the income earned on
that fund? The doctor, the injured patient who is as yet unknown, all patients, no
one? The addition of insurance adds yet another element but no clear answer.
Halperin, 1984, supra note 89, at 761. For a discussion of the insurance wrinkle, see
Halperin, Disguised Interest, supra note 89, at 527.
473. See supra notes 319-414 and accompanying text.

1998]

THE MYTH OF MATCHING

161

the recipient immediately can result in investment income slip
ping through the cracks and being taxed to no one.
Suppose, for example, that C contracts with D for D to per
form services in the future, and C prepays for the services to be
rendered. Since D can earn an investment return on the prepay
ment, she should be willing to charge a lower price to C than
would be the case without the prepayment. The prepayment by
C can thus be reconceptualized as a loan to D coupled with the
transfer of the purchase price of the goods or services. C thus
earns "interest," which could, if Congress chose, be taxed to C
under rules similar to the OID rules.
For example, suppose C transfers $100 to D on December 31,
[1996], and D promises to provide a service on December 31,
[1997]. [With a 10% rate of return, t]he transaction can be
treated as a loan from C to D of $100 with $110 payable at ma
turity. On the due date, December 31, [1997], the parties can be
viewed as making reciprocal payments, D transferring $110 to C
in payment of the loan plus interest and C paying $110 to D for
services rendered. If the prepayment were for a longer period,
then the OID rules could be used to accrue interest annually. 474

Current law, however, does not require the taxation of interest

to C. And the only way it can be taxed to D as a surrogate, in
order to ensure that it does not escape taxation altogether, is to
require D to include the prepayment in income upon receipt.
An equivalent extra burden on the payee would occur if D
were subject to tax at the same rate as C and D were taxed on
the investment income accrued to C. If this were true, then D
would give C credit only for an after-tax rate of return indirectly
exposing C to tax. D is, in form, taxable on the earnings it re
ceives when it invests a prepayment. Thus, in the above example,
D would earn $10 of interest on the $100 it received on December
31, [1996]. However, if D is performing services worth $110 on
December 31, [1997], taxation at that point on the original $100,
plus $10 of interest, merely reflects the correct treatment of D. In
order to place the burden of the tax on investment income on D,
it must be taxed on the original $100 at the point of receipt. 476

Recall from the discussion of capital expenditures that if D is
not taxed on the $100 on receipt, then even though the interest
received on the investment is nominally taxed to D it is effec
474. Halperin, 1984, supra note 89, at 758.
475. Id. (footnoted omitted).
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tively exempt from tax, contrary to the income-tax value. 476
4.

Final Thoughts

The two-party analysis discussed in this part is the latest
and most sophisticated example of how tax values are indepen
dent of financial accounting values, particularly the matching
principle. The two-party matching analysis has no counterpart
in financial accounting, yet it is merely a more refined applica
tion of tax principles pioneered earlier in the context of one
party analysis. The analysis described here evolved out of the
increasing appreciation of time value of money principles, and
those prineiples revealed the inappropriateness of the financial
accountant's matching principle in the world of tax. That is, tax
values seek to protect the tax base of "income," which is a con
struct independent of financial accounting but, unfortunately,
shares a nomenclature with financial accounting. As this part
exemplifies most tellingly, tax values are different not just in
degree but in kind from financial accounting values.
Some commentators have argued for extension of the analy
sis described in this part to other contexts. 477 In the meantime,
however, courts should strive to further understanding of the
tax values discussed here by openly focusing on them and being
informed by them when deciding cases under Code sections al
ready implementing them. An example is the controversial case
of Albertson's, Inc. v. Commissioner, which the Ninth Circuit
476. See supra notes 81-125 and accompanying text. An alternative method of en
suring taxation of the investment income would be available if C's payment is of a de
ductible expense. "If C is prepaying for a deductible item, he should be allowed a deduc
tion of $110 in [1997] and be charged with $10 of interest income at that time. If,
despite payment in [1996], C's deduction were delayed until [1997], when the services
are performed, and limited to the amount paid, $100, the net result would be correct."
Halperin, 1984, supra note 89, at 758. Cash basis taxpayers, however, are allowed to de
duct expenses when paid, and not all prepayments are of deductible expenses in any
event. Nevertheless, if D includes the prepayment in income upon receipt and C's pay
ment is a deductible expense that may not be deducted until economic performance
under section 461(h), the investment income will be truced twice to each party under this
analysis. See Halperin, Disguised Interest, supra note 89, at 518.
477. See, e.g., Y"m, supra note 89, at 480-90 (encouraging Treasury to issue regula
tions under section 7872 to cover the fact situation encountered in Indianapolis Power &
Light); Halperin, Disguised Interest, supra note 89 at 539-50 (proposing a special true on
the investment income of nonqualified deferred compensation since surrogate taxation
fails when the employer is true exempt or has net operating losses); Fellows, supra note
452, at 1539-41 (advocating an alternative to section 461(h) to take account of the limi
tations in surrogate taxation).
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first decided in favor of the taxpayer. 478 Because of the ensuing
uproar over its decision, however, it vacated that decision and
granted a rehearing, 479 subsequently deciding the case against
the taxpayer. 480
Albertson's had nonqualified deferred compensation agree
ments with some of its executives and directors that were sub
ject to the deferred deduction rule in section 404(a)(5). The
agreements provided that an interest-like component would be
added to the deferred compensation to compensate the recipi
ents for tlie time value of the deferral. Albertson's argued that,
although the compensation itself was not deductible until paid
to the cash basis recipients, the interest-like component was not
subject to the deduction deferral rule of section 404(a)(5) but
rather was deductible as it accrued. The interest-like component
was not included in the recipient's income until received. Thus,
unless deduction of the interest-like component was deferred,
that investment return would escape taxation entirely, a result
anathema to the income-tax value.
AB I argued elsewhere:
One can envision three approaches to this issue of statutory
interpretation. Under an ultimate purpose approach, the inter
preter would first try to identify the ultimate purpose of delayed
deduction in section 404(a)(5) for nonqualified plans and would
then ask whether deductions for accruals of the interest-like com
ponent would be inconsistent with that purpose. This was the ap
proach taken by the Ninth Circuit in its final decision, which held
the accruals nondeductible until paid. The court believed that the
ultimate purpose of delaying the employer deduction under non
qualified plans, while allowing immediate deductions for contribu
tions to qualified plans, was to encourage the use of qualified
plans, which must satisfy complex minimum funding, participa
tion, and vesting requirements and avoid discrimination in favor
of highly compensated individuals. If substantial amounts could
be deducted before inclusion by the employees in the case of a
nonqualified plan, the court reasoned, the ultimate purpose of
section 404(a)(5) would be frustrated. Thus, the deduction was
denied.
478.
479.
the case,
480.

38 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 1993).
12 F.3d 1259 (9th Cir. 1994). For a listing of the exhaustive commentary on
see Geier, Purpose, supra note 17, at 527 n.81.
42 F.3d 537 (9th Cir. 1994).
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Since section 404(a)(5) disallows immediate deduction only of
"compensation," a literal textualist, such as Justice Scalia, would
look up the word "compensation" in the dictionary, finding that it
means payments for services rendered. An adherent of this ap
proach would likely conclude that accruals of the interest-like
component were deductible because this component compensates
for the time value of the deferral in payment of compensation, not
for the services rendered. This approach was, essentially, the one
taken by the Ninth Circuit in its first decision in the case.
There is yet a third approach. In my world ..., the court
would have disallowed the deduction by using what I call a struc
tural analysis. The statute's immediate implementive purpose . . .
is to defer the employer deduction for amounts paid to employees
under a nonqualified plan until the employees are taxed on these
amounts. That is, it creates a matching regime [in order to pro
tect the taxation of the interest-like component.] That structural
aspect . . . would be frustrated by allowing a deduction for an in
terest-like component before those amounts were paid to the em
ployees and included in their income....48 1

IV.

CONCLUSION

We tax professors have a hard enough time trying to con
vince our beginning tax students that tax law is not about fi
nancial accounting. 482 It is time we made a more concerted effort
toward spreading that message to the bench and bar by fully de
bunking the myth that "matching" income and related deduc
tions in the same accounting period is as much a value in the
income tax as it is in financial accounting. While the Internal
Revenue Code does indeed seem on the surface to require
matching-and requires a departure from matching-in numer
ous contexts, each of these provisions can be better explained by
the true tax value that underlies it. Matching has no indepen
dent tax value, even though it is central to financial accounting.
It is at best merely descriptive in those contexts that require
matching in order to implement tax values, but the tax values
themselves are what is important. At its worst, continued reli
ance on the rhetoric of matching-rather than the anti-tax arbi
trage value and the income-tax value-leads to weak and hap
481. Geier, Purpose, supra note 17, at 518-19.
482. See DODGE ET AL., supra note 20, at 1-2 (discussing "common myths regarding
tax law and the study of tax law"). See also supra text accompanying note 1.
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hazard decisionmaking that often focuses on factors that should
be irrelevant if the issue were properly understood.
Only relatively recently-about the last fifteen to twenty
years-have the tax values described here become widely under
stood in academia and generated statutory amendment. The
rhetoric in judicial opinions, built on prior case language de
cided in eras with little understanding of these values, has often
failed to keep pace. Even administrative guidance from the In
ternal Revenue Service often fails to spread popular understand
ing of these values, as it tends to announce results without
much discussion of them or, at the least, to r.estrict the discus
sion to beside the point constraints of earlier guidance and deci
sions. One is extremely hard pressed to find a single judicial
opinion or piece of administrative guidance that forthrightly re
lies on the intellectual history recounted here and explicitly
talks about the real tax values at stake beneath the various
"tests" developed in various contexts. 483 Very few indeed are will
ing to jettison the rhetoric of time worn "tests" created genera
tions earlier. We are often reduced, through the perpetuation of
such rhetoric, to fashioning our arguments to the deci
sionmakers in what should be recognized as truly irrelevant
terms, helping to solidify these red herrings ever more stub
bornly in the legal landscape. We have to dance around what ac
tually should be front and center in the analysis simply because
the constructs of the "acceptable" arguments were fashioned in
times in which the tax values that are truly at stake were
poorly understood. We sometimes-perhaps even often-reach
the right results in these situations, but we miss chance after
chance of developing widespread understanding and coherence
in the development of the law through explicit examination of
the real tax values. As Professor William A Klein strongly put
it:
What is there about the legal system that leads judges at the
highest level, with the finest support from the smartest and best
trained of clerks and the elite players in the adversary system, to
demonstrate such ignorance of, or disdain for, sound tax princi
ples-principles that, once recognized, should be non
controversial?484
483. I am thinking of such tests as the all events test in accrual accounting and
the repair vs. permanent improvement test in the capital expenditure area.
484. William A. Klein, Thilor to the Emperor With No Clothes: The Supreme Court's
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The concept of stare decisis should not be construed as one of
stagnating reliance on the well-intended but poorly informed su
perficialities of prior opinions.
My hope in this Article is to trace the historical develop
ment of thought in this area in a single, easily accessible piece
and, in so doing, to articulate explicitly how the matching prin
ciple is diametrically opposed to fundamental tax values in some
contexts and provides no independent tax value in any other.
Simply put, matching has nothing to do with the values sought
to be protected in an income tax. My ultimate hope is that this
Article will encourage explicit recognition by judges (and jus
tices) and practitioners of the true tax values that underlie the
provisions and doctrines discussed here and that should be
center stage in modern day tax analysis.

Tux Rules for Deposits and Advance Payments, 41 U.C.LA L. REv. 1685, 1688 (1994).
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